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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 September 2010
When the Proslogion is read from within the context of Anselm's De Veritate it seems that Anselm's project is firmly based on theological premises. Anselm works with a two-fold conception of truth. Truth is first of all a quality inherent in the statement itself. It is the correctness (rectitudo) of the statement. Second, truth is the correspondence with the extra-linguistic reality. This second level of truth is accidental to the statement. What provides the link between extra-linguistic reality and the statement is the Word of God, which is the level of true reference, where original statements correspond to the original will of God in the creation. When Plato asks what true knowledge is in the Theatetus, the final answer seems to be that what is needed is a statement which carries its own truth as a certainty of Being and Unity within itself. However, no such statement is presented in the dialogue. The name of God in the Proslogion is such a statement which carries its own truth as a certainty of Being and Unity within itself, in that on the first level of truth (rectituto) it is impossible to deny. As the statement concerns the Being of God and cannot be denied it necessarily overflows into the second level of truth which is correspondence with extra-linguistic reality. Therefore, this article argues that Anselm develops a statement which fulfils the criterion of true knowledge presented in the Theatetus. He manages to do this from the position of faith, which includes a strict theological rationality.
1 Here I would like to refer to Nielsen's, Bent FlemmingDie Rationalität der Offenbarungsteologi (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. His insightful interpretation of Karl Barth's reading of Anselm's Proslogion has inspired the following article.
2 Barth, Karl, Anselm: Fides quaerens Intellectum (London: SCM Press, 1960), p. 16Google Scholar.
3 Barth, Karl, The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 8Google Scholar.
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5 Davies, Brian, ‘Anselm and the Ontological Argument’, in Davies, Brian and Leftow, Brian (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 158CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Gareth Matthews, ‘Anselm Augustine, and Platonism’, ibid., p. 62.
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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 86.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 87.
22 Ibid., p. 96.
23 One might note that ‘non est possible naturam aeternitatis pluralitatem admittere’ (EDIV, ch. 15), which again points to the absolute principle of Unity and its connection with intelligibility, which is constantly at work within the Platonic tradition. As Anselm notes: ‘Aeternitates autem plures intelligi nequeunt’ (EDIV, ch. 15).
24 Hopkins, Jasper and Richardson, Herbert, Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 14Google Scholar.
25 King, ‘Anselm's Philosophy of Language’, p. 101.
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27 Hopkins and Richardson, Truth, Freedom, and Evil, p. 14.
28 King, ‘Anselm's Philosophy of Language’, p. 103.
29 Russell, Bertrand, ‘General Propositions and Existence’, from The Many-Faced Argument, ed. Hick, John and McGill, Arthur C. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 220Google Scholar.
30 Ibid., p. 223.
31 Barth, Anselm: Fides quarens Intellectum, p. 73.
32 Davies, ‘Anselm and the Ontological Argument’, p. 159.
33 Ibid., p. 161.
34 Visser, Sandra and Williams, Thomas, ‘Anselm on Truth’, in Davies, Brian and Leftow, Brian (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 219Google Scholar.