This essay argues that a prime source of contemporary technological pessimism is the loss of place that accompanied the conquest of space through the construction of large technological systems of transportation and communication. This loss may involve physical destruction, or it may involve the more subtle withdrawal of economic, political, and cultural meaning and power from localities in favor of these far-flung systems.

The argument proceeds in five stages. First, key terms are defined, notably “environmental damage” and “technological system.” Second, the origins of the modern ideology of circulation are traced in the development of a capitalist world-economy, and in the historical theories of Enlightenment philosophes (with special attention to Turgot and Condorcet). Third, possible relations between that ideology and nineteenth-century systems-building are briefly sketched. Fourth, the ambiguous political character of these systems — at once liberating and constraining — is noted. Finally, the cultural challenge of overcoming spatial alienation is described with reference to some late nineteenth-century writers who sought to trace new pathways both spatially and linguistically.

This paper deals with the achievements of those French mathematicians active in the period 1800–1830 who oriented their work specifically around the needs of engineering and technology. In addition to a review of their achievements, the principal organizations and institutions are noted, as is their importance as sources of employment and influence.

The argument is centered on the word ‘neglected“ in the title. A case is made that a mass of work was produced which made considerable impact at the time but has been overlooked or even completely ignored by historians since. The paper begins with a general discussion of the notion of context, both for the historical figures and for their supposed historians, and several examples of historical distortion are given.

Regarding France itself, we see a professional and research profile rather different from that in other countries. The question of national differences in the organization and prosecution of science is thereby sharply exposed.

A scientific work presupposes a body of texts that are a condition for its intelligibility. This paper shows that the study of intertextual reference — of the ways a text indicates its relation to other texts — provides a fruitful perspective in the study of science that deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. The paper examines intertextual reference in early nineteenth-century mathematics, first surveying a variety of mathematical texts in the period and then examining in detail W.R. Hamilton's work on quaternions.

Three questions are addressed: (1) What forms of intertextual reference are employed? (2) What is the range of intertextual reference? (3) What are the functions of intertextual reference? The answers to the first two questions provide an unexplored perspective on the institutional changes in science during the period. The transitional status of the period in the development of later professional science is reflected in the relative openness in the forms of intertextual reference employed and the range of texts to which reference was made. In virtue of these features the period is particularly fruitful in the study of the functions of intertextual reference. With some major qualifications, the paper defends a Mertonian view that intertextual reference needs to be understood in terms of the claim to intellectual property rights.

The development of modern mathematical biology took place in the 1920s in three main directions: population dynamics, population genetics, and mathematical theory of epidemics. This paper focuses on the first trend which is considered the most significant. Modern mathematical theory of population dynamics is characterized by three aspects (the first two being in a somewhat critical relationship): the emergence of the mathematical modeling approach, the attempt at establishing it in a reductionist-mechanist conceptual framework, and the revival of Darwinism. The first section is devoted to the analysis of the concept of mathematical model and the second one presents an example of a mathematical model (Van der Pol's model of heartbeat) which is a good prototype of that concept. In section 3 the main trends of mathematization of biology and the cultural and scientific contexts in which they found their development are discussed. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the contributions of V. Volterra and A. J. Lotka, to the analysis of the differences of their scientific conceptions, and to a discussion of a case study: the priority dispute concerning the discovery of the Volterra-Lotka equations. The historical analysis developed in this paper is also intended to detect the roots of some recent trends of mathematization of biology.

This paper charts eighteenth-century chemistry's transition from its definition as an art to its proclaimed status as a science. Both the general concept of art and specific practices of eighteenth-century chemists are explored to account for this transition. As a disciplined activity, art orients practitioners' attention toward particular directions and away from others, providing a structured space of possibilities within which their discipline develops. Consequently, while chemists throughout the eighteenth century aspired to reveal nature's “true voice,” the path of their investigations was directed by and toward their laboratory manipulations. So long as the chemical community maintained an ethos of polite cooperation and eschewed theoretical wrangling, this point was hidden by a rhetoric of “matter of fact” reporting. But as “facts” mounted in the 1770s and 1780s, especially in pneumatic chemistry, cooperation gave way to contention as chemists sought to name and organize their findings without the guidance of a communally accepted “natural” system. Lavoisier and his fellow “new” chemists offered a forceful solution to this dilemma by introducing a revolutionary network of theories, nomenclature, and instruments that unabashedly fused the productive manipulation of their laboratory work with what they claimed as the structure and activity of nature.

The thesis of the paper is that there is no “abuse” of science as suggested by the legend of Galileo but only a mutual opportunism characterizing the relation between science and politics.

Any scientific research depends on the accessibility of its subject matter, plus material resources. The absence of internal constraints, the hunger for novelty, translate into a powerful drive to secure both. The coupling between science and politics in our time is based on a mutual dependence: resources and accessibility are exchanged for solutions to problems and legitimation.

Scientific disciplines are highly sensitive to their environments with respect to the possibilities of extending their power of definition and of thereby obtaining resources. The ability of the sciences to expand their power of definition depends on the political “context of relevance.” The context, such as a socialist or fascist ideology, selects against certain sciences. But for a government to be able to favor one school at the expense of another there have to be competing factions within science, and their conflict has to be to some extent unresolved.

Modern democratic systems differ from totalitarian ones insofar as their interest in science is ideologically vague and primarily economic in nature. This does not mean that the same mechanisms of mutual utilization do not operate.

Starting from the thesis that a science constructs the knowledge of the part of the world allotted to it, the present paper aims at bringing together all the various aspects of physics (structural, epistemic, historical, social) under a unified conceptual framework — that provided by the Marxian concept “mode of production.” After an introduction providing the initial plausibility grounds for the undertaking, the concept is analyzed into its conceptual elements in Part I of the paper. The analysis presents the reconstruction initiated by Louis Althusser and developed by his followers. Part II starts from a characterization of physical problems. This offers a basis for “reading” physics in the terms introduced in Part I. The rest of Part II is devoted to the identification of all the aspects of physics with the conceptual elements in question. The paper aims at three things: to uncover the connections holding among seemingly disparate aspects of physics, usually discussed in almost total independence from each other; to take full account of the social dimensions of physics without vindicating social constructivism; to show that the boundaries separating the disciplines of philosophy, history and sociology of science are more arbitrary than usually considered.

The political changes in Czechoslovakia and in other Eastern European countries in 1989 are closely related to Jan Patoĉka's philosophy. He was one of the first speakers for the human rights manifesto “Charta 77” and died following his political interrogations in 1978. Vàclav Havel, the president of the ĉSFR, was one of his students. Patoĉka's philosophy is sketched here following his interpretation of Comenius, beginning with an early work of 1932 and until his interpretation of Comenius' The Paradise of the World and the Labyrinth of the Heart in his book Die Philosophic der Erziehung des J. A. Comenius (1970) (J. A. Comenius' Philosophy of Education).

As a phenomenologist who transcends both Husserl and Heidegger, Patoĉka's conflict with the political system of his country was inevitable. The regime could not put up with his thesis on the “open soul” which, due to its existential openness, can hear the “call of conscience.” Behind this thesis stands Patocka's teaching of the three movements of existence. And out of this follows his “Education of the Turning.” Patoĉka's theory of education leads straight to some nondogmatic conceptions of education such as the “Communication Pedagogics” which dates back to the dialogical education of Martin Buber.