The thesis of this paper is that there are three basic processes by which a technological innovation is fitted into an existing culture: (1) Rejection, in situations where all interested groups are satisfied with a traditional technology and reject apparently superior innovations because they would force unwanted changes in technology and ideology; (2) Acceptance, in situations where a new technology is embraced by all because it appears to serve the same social and ideological functions as an inferior, or inoperative, traditional technology; and (3) — most commonly in complex societies — conflict over acceptance or rejection, in situations where a new technology introduced or proposed by one group, who perceive it as advancing their interests, is resisted by another group, who perceive it as threatening their welfare. A traditional tripartite concept of culture is employed, distinguishing technology, social organization, and ideology. Four case studies are introduced to illuminate the issue: the Thonga tribesmen of Mozambique, whose occupation as gold and diamond miners at first suited perfectly the requirements of the Thonga lineage and marriage system; the Yir Yoront of Australia, an aboriginal group who found that the steel axe introduced by whites disrupted the patriarchal status system and confounded their mythology; the Senecas, an American Indian tribe that for generations rejected male plow agriculture because their way of life was organized around female horticulture, but who took up male agriculture at the urging of a prophet when traditional male roles disintegrated on the reservation; and the anthracite miners and mine operators of nineteenth-century Pennsylvania, who discovered that fundamental changes in both social organization and ideology were needed in order to cope with catastrophically high rates of industrial accidents attendant on the new system of deep-shaft mining.

The purpose of this essay is revisionist on two counts: first, that the American colonies and early United States republic kept pace with Great Britain in reaching a relatively advanced stage of industrialization by the early nineteenth century and second, that the Middle Atlantic States shared equally with New England the innovative role in creating America's industrial revolution. In both cases the industrial leaders achieved their preeminence by different routes. By concentrating on the importance of the sources of machine power as the defining characteristic of industrialism, scholars have overlooked alternative paths to industrial change. In Britain steam power and the textile industry were the foundations of an industrial revolution. But in American colonies the use of water power and the growth of industries such as woodworking and building led to an equally revolutionary change in the production of machine-made products. Benign geography in colonial America provided abundant wood and water power and an excellent transportation system based on navigable rivers and a hospitable coastline. But the crucial factors were cultural: the compelling urge to do things with less human work, the open reception to new immigration, a younger and more venturesome population, a favorable legal and fiscal environment for enterpreneurs. In the American context the tendency of scholars to emphasize the leadership of New England was largely a result of the greater local availability of manufacturing records. But recent research has demonstrated that Philadelphia, the largest port of entry in the eighteenth century, was quite naturally a center of innovation in construction materials, woodworking machinery and shipbuilding to meet the needs of the expanding agricultural hinterland and the coastal trade. In sum, the values of an expanding, youthful, skilled population replenished by fresh and venturesome sources from abroad helped shape cultural values that were particularly favorable in the geographic environment of North America for alternative paths of rapid industrial growth.

The question posed by this paper is why the Russian autocracy failed to pursue successfully Peter the Great's conscious policy of creating a society dominated by technique and competitive with technological levels achieved by Western Europe. The brief answer is that Peter's idea of a cultural revolution that would create new values and institutions hospitable to the introduction of technology clashed with powerful interests within society. The political opposition centered around three groups which were indispensable to the state in fulfilling his vision: the nobility, the clergy, and the scientific establishment. Peter's original intention was to combine theoretical models and technology transfer from the West with educational reforms in Russia to produce new cadres of technical specialists. He attempted to adapt the Leibniz-Wolff cosmology to Russian conditions in order to reconcile ideological conflicts between military service and technical training, science and religion, theory and practice. The embodiment of his ideas in Russian science and religion were Mikhail Lomonosov and Feofan Prokopovich. Under his successors Peter's supporters encountered increased resistance: from the nobility to technical education, from the clergy to the scientific outlook, and from the Academy of Sciences to practical work. All three interest groups were willing to sacrifice real political rights for a recognition by the states of their autonomy to define their social roles. In the end the compromise was effected at the expense of Peter's ideal of the society dominated by technique.

As the American economy became more complex and differentiated in the post-1850 decades, so too did the demand for manufactured products, creating wide markets for both mass-produced standard goods and batch-produced specialties among consumers and producers alike. These developments conditioned the emergence of distinctive work cultures within the two broad spheres of manufacturing, as well as distinct approaches to technological selection and use, labor, marketing, and management. As the mass production dynamic has been well documented, this essay focuses principally on elaborating the practices of industrial specialists for comparison with those of “managerial capitalism.” Conditions and controversies in the textile, woodworking, and metalworking trades provide an in-depth example of larger patterns among batch-oriented sectors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including issues of the politics (i.e., power relations) in production and the recording of masculine identity and values. The role of public policies in facilitating the universalization of mass production rhetorics and practices is considered at the close.

The avant-garde's fascination with technology around 1900 grew out of several motivations: to shock the antitechnological bourgeois public; to experience a sense of mastery toward the material world, especially with cars, airplanes, and other machines; and to overcome the nineteenth-century separation of art and technology. The article highlights the radical shifts in the perception of technology that correspond with the emerging hands-on encounter with technological objects in homes, cities and at the workplace at the turn of the century. This technological fundamentalism differed sharply from the anxious and symbolically mediated approach to the “materialism” of the machine in the nineteenth century. It was accompanied by a concept of liberation through technological purity which is reflected by the fact that Gropius, Mies van der Rohe and Corbusier did not just design functional objects but also made special efforts to accentuate their functionalism as part of the aesthetic experience of modernity. As French and Italian artists, especially the Futurists, incorporated speed, virility, and the experience of the elementary in the metaphoric construction of technology, they even expressed a kinship with those painters and sculptors who shifted their focus to the rediscovery of the “primitive” magic in the art works from Africa and Polynesia

This article uses the history of early sound recording technology in the united States between 1878 and 1915 to show how published discourse contributed to the way the talking machine was defined and situated as a commercially viable product. Comparing the published accounts of Edison's phonograph and Berliners gramophone in popular scientific articles between 1878 and 1896 illustrates that technological advances in sound recording technology take on important cultural meanings. Critical to these meanings is the way in which the technological “fidelity” is linguistically transformed into an aesthetic quality, projected and interpreted within demonstrable values of musical culture. Beginning in 1902, the Victor Talking Machine Company, formed to market the gramophone, took advantage of these cultural meanings to claim a technological advantage over Edison's cylinder recorder. Whose voice was recorded became part of the claim to technological superiority. The Victor Company succeeded in capitalizing “Culture” by promoting their recordings of opera stars like Enrico Caruso as technologically and culturally faithful to live musical performance and as a democratically available access to a privileged lifestyle. Thus did the Victor Company use a terrier and a tenor to legitimate their talking machine as an American musical instrument

The informative and engaging essays in the foregoing collection suggest several interesting concepts that deserve further research and reflection. Over the past decade, the “social construction of technology” has become a concept often explored by historians (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987). Even though it has performed the useful function of discrediting technological determinism, the concept suggests too narrow a set of influences that shape technology. Two other concept, “nature-shaped technology” and “culture-shaped technology,” convey the character of technology more effectively. To designate “nature” as a shaper of technology reminds us that in a relatively prisine world the designer of technology negotiates with natural forces more than with human-built ones. To see culture as a shaper of technology suggests a broader range of influences affecting technology, not simply the social. “Shaping” conveys the notion of influence and avoids that of determinism better than “construction.”