in spite of koyré's conclusions, there are sufficient reasons to claim that galileo, and with him the beginnings of classical mechanics in early modern times, was closely related to practical mechanics. it is, however, not completely clear how, and to what extent, practitioners and engineers could have had a part in shaping the modern sciences. by comparing the beginnings of modern dynamics with the beginnings of statics in antiquity, and in particular with archimedes — whose rediscovery in the sixteenth century was of great consequence — i will focus on the question of which devices played a comparable role in dynamics to that of the lever and balance in statics. i will also examine where these devices came from. in this way, i will show that the entire world of mechanics of that time — “high” and “low,” practical and theoretical — was of significance for shaping classical mechanics and that a specific relationship between art and science was and is constitutive for modern sciences.

we present a number of findings concerning galileo's major discoveries which question both the methods and the results of dating his achievements by common historiographic criteria. the dating of galileo's discoveries is, however, not our primary concern. this paper is intended to contribute to a critical reexamination of the notion of discovery from the point of view of historical epistemology. we claim that the puzzling course of galileo's discoveries is not an exceptional comedy of errors but rather illustrates the normal way in which scientific progress is achieved. we argue that scientific knowledge generally develops not as a sequence of independent discoveries accumulating to a new body of knowledge but rather as a network of interdependent activities which only as a whole makes the individual steps understandable as meaningful “discoveries.”

the article deals with the interrelation between galileo and the visual arts. it presents a couple of drawings from the hand of galileo and confronts them with viviani's report that galileo had not only wanted to become an artist in his youth but stayed close to the field of visual arts throughout his lifetime. in the ambiance of these drawings the famous moon watercolors are not in the dark. they represent a very acute and reasonable tool to convince the people who trusted images more than words. the article ends with panofsky's argument that it was galileo's anti-mannerist notion of art that evoked a repulsion of kepler's ellipses. it tries to show that it was again an aesthetical prejudice that hindered einstein from accepting panofsky's theory.

in 1612, lodovico cigoli completed a fresco in the pauline chapel of the basilica of santa maria maggiore in rome depicting apocalypse 12: “a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet.” he showed the crescent moon with spots, as his friend galileo had observed with the newly invented telescope. considerations of the orthodox view of the perfect moon as held by philosophers have led historians to ask why this clearly imperfect moon in a religious painting raised no eyebrows. we argue that when considered in the context of biblical interpretation and the rhetoric of the counter-reformation, the imperfect moon under the woman's feet was entirely consistent with traditional interpretations of apocalypse 12.

this article confronts an old-new orientation in the historiographical literature on the “galileo affair.” it argues that a varied group of historians moved by different cultural forces in the last decade of the twentieth century tends to crystallize a consensus about the inevitability of the conflict between galileo and the church and its outcome in the trial of 1633. the “neo-conflictualists” — as i call them — have built their case by adhering to and developing the “three dogmas of the counter-reformation”: church authoritarianism is portrayed by them as verging towards “totalitarianism.” a preference for a literal reading of the scriptures is understood as a mode of “fundamentalism.” and mild skeptical positions in astronomy are read as expressions of “instrumentalism,” or “fictionalism.” the main thrust of the article lies in an attempt to historicize these three aspects of the catholic reform movement. finally, the lacunae in insufficiently explored historiographical landscape are delineated in order to tame the temptation to embrace the three dogmas, and to modify the radical conflictualist version of the story of galileo and the church.

in the lively discussions on galileo's laws of motion after the pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “galilean affair.” that is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by french and italian jesuits with the substantial adherence of m. mersenne. this new trail was originated by gassendi's presentation of galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of copernicanism.

i propose a revisionist account of the production and reception of galileo's telescopic observations of 1609–10, an account that focuses on the relationship between credit and disclosure. galileo, i argue, acted as though the corroboration of his observations were easy, not difficult. his primary worry was not that some people might reject his claims, but rather that those able to replicate them could too easily proceed to make further discoveries on their own and deprive him of credit. consequently, he tried to slow down potential replicators to prevent them from becoming competitors. he did so by not providing other practitioners access to high-power telescopes and by withholding information about how to build them. this essay looks at the development of galileo's monopoly on early telescopic astronomy to understand how the relationship between disclosure and credit changed as he moved from being an instrument-maker to becoming a discoverer and, eventually, a court philosopher.

more than a century ago three eminent galileo scholars, raffaello caverni, antonio favaro, and emil wohlwill, discussed the emergence of galileo's science of motion and the documentary evidence pertaining to it. among the works of these scholars, only favaro's edizione nazionale of galileo's works is still widely used, while the contents of their other writings only play a minor if any role in the current english-speaking literature. the disappearance from historical memory of many of the substantial contributions by these authors is closely associated with a narrowing of the perspective under which galileo's science and its context have been discussed in more recent scholarship.

raffaello caverni is a controversial figure among the scholars of galileo's work. almost entirely ignored for half a century, his research has been more attentively considered only after his major work (caverni 1891–1900) was reprinted in 1970.

we consider this merit, however, to have almost no value in comparison to one which we wish to acquire from the offended worshippers of galileo. we announce to them that after having identified and reordered the scattered writings which complete the sixth dialogue as far as percussion is concerned, we were also able to reintegrate the dialogue with regard to the use of a little chain to provide a rule for aiming artillery, without having to resort to laborious calculations.

antonio favaro was born in padua on 21 may 1847 to a cultivated family of lower nobility. after having accomplished his studies in mathematics at the university of padua in 1866, he went to turin, where he specialized as an engineer at the scuola d’applicazione (polytechnical high school) in 1869. as early as 1872, he was appointed as extra-ordinary professor at the university of padua. for fifty years he taught graphical statics there. during different periods he also gave courses in infinitesimal calculus and projective geometry. since 1878 favaro, as one of the first in an italian university, also taught history of mathematics. he died in padua on 30 september 1922, shortly after his retirement.

the historians of science have only recently learned of the existence of a sixth volume of the grandly conceived work of the abbé raffaello caverni entitled storia del metodo sperimentale in italia. five volumes had already been published between 1891 and 1898. the sixth volume was published, one might say, in an almost furtive way. in fact, the first notice of it was given in a journal by aldo mieli just a few months ago. among materials he is collecting under the heading, “for a biography of the italian historians of science,” in addition to other things already said about caverni in a previous issue, mieli has published the following “information received from g. vacca”: “the printing of the sixth volume of the history of the experimental method in italy dealing with the history of hydraulics had been started but was interrupted by the author's death. about 450 pages have been printed, the greater part of the copies of the loose sheets have been lost.”

galileo galilei is one of the few figures in the history of science who has attracted the imagination even of laymen to the natural sciences. the battle of this great physicist against the domination of his church, a battle which he ultimately lost, manifests fundamental human interest that extends beyond the individual. galileo pits the right of the thinking individual against the right of an institution that defends its claim to set norms for individual thinking because it posseses superhuman truths.

in the fourth volume of his history of the experimental method in italy (caverni 1891–1900, 4:506–33), raffaello caverni fulfilled the promise he had made four years earlier in an introductory overview of his work (ibid., 1:135–36): to prove on the basis of the history of the discovery of the parabolic shape of the projectile trajectory that galileo claimed the intellectual property of his eminent contemporaries as his own, and to show how this was accomplished. one had the right to expect that the proponent of such an entirely new opinion in a case which he himself considered to be, in the words of bacon, an instantia praerogativa for the justification of his view, would weigh the value of each individual argument with absolute impartiality and do complete justice to the ambiguity of the given facts. he would have to state his case in compelling logic so that a clear-thinking individual would have no choice, in this case at least, but to believe in the dishonorable theft by a great man. in these expectations we have been disappointed thoroughly by caverni: his argumentation is in all aspects that of a shrewd lawyer who considers it his task to allow only one side of the question to come to light, to collect everything that might be utilized in favor of his biased reading, to hold back anything which might give rise to the idea that things could be viewed in another way. he believed it permissible for his own purposes to operate with presumptions as if they were facts, and to regard as proven what is at best probable.