Argument

This paper investigates the conceptual treatment and mathematical modeling of force in Newton's Principia. It argues that, contrary to currently dominant views, Newton's concept of force is best understood as a physico-mathematical construct with theoretical underpinnings rather than a “mathematical construct” or an ontologically “neutral” concept. It uses various philosophical and historical frameworks to clarify interdisciplinary issues in the history of science and draws upon the distinction between axiomatic systems in mathematics and physics, as well as discovery patterns in science. It also dwells on Newton's “philosophy” of mathematics, described here in terms of mathematical naturalism. This philosophy considers mathematical quantities to be physically significant quantities whose motions are best mapped by geometry. It then shows that to understand the epistemic status of force in the Principia, it is important to scrutinize both Newton's mathematical justificatory strategies and his background assumptions about force – without constructing, however, an overarching metaphysical framework for his science. Finally, the paper studies scientific attempts to redefine or eliminate force from science during the period between Newton and Laplace. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper implicitly suggests that questions about the reality of force be distinguished from questions about the validity of force, and that both sets of questions be distinguished from questions about the utility of the concept of force in science.