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Economic Models and Policy Advice: Theory Choice or Moral Choice?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2008

Robert Evans
Affiliation:
Cardiff Scholl of Social Science Cardiff University, 50 Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3AT, U.K.

Abstract

This paper examines the interaction between economic models and policy advice through a case study of the U.K. government's Panel of Independent Forecasters. The Panel, which met for the first time in February 1993, was part of the government's response to the policy vacuum created by its departure from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The paper focuses on the policy recommendations made by the Panel and their foundation in economic models. It is argued that, because of their ambiguity, economic models do not provide an “objective” basis for policy making. Rather, they provide a level epistemological basis for debating the various social, political, and moral theories that can be used to frame economic policy. The paper concludes that although economic models often serve to depoliticize economic issues, they also have the potential to do exactly the opposite — namely, repoliticize them by connecting economics to wider social and moral debates.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999

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Footnotes

*

This paper was originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Social Studies of Science held at Tucson, Arizona, in October 1997 and has benefited from the comments of all those who participated in the sessions on “Models as Mediators.” I am particularly grateful to Sergio Sismondo for taking on the task of coordinating this special issue and also for steering my own contribution through several revisions to eventual acceptance. In addition, Brian Martin and two anonymous referees provided both encouragement and constructive criticism that greatly improved the paper. Of course, any errors that remain are mine and mine alone.

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