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If a speaker (S) says something in a language (L) and one of the listeners (A) knows L but another (B) does not, then, normally, A will understand what S said but B will not. What is it, exactly, that A, but not B, succeeds in doing in this case, and how to account for the difference? This is a fundamental problem, which the philosophy of language should be able to solve, yet, to my knowledge, has not done so to date.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1970
References
page 221 note 1 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1953) pt 1 1.Google Scholar
page 221 note 2 Ibid.
page 221 note 3 Wittgenstein, L., The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, 1964) p. 5.Google Scholar
page 222 note 1 De Magistro, chap. xi ff.
page 223 note 1 Philosophical Investigations, pt 1 2.Google Scholar
page 223 note 2 Ibid., 6.
page 224 note 1 My reason for speaking of propositions rather than sentences will become clear later on.
page 226 note 1 The word idea is particularly suited to incomplete propositions, e.g. I have an idea what he did or … where he is, etc.
page 230 note 1 Beards are native to human males yet, fortunately, they are not innate.
page 231 note 1 This lecture includes some ideas and some passages from my ‘Semantics and Aletheia: A comment’ (The Philosophical Forum, 14Google Scholar (New Series)), which are reprinted here with the Editor's permission.