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Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Christopher Coope
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Extract

I shall start by considering the apparently paradoxical doctrines that Wittgenstein put forward about knowledge: they show how the concept of knowledge is, as he says, ‘specialized’. This is not, as I shall show, a very important issue in itself, but it leads on to other points, of more interest: how it comes about, for example, that ‘not all corrections of our beliefs are on the same level’. I shall then discuss the idea that we inherit a certain picture of the world that forms the background of our experiments and researches. This idea, which is not of course unique to Wittgenstein, is, however, developed with many fresh insights. I end with some discussion of Wittgenstein's reported views on religious belief, which should not, in my opinion, be regarded as part of his contribution to philosophy, the interest of them being, perhaps, more biographical than philosophical.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 7: Understanding Wittgenstein , March 1973 , pp. 246 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1973

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References

page 247 note 1 Belief (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969) p. 266.Google Scholar

page 249 note 1 We must distinguish the cases where I have made sure, from those where it just is sure without my having made it so. In both cases, there is no such thing as a further check, but only in the first is there knowledge. This point is necessary if we are to avoid the absurd consequence that one can cease to know something by making sure of it.

page 249 note 2 In this connection Wittgenstein (OC, 1) refers to ‘a curious remark of J. H. Newman’: I have no idea what he had in mind, but it is interesting to note that Newman, describing how, in his opinion, Protestants of his time came about their belief that the Catholic Church was a ‘simple monster of iniquity’, says that they would, for the most part, not produce grounds, but would say such things as: ‘It is too notorious for proof; everyone knows it; every book says it …’ The Present Position of Catholics in England, 1892 ed., p. 50.Google Scholar

page 251 note 1 ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, sec. 6, in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1953).Google Scholar

page 251 note 2 Quine, W. V. and Ullian, J. S., The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 90.Google Scholar

page 251 note 3 In Knowledge and Certainty (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963) p. 69Google Scholar

page 255 note 1 RFM, II, 78.Google Scholar

page 256 note 1 Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), Sec. 18.Google Scholar

page 259 note 1 The other and more vital part of Wittgenstein's argument, is to understand how, in his view, ‘inner processes stand in need of outward criteria’ (PI, I, 580Google Scholar) and that is another story.

page 259 note 2 The real offender, I suspect, was Prichard.