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Wittgenstein's Influence: Meaning, Mind and Method

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

A. C. Grayling
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Extract

In the first and shorter part of this essay I comment on Wittgenstein's general influence on the practice of philosophy since his time. In the second and much longer part I discuss aspects of his work which have had a more particular influence, chiefly on debates about meaning and mind. The aspects in question are Wittgenstein's views about rule-following and private language. This second part is more technical than the first.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 28 , March 1990 , pp. 61 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1990

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References

1 The fuller picture demands a treatment of points raised by Kripke, McDowell, McGinn, Wright, Pears and others; see e.g. Kripke, 1982; McDowell, 1984, McGinn, 1984; Wright, 1986b; and Pears, 1989.

2 Wright's phrase. Pears calls it the ‘Anti-Platonist chapter’.