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Values, Reasons and the Environment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

Roger Crisp
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Extract

By 2030, according to one reliable source, the world's population will have increased by 3 · billion, demand for food will have nearly doubled, and industrial output tripled (World Bank, 1992, p. 2 and passim). Consider two possible histories of the world in this period:

The Admirable (A) History. Wastage of energy and natural resources is reduced, as is poverty in developing countries. Pollution decreases. Greenhouse warming slows. Biodiversity is preserved. The natural environment is protected. Food is not short.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 36 , March 1994 , pp. 75 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1994

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References

1 See Schelling, 1983, for caution about predictions such as these. My argument does not depend on their truth.

2 On perfectionism in general see Attfield, 1987, esp. chs. 3–4; 1991, esp. ch. 8. Perfectionist theories can be individualist, like Attfield's, or non-individualist, like that of Johnson, 1991, esp. chs. 3–4, who attributes independent moral standing to species.

3 This person may be influenced by Williams, 1981b. There are two interpretations of what Williams means by ‘internalism’ about reasons:

Weak internalism: A can have a reason to φ iff A has some motive to be served by φ-ing.

Strong internalism: A can have a reason to φ iff A has some motive to be served by φ-ing for that reason.

I am accepting weak internalism and would argue that the strong version often seems plausible because it is confused with the weak.

4 It could be that—even if aesthetic values are more weighty here—the referentiality of welfare values somehow gives us an agent-relative reason not to maximize grounded on common humanity. Just as I am justified in failing to maximize in order to further my self-interest, so we might be justified in failing to maximize aesthetic value to further our collective welfare.

5 I am grateful for comments on previous drafts to Robin Attfield, Nigel Bowles, Robert Frazier, Brad Hooker, Thomas Hurka, Andrew Mason, Mark Nelson, Markku Oksanen and Peter Sandøe.