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Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

Ross P. Cameron
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Extract

Together, these entail that for every true proposition p, there exists some thing which could not exist and p be false.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 107 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

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