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Some Remarks on the Logic of Explanation in the Social Sciences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
Extract
If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.
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References
page 64 note 1 Popper, Karl R., Logik der Forschung (Vienna, 1935)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, Paul, ‘The Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy and Science, xv (1948)Google Scholar, reprinted in Feigl, H. and Brodbeck, May (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, 1953)Google Scholar. This is to mention only the two important works, which stood at the beginning of an extensive discussion.
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