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Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Alan Millar
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Extract

According to the rationality thesis, the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality. How in this context should we conceive of rationality? In one sense, being rational is contrasted with being non-rational, as when human beings are described as rational animals. In another sense, being rational is contrasted with being irrational. I shall call rationality in this latter sense evaluative rationality. Whatever else it might involve, evaluative rationality surely has to do with satisfying requirements of rationality such as, presumably, the following:

(1) That one avoid inconsistency in beliefs.

(2) That one not adopt new beliefs unless what one knows entails or is evidence for the truth of those beliefs.

(3) That one not have φing as a goal yet do nothing necessary for one to φ. (Means/end requirement.)

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 49 , March 2001 , pp. 179 - 198
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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