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Not Funny Any More? Morality, Meaning, and Manhattan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2025

Abstract

In a sense that will be made more precise in the essay that follows, someone might think that it is possible for an artist's work to be rendered less artistically successful by mere dint of her own immoral behaviour or character. Using Woody Allen's film, Manhattan, as a case study, I explain what lies in the way of making good such a claim and, ultimately, why I am highly sceptical about such a project's prospects. In short, what must be established is that knowledge of the author's putative misdeeds or character flaws enables us to better understand the artwork in question, as opposed to distracting us from doing so, and it is extremely difficult to argue for this thesis in a principled, cogent way. Someone who tries to provide such an argument, in discussing Manhattan, is Erich Hatala Matthes. I explain where his argument fails and, in doing this, also suggest that he misinterprets the film.

Type
Paper
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2025

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