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The Noble

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

We can try to imagine a people who in circumstances of hardship and danger—in hunting and warfare, for instance—show endurance, persistence, indifference to pain, and an unflinching readiness to accept death. Yet it may be that these qualities do not have any important place in their picture of themselves. Their courage is simply something they take for granted and it does not go with any practice of praise and blame. They are not proud of themselves when they act bravely, nor ashamed of themselves if they fail to do so. This would be a courage that would be independent of the social practices of praise and blame, admiration and contempt, pride and shame. It would be a courage that did not fit into a scheme of values. This raises the question whether it could properly be regarded as an ethical quality, as a virtue.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1983

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References

1 Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sect. VII.

2 Ibid.

3 Bk III, Part II, sect. XII.

4 Summa Theologica, 2a2ae.123, 8.

5 C.f. Joyce, , A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 209.Google Scholar

6 However, cf. Aquinas's defence of the magnanimous man (Summa, 2a2ae. 129, 3). Aquinas argues that the magnanimous man's slow step and deep voice proceed from his concentration upon great matters.

7 Aristotle, , De Čaelo.Google Scholar

8 Aesthetic, Ch.VI.

9 For further discussion of this point in relation to ‘sincerity’ the reader is referred to my The Autonomy of Art’, Institute of Philosophy Lectures 6 (1971/1972).Google Scholar

10 The Psychology of Imagination, 28.Google Scholar

11 Taylor, Charles, Hegel, 502.Google Scholar

12 Eliot, T. S., ‘Little Gidding’.Google Scholar

13 Ref. pp 522ff. Ch. VI ‘Spirit in Self-Estrangement; Culture and its Realm of Reality’, trans Baillie.

14 Ch 11.

15 The relevance of this passage, and of Trilling's argument in general, was drawn to my attention by Christopher Edwards.

16 Cf. Knight, Wilson, The Imperial Theme.Google Scholar

17 I am greatly indebted at this point to criticisms and suggestions made by S. L. Goldberg, and to his article ‘Morality and Literature’, The Critical Review (1980).Google Scholar

18 For an excellent discussion of this topic, cf. Letwin, Shirley, The Morality of the Gentleman.Google Scholar

19 I am indebted to Christopher Edwards, James Hopkins and, especially, to S. L. Goldberg for suggestions and criticisms.