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Moderately Massive Modularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Peter Carruthers
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Extract

This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind's structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 53 , September 2003 , pp. 67 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2003

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