¹ Strawson, P., ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974).Google Scholar

² Korsgaard, C., ‘Creating Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations’, in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Strawson, G., ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), 5–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Moore, G. E., Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), chapter 6.Google Scholar

⁵ Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Zimmern, H. (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), section 2.Google Scholar

⁶ Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind (London: Penguin, 1963), p. 186.Google Scholar

⁷ Garnett, A. C., ‘Moore's Theory of Moral Freedom and Responsibility’, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Volume I, ed. Schilpp, P. A. (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1968).Google Scholar

⁸ Moore, G. E., ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Schilpp, P. A., Volume II, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1968).Google Scholar

⁹ Chisholm, R., ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, in Free Will, ed. Watson, G. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. Chapter 4.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Wiggins, D., ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’, in Needs, Values, and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).Google Scholar

¹¹ Berlin, I., ‘From Hope and Fear Set Free’, in Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, ed. Hardy, H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

¹² Williams, B., ‘How Free Does the Will Need to Be?’ in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Lewis, D., Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Stalnaker, R., ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Rescher, N. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁵ van Inwagen, P., ‘A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’, Theoria 40 (1974), 9–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), 185–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Wiggins, ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’.

¹⁷ Lewis, D., ‘Are We Free to Break the Laws?’ in Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 292.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Kant, I., Ethical Philosophy, trans. Ellington, J. (Inianapolis: Hackett, 1994)Google Scholar, Grounding 488 on Akademie pagination.

¹⁹ Cartwright, N., Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. Chapter 4.Google Scholar

²⁰ Pais, A., ‘Subtle is the Lord …’ The science and the Life of Albert Einstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. vii.Google Scholar

²¹ Lewis, ‘Are We Free?’, as in note 17 above.

²² Jackson, F., ‘A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1977), 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Bennett, J., ‘Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction’, Philosophical Review 93 (1984), 57–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Fischer, J. M., The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).Google Scholar

²⁵ Ginet, C., On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Korsgaard, , Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 188–221.Google Scholar

²⁷ Russell, B., Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: Routledge, 1992), Part I, chapter 5, pp. 55–6.Google Scholar

²⁸ Wiggins, , ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’, p. 292.Google Scholar

²⁹ Strawson, P., ‘Replies’, in Philosophical Subjects, Van Straaten, Z. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 265.Google Scholar