Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T10:04:33.726Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Medical Analogies in Buddhist and Hellenistic Thought: Tranquillity and Anger

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2010

Christopher W. Gowans
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli, nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy is ‘a medical science for the mind.’ He thought we should ‘hand ourselves over to philosophy, and let ourselves be healed.’ ‘For as long as these ills [of the mind] remain,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot attain to happiness.’ There are many different forms of medical analogy in these two traditions, but the most general form may be stated as follows: just as medicine cures bodily diseases and brings about physical health, so Buddhist dharma or Hellenistic philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health—where psychological health is understood as the highest form of happiness or well-being. Insofar as Buddhist dharma involves philosophy, as it does, both renditions of the analogy may be said to declare that philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health. This feature of the analogy—philosophy as analogous to medical treatment—has attracted considerable attention.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 66 , July 2010 , pp. 11 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For example, see Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu and Bodhi, Bhikkhu, eds. and trs., The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), pp. 614–6 and 867Google Scholar (I 510–12 and II 260). For ancient texts, ordinary pagination is followed by standardized pagination (in parentheses).

2 Śāntideva, , The Bodhicaryāvatāra, Crosby, Kate and Skilton, Andrew, trs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 143Google Scholar (10.57).

3 Cicero, , Cicero and the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4, Graver, Margaret, tr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 5 and 70CrossRefGoogle Scholar (3.6 and 4.84).

4 For example, with respect to Buddhism, see Gombrich, Richard, Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 2 and 59CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and with respect to Hellenistic philosophy, see Nussbaum, Martha, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar and Annas, Julia, ‘Philosophical Therapy, Ancient and Modern,’ in Kuczewski, Mark G. and Polansky, Ronald, eds., Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 109–127Google Scholar. They are briefly compared in McEvilley, Thomas, The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies (New York: Allsworth Press, 2002), pp. 596–7Google Scholar.

5 In the case of Buddhism, see Zysk, Kenneth G., Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery, Corrected Edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998)Google Scholar. In the case of Hellenistic philosophy, see Edelstein, Ludwig, ‘The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine,’ in Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein, Temkin, Owsei and Lilian, C., eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 349–66Google Scholar and Longrigg, James, Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians (London: Routledge, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Insofar as the ancient practices took a religious or ethical approach, in contrast to an empirical one, they may well have supposed that a person’s physical disease sometimes depended on the person’s beliefs. In fact, the Buddhist doctrine of karma might an instance of this: it maintains that the moral quality of a person’s actions affects his or her future well-being, where this includes physical disease and health. However, the tradition is ambiguous on this point. For discussion, see Ghose, Lynken, ‘Karma and the Possibility of Purification: An Ethical and Psychological Analysis of the Doctrine of Karma in Buddhism,’ Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (2007), pp. 259–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, pp. 267–8 (I 174–5).

8 See Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, pp. 533–6 (I 426–32).

9 See Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, pp. 536 and 540 (I 431 and 436).

10 See Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 100 (I 15–16).

11 Buddhaghosa, Bhadantācariya, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu, tr. (Seattle: Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatta Editions, 1999), p. 520Google Scholar (XVI 87).

12 There has been some scholarly discussion of the claim that the Four Noble Truths are based on a medical model. For a review of this literature, and scepticism concerning the claim, see Zysk, Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery, pp. 38 and 144–5 (n. 2).

13 See Nāgārjuna, , Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland, Jeffrey Hopkins, , tr. (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), pp. 114, 143 and 144Google Scholar (2.142, 4.372, and 4.376), and Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, pp. 69 and 101 (7.22 and 8.144).

14 See Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, pp. 18, 29 and 44 (2.55, 4.48 and 5.109).

15 See Āryadeva, , Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, Lang, Karen C., tr. (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), p. 85Google Scholar (VIII 18).

16 See Āryadeva, Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, p. 85 (VIII 20).

17 Candrakīrti, , Four Illusions: Candrakīrti’s Advice for Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path, Lang, Karen C., tr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar (7.237).

18 See Āryadeva, Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, p. 65 (VI 5) and Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 41 (5.81).

19 See Nāgārjuna, , The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Garfield, Jay L., tr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 36Google Scholar (XIII 8).

20 In the Pāli canon, the Buddha’s teaching is said to be a purgative that always succeeds; see Woodward, F. L., tr., The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikāya), vol. 5, (London: Luzac & Company (for The Pāli Text Society), 1961), pp. 153–4Google Scholar (10.108). However, in this text, the claim is that right view purges wrong view with no suggestion that right view then purges itself.

21 See Candrakīrti, , Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti, Sprung, Mervyn, tr. (Boulder, CO: Prajñā Press, 1979), pp. 150–51Google Scholar (248–9).

22 Epicurus, , ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ in Inwood, Brad and Gerson, L. P., eds. and trs., Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, Second Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 30–31Google Scholar (131). Cf. Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ pp. 30 and 31 (128 and 135); Lucretius, , On the Nature of Things, Smith, Martin Ferguson tr. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 35–6Google Scholar (2.18–19); and Cicero, , On Moral Ends, Woolf, Raphael, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar (1.71).

23 For discussion of Philodemus on anger, see Annas, Julia, ‘Epicurean Emotions,’ Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 30 (1989), 145–64Google ScholarPubMed and Sorabji, Richard, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 26Google Scholar and 201–3.

24 Quoted in Annas, ‘Epicurean Emotions,’ p. 159.

25 Quoted in Annas, ‘Epicurean Emotions,’ p. 158.

26 See Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp. 75–6 (3.309–22). For a survey of Epicurean views on anger, see Harris, William V., Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 99–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Ch. 7.

27 Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., eds. and trs., The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 155Google Scholar (25C). For discussion of the medical analogy in Epicureanism, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Ch. 4.

28 Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ p. 28 (122).

29 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary, p. 156 (25J). The remedy says: ‘God presents no fears, death no worries. And while good is readily available, evil is readily endurable.’ Cf. Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ p. 31 (133).

30 For a summary of these, see the editors’ ‘Introduction’ in Philodemus, , On Frank Criticism, David Konstan, , et al. , eds. and trs. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), pp. 20–23Google Scholar.

31 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, pp. 95 and 117 (Cols. IIb and XVIIa).

32 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, p. 71 (Frs. 63–4).

33 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, pp. 31, 39 and 83 (Frs. 7-8, 20, and 79).

34 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, p. 71 (Frs. 63–4).

35 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, pp. 67 and 85 (Frs. 59 and 84N).

36 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp. 28–9 (1.937–950); repeated at p. 100–101 (4.10-25).

37 Quoted in Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, p. 137.

38 Seneca, Epistles 66–92, Richard M. Gummere, tr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), p. 449 (92.3).

39 Seneca, , ‘On Anger,’ in Seneca, Moral and Political Essays, Cooper, John M. and Procopé, J. F., eds. and trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 114Google Scholar (3.42.1).

40 See the passages on pp. 211–12 of Graver’s edition of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. For discussion of the medical analogy in Stoicism, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, ch. 9.

41 Quoted in Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, p. 324.

42 See Epictetus, , The Discourses of Epictetus, Gill, Christopher, ed., Hard, Robin, tr. (London: J. M. Dent (Everyman), 1995), pp. 188–89Google Scholar (3.21.18–20).

43 Seneca, Epistles 1–65, Richard M. Gummere, tr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), p. 443 (64.8–9).

44 Seneca, Epistles 93–124, Richard M. Gummere, tr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), p. 333 (116.1).

45 Seneca, Epistles 66–92, p. 143 (75.11).

46 Seneca, ‘On Anger,’ p. 23 (1.6.1).

47 See Empiricus, Sextus, Outlines of Scepticism, Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 9Google Scholar (1.23–4).

48 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 10 (1.25).

49 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 5 (1.10).

50 See Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, pp. 313–15 and Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, pp. 27–8 and 198–200.

51 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 216 (3.280).

52 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 216 (3.280–81).

53 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 118 (2.188).

54 In various ways, all of these outlooks maintained that physical disease was to be avoided.

55 See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, p. 7 (1.16–17).

56 For example, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, p. 403, and Nussbaum, Martha, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 394CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Cicero, Cicero and the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4, p. 5 (3.6).

58 See note 6 above.

59 There are some tendencies in Mahāyāna Buddhism to put less emphasis on our own capacity for enlightenment and more emphasis on the assistance of bodhisattvas. This does not change the fact that enlightenment brings tranquillity in the face of fortune.

60 See Williams, Bernard, ‘Do Not Disturb,’ review of Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, London Review of Books 16 (October 20, 1994), pp. 25–26Google ScholarPubMed.

61 For example, see Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 53 (6.42) and Seneca, ‘On Anger,’ pp. 65–6 (2.28).

62 Seneca, ‘On Anger,’ p. 51 (2.10.7).

63 Seneca, ‘On Anger,’ p. 34 (1.16.4).

64 Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 56 (6.65); cf. p. 53 (6.33).

65 Śāntideva, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 61 (6.120).