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Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Terence Horgan  and
John Tienson
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Extract

David Marr (1982) provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science (classicism, as we will call it henceforth). Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between classicism and potential non-classical conceptions of mentality that might emerge under the rubric of connectionism.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 34 , March 1993 , pp. 159 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1993

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