¹ Herrnstein, Richard J. and Murray, Charles, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010)Google Scholar.

² Beckwith, Jon and Huang, Franklin, ‘Should we make a fuss? A case for social responsibility in science.’ Nature biotechnology 23.12 (2005), 1479–1480CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Panofsky, Aaron, Misbehaving Science: Controversy and the Development of Behavior Genetics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Saul, Jennifer M., Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Here I'm moving between ‘having x-type reasons to φ’ and ‘having x-type obligations to φ’. I recognize that these are importantly different in some literatures. What I mean, in this context, is that having an obligation to φ means that failing to φ constitutes a failing to do what one ought.

⁶ That is, their epistemic mistake cannot be explained in terms of mistakenly forming beliefs.

⁷ Nelson, Mark T., ‘We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.’ Mind 119.473 (2010), 83–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goggans, Phil, ‘Epistemic obligations and doxastic voluntarism’, Analysis 51.2 (1991), 102–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Notable exceptions are Matthew Chrisman's middle road between doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology, Edward Hinchman's paper on intra- vs. inter-personal epistemic obligations, and Matthew Sample's work on the epistemic obligations of scientists. See Chrisman, Matthew, ‘Ought to Believe’, Journal of Philosophy 105.7 (2008), 346–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hinchman, Edward, ‘Reflection, Disagreement, and Context’, American Philosophical Quarterly 49.2 (2012), 95Google Scholar; Sample, Matthew, ‘Stanford's Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations’, Philosophy of Science 82.5 (2015), 856–866CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Or presupposed, or implied, etc. See section 5 for more on this.

⁹ After all, the obligation to feed the hungry isn't plausibly a culinary obligation.

¹⁰ If all cases have moral stakes (to some extent), then all we need is for there to be a mismatch between the level or gravity of the moral stakes and the strength of the obligation. So a case with low-grade moral stakes but strong obligations will work.

¹¹ Fricker, Miranda, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² In addition to being unnecessary in some cases, this kind of direct rebuttal is probably not effective in many cases. Direct rebuttals may prompt defensiveness rather than uptake or reasonable conversation. However, efficacy may or may not be at issue, as we'll see below.

¹³ Lewis, David, ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979), 339–359CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Elisabeth, , Camp, , ‘Contextualism, metaphor, and what is said’, Mind and Language 21.3 (2006), 280–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Recanati, , François, , ‘What is said.’ Synthese 128.1–2 (2001), 75–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Saul, Jennifer M.,. ‘Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated.’ Noûs 36.2 (2002), 228–248CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What is Said; Grice, H. P., ‘Meaning’, Philosophical Review 66.3 (1957), 377–388CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Stalnaker, Robert, ‘Common ground’, Linguistics and Philosophy 25.5 (2002), 701–721CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Perhaps we ought to understand academia (or science or genetics) as a single long extended conversation.

¹⁷ As mentioned above, an agent need not voice her disagreement in a way that registers that disagreement with every participant. It might well be that a particular agent can voice her disagreement with something a previous speaker has said in a way that the speaker himself does not recognize. If other participants in the conversation do recognize this, she might well have discharged her obligation.

¹⁸ Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.

¹⁹ Elgin, Catherine Z., ‘Science, ethics and education’, Theory and Research in Education 9.3 (2011), 251–263, at 252Google Scholar.

²⁰ Elgin, Catherine Z., ‘Understanding: Art and Science’, Midwest Studies In Philosophy 16.1 (1991), 196–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Panofsky. Misbehaving Science.

²² Hinchman, Edward, ‘Telling as inviting to trust’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.3 (2005), 562–587CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moran, Richard, ‘Getting Told and Being Believed,’ Philosophers' Imprint 5.5 (2005), 1–29Google Scholar.

²³ I am grateful to Nathan Sheff and Graham Hubbs for helpful discussions of the Gilbert-inspired source.

²⁴ Gilbert, Margaret, ‘Rationality in Collective Action’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36.1 (2006), 3–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ This does not mean, of course, that joint commitments always go smoothly. Sometimes, she says, ‘discussion among the parties may be called for in order that individual efforts are effective’. And that discussion, presumably, would sometimes involve voicing disagreements. See Gilbert, ‘Rationality in collective action’, 8

²⁶ Bratman, Michael, ‘Shared Cooperative Activity’, The Philosophical Review 101.2 (1992), 327–341CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Bratman and Gilbert don't fully agree about the nature of shared intentionality, but nothing in Gilbert precludes the use of the commitment to mutual support, here.

²⁸ Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Mill, On Liberty, 37–39.

³⁰ For further discussion of this, see Johnson, Casey Rebecca, ‘For the Sake of Argument: The Nature and Extent of Our Obligation to Voice Disagreement’ in Voicing Dissent (London: Routledge, 2018), 105–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar