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Introduction: Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2019
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- Type
- Introduction
- Information
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 86: Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth , October 2019 , pp. 1 - 9
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2019
References
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12 I am deeply grateful to all of them for their participation in the workshop that gave rise to this volume, as well as for their contributions to it.
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