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Integrity and Self-Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

The title of this paper proclaims its central interest—the relationship which holds between the concept of integrity and the concept of the identity of the self, or, for short, self-identity. Unreflective speech often suggests a close relationship between the two, but in the latter half of this century, notwithstanding one or two notable exceptions, they have been discussed with minimum cross-reference as if they belonged to two rather different philosophical menus which tended not to be available at the same restaurant on the same night. My intention is to argue that our account of the one carried implications for the other and that this relationship is reflexive. My argument will proceed by stating and criticizing a common account of the relationship between each of these concepts which tends to offer mutual support for the implied account of each. Thereafter an alternative account will be outlined.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1993

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References

1 See N. Mandelstam's Hope against Hope, e.g. pp. 7ff, for a description of arrest.