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I. Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions and Does it Neglect Affectivity?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Robert C. Solomon
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Extract

I have been arguing, for almost thirty years now, that emotions have been unduly neglected in philosophy. Back in the seventies, it was an argument that attracted little sympathy. I have also been arguing that emotions are a ripe for philosophical analysis, a view that, as evidenced by the Manchester 2001 conference and a large number of excellent publications, has now become mainstream. My own analysis of emotion, first published in 1973, challenged the sharp divide between emotions and rationality, insisted that we reject the established notion that the emotions are involuntary, and argued, in a brief slogan, that ‘emotions are judgments.’ Since then, although the specific term ‘judgment’ has come under considerable fire and my voluntarist thesis continues to attract incredulousness the general approach I took to emotions has been widely accepted in both philosophy and the social sciences. When Paul Griffiths took on what he misleadingly characterized as ‘propositional attitude’ theories of emotion as the enemy of all that was true and scientifically worthy, I knew that we had made it. Such ferocious abuse is surely a sign that we had shifted, in Kuhnian terms, from being revolutionary to becoming the ‘normal’ paradigm. The current counter-revolution of affect programmes and neuro-reductionism says a lot about who we are and how far we have come. (Progress in philosophy is moved more by this drama of one outrageous thesis after another—once called ‘dialectic’—than by cautious, careful argument.)

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 52 , March 2003 , pp. 1 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2003

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References

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13 Calhoun, C. and Solomon, R., What is an Emotion? (Oxford University Press 1984)Google Scholar.

14 Ortony et. al. (1988).

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16 The line is from William Henley's ‘Invictus,’ which has been forever tarnished by mass-murderer Timothy McVeigh, who quoted it immediately before his execution (June 2001).