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Coincidence and Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

Penelope Mackie
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Extract

This paper is about a puzzle concerning the metaphysics of material objects: a puzzle generated by cases where material objects appear to coincide, sharing all their matter. As is well known, it can be illustrated by the example of a statue. In front of me now, sitting on my desk, is a (small) statue – a statue of a lion. The statue is made of clay. So in front of me now is a piece of clay. But what is the relation between the statue and the piece of clay? Are they identical, or are they distinct?

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 151 - 176
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

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