¹ ‘Every nation of the world is divided into haves and have-nots … The gap … is enormous. Confronting these disparities, the egalitarian holds that it would be a morally better state of affairs if everyone enjoyed the same level of social and economic benefits’, Arneson, Richard J., ‘Equality’, in Goodin, Robert & Pettit, Phillip, (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 489Google Scholar. ‘From the standpoint of politics, the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally.’ Dworkin, Ronald, ‘In Defense of Equality’, Social Philosophy and Policy, No. 1, (1983), 24–40, at 24Google Scholar. ‘Everyone matters just as much as everyone else. [I]t is appalling that the most effective social systems we have been able to devise permit … material inequalities.’ Nagel, Thomas, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 64Google Scholar. ‘Being egalitarian in some significant way relates to the need to have equal concern, at some level, for all persons involved.’ Sen, Amartya, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), ixGoogle Scholar. ‘A basic principle of equality [is] the principle of equal consideration of interests. The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions.’ Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2nd ed., 21Google Scholar. ‘We want equalization of benefits … [because] in all cases where human beings are capable of enjoying the same goods, we feel that the intrinsic value of the enjoyment is the same…. We hold that … one man's well-being is as valuable as any other's.’ Vlastos, Gregory, ‘Justice and Equality’, in Social Justice, Brandt, Richard B. (ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 50–51.Google Scholar

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⁴ A partial list of such critics is: Charvet, John, A Critique of Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Flew, Antony, The Politics of Procrustes (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981)Google Scholar; Frankfurt, Harry G., ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’, in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)Google Scholar and ‘Equality and Respect’, in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Hayek, Friedrich A., The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Kekes, John, The Illusions of Egalitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Lucas, J. R., ‘Against Equality’, Philosophy 40 (1965), 296–307Google Scholar and ‘Against Equality Again’, Philosophy 42 (1967), 255–280Google Scholar; MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Matson, Wallace, ‘What Rawls Calls Justice’, Occasional Review 89, (1978), 45–47Google Scholar; and ‘Justice: A Funeral Oration’, Social Philosophy and Policy, No. 1, (1983), 94–113Google Scholar; Narveson, Jan, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002)Google Scholar; Pojman, Louis P., ‘A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism’, Faith and Philosophy 8, (1991), 481–504Google Scholar; and Sher, George, Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

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⁷ Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Equality—An Exchange’, TLS (12 1, 2000), 16.Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Nagel, , Mortal Questions, 108.Google Scholar

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¹⁸ Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 507 and 509.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 51.Google Scholar

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²³ Rawls, , Theory of Justice, 3.Google Scholar

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²⁶ Nagel, , Equality and Partiality, 64–65.Google Scholar

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