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Norms, History and the Mental

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

Many people think the mind evolved. Some of them think it had to evolve. They think the mind not only has a history, but a history essential to its very existence.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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