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The first person: problems of sense and reference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

Edward Harcourt
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Extract

0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being.

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Papers
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 46 , March 2000 , pp. 25 - 46
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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2000

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