¹ About the fall of the MacMahon government in France.

² The letter discussing an incident on New Year's Day 1859, when Napoleon III had deliberately snubbed the Austrian ambassador to France, Count Joseph Alexander Hübner, which was the first clear warning of impending Franco-Austrian conflict. It had been the occasion for an alarmed foray into foreign policy by Disraeli. See above, 145.

³ Derby may have chosen to ignore this letter until he received that of 19 May; his diary makes no record of it until the second letter was received.

⁴ Derby thought Disraeli's ‘language shows an irritability quite unusual with him’. DD, 19 May 1874, p. 173. Thereafter, however, the Prime Minister regularly complained about the dilatoriness of the Foreign Office.

⁵ Derby was mystified by Disraeli's persistence with this, ‘for the event was one on which no action could be taken, and whether the news reached us at 10 p.m. on Sat or next morning at breakfast could be of no practical importance to anybody’. DD, 20 May 1874, p. 173.

⁶ It is uncertain what this despatch was about, though it is possible it was the Brussels conference on the usages of war. That and Spain were the only matters of foreign policy discussed at Cabinet that day.

⁷ Derby agreed: ‘Layard is wanting in tact and diplomatic smoothness: indeed diplomacy is the last profession he should have chosen.’ DD, 22 February 1875, p. 197. Disraeli changed his mind later, when Layard was his tool in the undermining of Derby's policy.

⁸ Francisco Serrano Domínguez, Duke de la Torre (1813–1885), Spanish statesman; sometime acting regent, acting president, president, prime minister, and chairman of the executive.

⁹ Derby passed this note to Disraeli ‘before the Cabinet began’. According to Derby's diary, he, Salisbury, and Cairns, with Disraeli's support, led the successful case against increased expenditure. DD, 12 January 1875, p. 189.

¹⁰ The enclosure does not remain, but evidently discussed Bismarck's aggressive treatment of Belgium. The German Chancellor, engaged in his Kulturkampf campaign against domestic ‘ultramontanism’, was using alleged support by Belgian clergy for his opponents in Germany as a pretext for putting pressure on the Belgian government. It followed an incident in which a Belgian, Alexandre Duchesne, asked a senior French cleric to pay him to assassinate Bismarck. The dispute added to tension between France and Germany, the latter ever suspicious of French designs on Belgium, and formed part of the backdrop to the ‘War-in-Sight’ crisis. See below, 290.

¹¹ The reference is to the ‘War-in-Sight’ crisis. Bismarck's aggressiveness had increased tension between Germany and France, and France suspected it was the prelude to a general war. The issue reached a crisis point with the publication in Die Post, on 19 April, of an officially inspired article headed ‘Ist der Krieg in Sicht?’ Peace was secured by 11 May. At a meeting in Berlin between the Kaiser and the Tsar, Odo Russell made it clear to Bismarck that Britain would support Russian attempts to prevent war.

¹² This letter is reproduced in M&B, V, p. 422.

¹³ With the Queen.

¹⁴ Despite Disraeli's grand aspirations, Russia was already warning Bismarck not to move against France, which proved sufficient to stop Germany. The Prime Minister nevertheless had the satisfaction of being able to ride on Russia's coat-tails. His reference was to Britain's intervention in the eastern crisis of 1839–1841, when Palmerston had co-operated with Russia to stop the Egyptians, under Mehmet Ali, defeating the Turks and precipitating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As part of the settlement, Mehmet Ali lost control of Syria, which he had conquered. Orleanist France, which saw Mehmet Ali as its protégé, was outraged at Palmerston's intervention in concert with autocratic Russia. Historians have regarded it as one of his diplomatic triumphs, reversing the Russian advantage achieved in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which Russia had forced on a weakened Turkey in 1833.

¹⁵ This letter is reproduced in M&B, V, p. 423.

¹⁶ Disraeli's reference was to the success of British policy over ‘War in Sight’. See above, 290 and 291.

¹⁷ A larger part of this letter, with two further, short paragraphs, is reproduced in M&B, V, p. 426.

¹⁸ Archivist's note: ‘?June 1875’. Buckle agreed, though there seems no particular reason for assuming it was written then, other than its proximity to the ‘War-in-Sight’ crisis.

¹⁹ The post still held by George, Duke of Cambridge.

²⁰ A revolt against local misgovernment broke out in Herzegovina in early July 1875; by the end of August the whole of Bosnia was involved. On 19 August, Turkey had agreed to a Russian proposal for mediation by consuls representing the great powers. The British ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot (see above, 127), had indicated British support for the consular mission, as his telegram explained.

²¹ Telegram. A note on the reverse: ‘Herzegovina Assents reluctantly to joint mediation.’

²² See above, 294. Count Gyula Andrássy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, had brought pressure to bear at the Porte, through a joint representation from his own ambassador and those of Russia and Germany. The Porte had urged Britain to act with the other powers in making it clear to the insurgents that they could expect no outside aid. Disraeli reluctantly consented to do so.

²³ Derby was wise. The consular mission that was supposed to mediate between the insurgents and the Turks arrived in Mostar in mid-September. The rebels refused to meet its representatives or to accept Turkish promises. By the end of the month the mission had failed.

²⁴ This Cabinet meeting made the decision to purchase the reversion of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal Company. In early October 1875, the Ottoman Empire announced its bankruptcy, undermining the Egyptian ability to borrow money. On 15 November 1875, Frederick Greenwood, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, had warned Derby that the Khedive was thinking of selling to France the reversion of his 176,602 canal shares, equivalent to a 44% interest in the Company. When Greenwood called at the Foreign Office on 16 November, he found that a British bid for the shares was ‘as good as settled’. Derby raised the question in Cabinet on 17 November and it was agreed in principle that the Government would seek to obtain the shares. The Khedive formally offered them for £4 million on 23 November. After the meeting on 24 November, Rothschilds the bankers provided the money in the absence of Parliament. For Derby's account of the meeting, see DD, p. 256. He recorded that ‘all attended, except J. Manners’, though Gathorne Hardy, too, was absent (DGH, p. 254).

²⁵ Lionel Nathan de Rothschild. See above, 257.

²⁶ General Edward Stanton, consul-general in Egypt.

²⁷ Buckle (M&B, V, p. 442) accused Derby of being against the Suez shares purchase, but there is no evidence to support the accusation. Neither Malmesbury's account, nor Derby's diary, nor Carnarvon's, lists any objection to the purchase. In his diary entry for 24 November, Derby noted that ‘there was no difference of opinion among us’. DD, p. 256. Indeed, it was he who first brought the issue to Cabinet.

²⁸ The French ambassador, rather than the Liberal politician, Sir William Harcourt. Derby was concerned that the public desire for an active British policy might create difficulties overseas, especially if it later turned into a ‘war-cry’. DD, 29 November 1875, p. 257. His desire to dampen down public opinion and mollify France would irritate some of his colleagues and the Queen. See below, 303.

²⁹ Charles Gavard, the French chargé d'affaires in London. The conversation with Harcourt was on 27 November; that with Gavard on 20 November.

³⁰ The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns.

³¹ The Khedive was offering, for £2 million, to sell his right to 15% on all Suez profits over 5%, ‘a very shadowy kind of property’. DD, p. 257. He said the French were prepared to offer the money; Derby was sceptical. This second offer was rejected; it has been confused by some with Derby's support for the initial purchase. On 24 December, Derby advised the Khedive not to sell his rights to France and the Khedive backed down.

³² ‘Decypher [sic] telegram from M^r. Disraeli’. No address. Note on reverse: ‘Suez Canal As to Khedive's power to sell his right to 15% profits.’

³³ Carnarvon had expressed alarm at Derby's public offer to the French of an international commission to manage the Canal. Disraeli had written to Derby from Longleat on 2 December on other matters, noting that he had received a letter from Carnarvon, ‘the vein of wh: in my mind is correct’. Derby firmly deflected both men's objections.

³⁴ His exchanges were reported in letters written by Gavard and Harcourt to Decazes, and published in The Times on 3 December.

³⁵ Presumably the royal embarrassment referred to in Derby's letter of 20 December, 305.

³⁶ Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh (1844–1900), the Queen's second son, who had run up huge debts. Two days later, Derby recorded a letter from Disraeli, who had ‘been reproached by the Queen’ for letting the secret out. DD, p. 259.

³⁷ The Andrássy Note of 30 December 1875, which embodied proposals from Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany asking the Turks to provide guarantees to implement the reforms to which they had agreed in August. Derby received the Note at Knowsley on 4 January: ‘The long-expected Austrian note is come: I read it rapidly, and with satisfaction, for in tone and general purport it appears moderate, and I can see nothing in it dangerous to Turkish power’. DD, 4 January 1876, p. 265.

³⁸ Derby had received a letter from Salisbury on 8 January, ‘the purport of it that we ought to accept the Austrian reforms in the lump, but take care not to engage ourselves in such a manner as to be drawn into further proceedings which may be contemplated by the three Emperors’. Derby agreed with Salisbury's conclusions, if not all his assumptions regarding the other powers. DD, p. 266.

³⁹ The Sultan.

⁴⁰ Via telegram. Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 18–19.

⁴¹ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 19.

⁴² Italy and France agreed to support the Andrássy Note in early January. The Daily Telegraph (4 January) and The Times (19 January) urged Britain to follow suit. The Cabinet agreed to support the Note on 18 January. The Turks accepted it on 13 February and the results were communicated to the Bosnian insurgents, who were granted a general amnesty on 22 February.

⁴³ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 22–23.

⁴⁴ Although there was an armistice in the fighting between the Turks and the insurgents from 1 to 12 April 1876, it broke down because the demands of the latter were deemed ‘inadmissible’. Fighting resumed in the region. On 1 April the Ottoman Empire defaulted on payments to its bondholders. On 18 April The Times pronounced the Andrássy Note dead: ‘a memorial of good intentions’.

⁴⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 23.

⁴⁶ Possibly a reference to Gorchakov's reversion to acting first with the Dreikaiserbund, as would be the case with the Berlin Memorandum, despite the Anglo-Russian co-operation over ‘War in Sight’ in 1875.

⁴⁷ Loftus. Polonius was Ophelia's father, regarded by Hamlet (Act 2, scene ii) as a ‘tedious old fool’; Disraeli's view of Loftus might be similarly summarized.

⁴⁸ On 26 April, The Times reported that the Austrians, Germans, and Russians were thinking of submitting more drastic proposals to the Porte, but that disagreement between St Petersburg and Vienna was holding up any new diplomatic initiative.

⁴⁹ The Cabinet met on Saturday 29 April, principally on the Merchant Shipping Bill. Given the death of Derby's mother on 26 April, doubt about his attendance might have arisen. DD, p. 292; DGH, p. 271.

⁵⁰ On 6 May 1876 the German and French consuls in Salonika were murdered in a Turkish mosque by a mob; an immediate demand for satisfaction was presented to the Porte, which promised redress. On 11 May, Gorchakov, Bismarck, and Andrássy met in Berlin to draw up a set of demands calling for fresh guarantees from the Sultan. The Berlin Memorandum was drawn up on 12 May, and its contents were made known to Odo Russell the following day. The ‘excluded ambassadors’ were, therefore, those of Britain, France, and Italy.

⁵¹ Appended in another hand at the bottom of the letter: ‘This relates to the “Berlin Proposals”, of which Count Munster told me Sat[urda]^y night but wh: had not yet reached Mr D. when I called on Sunday at 12.’

⁵² Reproduced in full in M&B, VI, pp. 24–26. This note was drafted by Disraeli to be read to the Cabinet on 16 May 1876 (see DD, p. 297). The paper was written in another hand (Corry's?) and was clearly passed to Derby for filing, given that it remains in his papers.

⁵³ The Berlin Memorandum asked the Sultan for fresh guarantees for the protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Its final clause suggested that, if a proposed armistice failed to bring peace, it would become necessary for the powers ‘to supplement their diplomatic action by [. . .] efficacious measures’. According to Derby, Disraeli ‘seemed to care very little about the plan itself, whether good or bad, but wished me to profess indignation at our not having been consulted earlier’. DD, 15 May 1876, p. 296. Derby objected to the Memorandum, in conversations with the Austrian, Russian, and German ambassadors, on 15 May. The Cabinet agreed to reject it on 16 May.

⁵⁴ Date in another hand.

⁵⁵ Year appended by another hand, which has also noted ‘Berlin proposals’ at the top of the letter.

⁵⁶ Hugh Guion MacDonell, secretary and periodically acting chargé d'affaires at the Berlin embassy, January 1875–May 1878.

⁵⁷ Than the wording of Derby's reply, presumably.

⁵⁸ Russell had urged Derby to reconsider his intention to reject the Memorandum and warned of serious consequences if Britain did reject it.

⁵⁹ The press, at least, approved of the government's policy. The Times (23 May) thought rejection was ‘in accordance with a foreign policy which has been practised by each party in succession’ – non-intervention. The Globe, The Standard, the Pall Mall Gazette, and the Daily Telegraph followed suit.

⁶⁰ As early as 9 May, Elliot had urged Vice-Admiral Drummond to send ships to Besika Bay because of the danger of unrest in Constantinople; on 22 May, the Cabinet agreed to strengthen the fleet in Turkish waters.

⁶¹ The extent to which the British fleet should be strengthened had been the subject of a debate in Cabinet, in which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had disagreed. DD, 24 May 1876, p. 298. This letter hints at Derby's frustration with Disraeli's Eastern preoccupations. The Prime Minister replied on 25 May that they should await the results of a conference between Elliot and Admiral Phipps Hornby ‘before troubling them further’. M&B, VI, p. 29.

⁶² A reference to previous exchanges about FO dilatoriness (see 313, above, and note); but Disraeli's complaints continued. See below, 335.

⁶³ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 29.

⁶⁴ The Convention of London of 13 July 1841, negotiated by Palmerston and signed by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey. This closed the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to non-Turkish warships when the Ottoman Empire was not at war.

⁶⁵ Derby already knew this: see DD, 27 May 1876, p. 299.

⁶⁶ It appears that Russell gave an initial indication in Berlin that he expected Britain to assent to the Memorandum; certainly, he was in favour of such a course. See above, 318.

⁶⁷ 326 and 327 are reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 30, as one letter, but they appear to be two separate letters, perhaps sent in the same envelope. The latter is unaddressed, unsigned, and undated.

⁶⁸ The news had arrived of the deposition of Abdul Aziz (1830–1876), Ottoman sultan since 1861.

⁶⁹ Disraeli seemed to believe that Elliot should have inspired the coup; for Disraeli, Elliot's negligence in palace conspiracy was merely one note on a long charge-sheet.

⁷⁰ See note above, 327.

⁷¹ Derby thought this fear was absurd, given the existence of the telegraph, but at the Cabinet of 1 June he agreed ‘that we shall tell the Powers that strict orders have been given to our fleet to do nothing that can ever be misconstrued as a violation of treaties, and that we hope and expect that similar instructions have been issued by them’. He regarded this as ‘needless, but it is also harmless’. DD, p. 300.

⁷² The Battle of Navarino, 20 October 1827, in which the British, French, and Russian fleets had destroyed the Turkish fleet; there had been confusion about Admiral Codrington's instructions and he was widely felt to have exceeded them, leaving Turkey dangerously exposed to Russia. ‘I reminded him’, Derby noted, ‘that in the days of Navarino there were no telegraphs.’ DD, 1 June 1876, p. 300.

⁷³ Not found.

⁷⁴ On 9 June the powers withdrew the Berlin Memorandum. The Times (10 June) and most of the other journals concurred in seeing this as a diplomatic success for the Government.

⁷⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 34–35.

⁷⁶ This meeting was one in a series of exchanges, formal and informal, between the great powers as they manoeuvred in the period immediately before Serbia and Montenegro went to war with the Turks.

⁷⁷ In other words, he was sober. Presumably, the claret in question was either the wine he consumed or the colour of his cheeks thereafter; possibly both.

⁷⁸ ‘good will’.

⁷⁹ For Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Russian proposition.

⁸⁰ There is a useful account of this meeting in R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: a study in diplomacy and party politics (London, 1962), p. 43. Shuvalov was making his point about Montenegro in response to Disraeli dismissing suggestions that Britain wished to annex Egypt.

⁸¹ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 36.

⁸² With a flurry of letters on 28 June, the precise chronological order is difficult to establish, but, given the lack of either a clear reply to this letter from Derby or any comment by Disraeli on the points made by Derby in his letters, it seems likely that this letter was written in the morning and the matter dealt with when the two men met. As usual, Derby took little notice of Disraeli's sabre-rattling.

⁸³ Gorchakov had proposed granting more territory for Montenegro and Serbia, and autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russians were also very keen for Britain to make joint representations with the other powers at the Porte, but Britain made it clear that this would not happen. On 9 July, the Queen (after advice from the Cabinet) formally responded to a Russian proposal for such a joint approach, as conveyed by a letter from the Tsar on 4 July. LQV, series two, II, pp. 468–470.

⁸⁴ On 30 June the Serbs declared war, followed by Montenegro on 1 July.

⁸⁵ The letter is dated 27 June, but Derby's diary records the meetings with Shuvalov and Harcourt as being held on 28 June. DD, p. 305.

⁸⁶ According to Derby, he had told Shuvalov that, of the three points made by Gorchakov's last despatch (see above, 332), Britain agreed with Russia on the question of Montenegro, on which the Turks ought to be conciliatory, but thought it was too late as Serbia had ‘evidently decided on war’. DD, 28 June 1876, p. 305.

⁸⁷ Monday 26 June 1876. Parl. Deb., CCXXX, cols 395–418. For Derby's contribution, see cols 411–417.

⁸⁸ Francis Napier, tenth Lord Napier of Merchistoun and first Baron Ettrick (1819–1898), who had briefly acted as Indian Viceroy in 1872.

⁸⁹ This letter is reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 44–45, but, as was Buckle's general practice, without Derby's reply. This is one of many examples of skilful omission by Disraeli's biographers.

⁹⁰ On the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’, the massacre of Bulgarians by Turkish Bashi-Bazouks, the first news of which had reached London via the Daily News on 23 June. Disraeli was clearly embarrassed by his own mishandling of the question. The fault lay with him, however, not the Foreign Office. In the House of Commons on 10 July he had denied the scale of the atrocities on the grounds that ‘oriental’ people ‘seldom, I believe, resort to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner’. This provoked laughter among MPs. Parl. Deb., CCXXX, col. 1182.

⁹¹ William Edward Baxter (1825–1890), Liberal MP for Montrose, formerly a junior minister.

⁹² This clearly refers to the Prime Minister's letter of the same date.

⁹³ A note at the foot of the letter adds: ‘I enclose a mem. sent me by Tenterden.’

⁹⁴ Reproduced in M&B, V, pp. 491–492, along with Richmond's reply of 26 July, pp. 492–493.

⁹⁵ Intriguingly, this letter is dated the day before the letter Disraeli wrote to Derby, his ‘faithful companion’, but the date may be an error; Richmond's letter to Cairns of 27 July (see below) suggests that the duke received it on 26 July, the same day on which Derby recorded receiving his own copy. DD, 26 July 1876, p. 313. Whether error or no, had Derby demurred, the simultaneous (or perhaps prior) despatch of letters to others would have marshalled support for Disraeli to negate any objection.

⁹⁶ Lady Derby.

⁹⁷ Lady Bradford was one of Disraeli's closest confidantes; as this letter suggests, neither she nor he was very discreet with gossip about Cabinet. It is interesting to compare this letter with those of late 1877 and early 1878, in which the Derbys were identified as the likely sources of Cabinet leaks. In fact, the Cabinet had been leaking from the very top for some time.

⁹⁸ Charles Philip Yorke (1836–1897), fifth Earl of Hardwicke; son of the Cabinet minister of 1852 and 1858–1859 of the same name. Known as ‘Champagne Charlie’, he held a Court appointment as Master of the Buckhounds.

⁹⁹ On 25 July, Disraeli told Lady Bradford, ‘We had a stormy Cabinet yesterday’. See Marquis of Zetland (ed.), The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, 2 vols (London, 1929), II, p. 58. The Cabinet evidently had a different view. Derby made no note of any debate (DD, p. 312) and nor did Hardy in his diary (DGH, p. 284).

¹⁰⁰ For the murder of the French and German consuls on 6 May.

¹⁰¹ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 46.

¹⁰² See Parl. Deb., CCXXXI, cols 721–746.

¹⁰³ Disraeli blamed Sir Henry Elliot for taking too long to send an official report.

¹⁰⁴ Richard Reade, British consul for the Ottoman vilayet of the Danube since 16 July 1874; resided at Rustchuk (variously spelt by contemporaries), now the Bulgarian city of Ruse. Reade served in the British delegation to the Constantinople Conference in December 1876. He was appointed consul for the Ionian Islands in 1879.

¹⁰⁵ Disraeli, still convinced that the press reports of atrocities were exaggerations, had made another gaffe in the House of Commons on 31 July, referring to the accounts as ‘coffee house babble’. Parl. Deb., vol. CCXXXI, col. 203.

¹⁰⁶ Spencer Compton Cavendish, Marquess of Hartington (1833–1908), eighth Duke of Devonshire from 1891; Liberal leader in the House of Commons.

¹⁰⁷ Milan Obrenović (1854–1901), ruled as Prince Milan IV (1868–1882) and King Milan I (1882–1889).

¹⁰⁸ Sir William Arthur White (1824–1891), British consul-general in Serbia, 1875–1878; thereafter in Bucharest.

¹⁰⁹ Gorchakov.

¹¹⁰ Hardy had asked for information about the massacres and Britain's response. He recorded receipt of Derby's reply in his diary on 29 August, and noted that the terms of any international mediation ‘ought to be such as the Powers will have a claim to compel adherence to and protection for the Christians should in some way be secured’. DGH, p. 288.

¹¹¹ On 10 August, Hardy had recorded his concern that Derby ‘does not seem to be aware of the feeling existing in & out of Parliament’. DGH, p. 287. R.A. Cross, on the other hand, told Mary Derby on 7 September that the agitation would ‘show the country what he [Derby] can do’, while leading members of the Opposition, such as John Bright and Lord Granville, were openly supportive of the Foreign Secretary, as a means of contrasting Derby's approach with Disraeli's.

¹¹² This is one of the few references that we have to Cairns being in any sort of ‘inner Cabinet’, and might be noted in view of Salisbury's later comments about his influence. See Memorandum by Arthur Balfour, 8 May 1880, in Robin Harcourt-Williams (ed.), Salisbury–Balfour Correspondence: letters exchanged between the third Marquess of Salisbury and his nephew Arthur James Balfour 1869–1892 (Hertfordshire Record Society, 1988), p. 43.

¹¹³ Disraeli had written to Derby on 15 August proposing either Elliot's dismissal or the appointment of an ‘extraordinary envoy’, on the grounds of Elliot's ill-health, to carry out the meaningful duties of ambassador instead. M&B, VI, p. 49. See also DD, 30 August 1876, p. 322. As usual, Buckle did not reproduce Derby's reply. Given his response, Disraeli agreed, and Elliot was retained at Constantinople until February 1877. DD, 3 September 1876, p. 323. See also below, 349.

¹¹⁴ A telegram, recorded in another hand.

¹¹⁵ The Prince of Montenegro had proposed an armistice; Britain would act as mediator. DD, 30 August 1876, p. 322.

¹¹⁶ Both Serbia and Montenegro, having suffered heavy defeats, had accepted Derby's offer of mediation. The Porte, on the verge of victory, hesitated, but eventually agreed to a ceasefire on 15 September.

¹¹⁷ The reference is to Henry IV Part 2, Act 1, scene ii, where Falstaff talks of turning ‘diseases to commodity’.

¹¹⁸ Reproduced, without the section ‘If these efforts [. . .] imperfect expressions’, in M&B, VI, pp. 51–52.

¹¹⁹ Reproduced in full in M&B, VI, pp. 52–53.

¹²⁰ Sir Andrew Buchanan (1807–1882), ambassador at Vienna until February 1878: ‘safe and sensible, but at no time has he been very efficient’. DD, 24 August 1875, p. 239. Disraeli thought him ‘a hopeless mediocrity’. M&B, VI, p. 49.

¹²¹ Disraeli went on to speculate at length about German policy.

¹²² Northcote had written to Disraeli on 2 September, with suggestions about punishments for the atrocities and concessions on autonomy.

¹²³ Walter Baring, second secretary at the Constantinople embassy since 1873, had been ordered to carry out an investigation into the atrocities, which he duly did from 19 July to 20 August. He estimated that some 12,000 Bulgarians were massacred, as opposed to the much larger figures mentioned in the press. The official Turkish estimate, on the other hand, was just 1,830.

¹²⁴ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 53–54, but without the first line or the section after ‘Bulgarian Bogy’.

¹²⁵ Northcote was one of the Cabinet ministers unhappy with the Government's public response to the atrocities. Referring to the ‘unfortunate levity of our chief’, he complained to Carnarvon, on 4 September, of the government's ‘insanely’ allowing ‘the idea to get abroad that we are indifferent to the cruelties which have been committed’.

¹²⁶ In his diary, Derby wrote that Disraeli's plea ‘was hardly necessary, since I agree with him’. DD, 7 September 1876, p. 324.

¹²⁷ In the manner of Hudibras, the seventeenth-century mock-heroic poem by Samuel Butler; suggestive of the ridiculous.

¹²⁸ i.e. ‘Christian’.

¹²⁹ Philippopoli/Philippopolis; modern-day Plovdiv in Bulgaria.

¹³⁰ Gladstone's pamphlet, ‘Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East’ – which contained his famous, if misinterpreted, phrase on removing the Turk from Europe ‘bag and baggage’ – had been published on 6 September. The Latin tag (loosely translated), referring to the ‘wordy and dignified’ letters of antiquity, or perhaps to papal epistles, poked fun at Gladstone's pretensions.

¹³¹ Principally Gladstone's.

¹³² Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 60.

¹³³ Northcote was due to speak at the Edinburgh Conservative Working Men's Association on 16 September.

¹³⁴ Disraeli was not glad that Northcote would be speaking. His instructions, in a letter of 11 September, are reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 61–62. Northcote was warned to give no indication that the Government was altering its policy in response to public opinion. He duly stated that it would be ‘an unwise hasty policy [. . .] to drive the Turk out of Europe’.

¹³⁵ From the London Trades Unionists and the Working Men's Peace Association.

¹³⁶ Derby told the first that ‘there are a great many people in England who fancy that Lord Beaconsfield is the Sultan and I am the Grand Vizier’. The Times, 12 September 1876.

¹³⁷ His speech of 11 September.

¹³⁸ ‘I doubt’, noted Hardy, ‘if Derby's cold water will quench the fire wh. however may burn itself out.’ DGH, 14 September 1876, p. 290.

¹³⁹ The historian E.A. Freeman (1823–1892) was one of Derby's harshest critics during the atrocities agitation. See DD, pp. 314, 320.

¹⁴⁰ In his speech at Edinburgh on 16 September. See his letter to Cross of 8 September, above, 357.

¹⁴¹ ‘Letter from Disraeli [. . .] urging me (needlessly) not to make any concession to the popular cry.’ DD, 22 September 1876, p. 328. The next day, too, Disraeli wrote, telling Derby: ‘You can't be too firm.’ See M&B, VI, p. 68.

¹⁴² See account, below, 365.

¹⁴³ The by-election had been called in the wake of Disraeli's elevation to the Lords. T.F. Fremantle, the Conservative candidate, received 2,725 votes, while R.C.G. Carington, the Liberal, had 2,539. This majority of 186 contrasted with Disraeli's total of 2,999 in 1874, as opposed to the nearest Liberal (also elected, as Buckinghamshire was a three-member seat), who only received 1,720 votes.

¹⁴⁴ In an eve-of-poll speech at Aylesbury on 20 September, Disraeli had declared that ‘a great portion of the people of this country’ had ‘arrived at a conclusion’ that, ‘if carried into effect, would alike be injurious to the permanent and important interests of England, and fatal to any chance of preserving the peace of Europe’.

¹⁴⁵ In his letter to Disraeli of 23 September, Salisbury had claimed that ‘the traditional Palmerstonian policy is at an end’ and had advocated, among other ideas, an official ‘Protector of Christians’. The letter is reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 70–71. Derby noted: ‘I keep copy of the proposal, though not believing that it will work.’ DD, 25 September 1876, p. 329. On 26 September, Disraeli wrote to Salisbury, politely acknowledging the proposal but commending Derby's policy. M&B, VI, pp. 71–72.

¹⁴⁶ With a deputation from the City. For an account, see The Times, 28 September 1876.

¹⁴⁷ Sir William James Richmond Cotton (1822–1902), Lord Mayor of London, 1875–1876; businessman and Conservative MP for the City of London, 1874–1885; a critic of Disraeli's policy in the East.

¹⁴⁸ John Gellibrand Hubbard (1805–1889), first Baron Addington from 1887, merchant and fiscal reformer; Conservative MP for the City of London.

¹⁴⁹ The same day, Derby's diary recorded: ‘The general feeling seemed to be that if nothing else would accomplish the object, we ought to go to war to drive the Turks out of Europe.’ DD, p. 330.

¹⁵⁰ This is the second half of the letter. Both halves are reproduced in almost complete form in M&B, VI, pp. 74–75. The first half deals with a royal intervention of no broader significance.

¹⁵¹ Robert Lowe (1811–1892), later Viscount Sherbrooke; Liberal MP; formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer and Home Secretary under Gladstone.

¹⁵² Serbia resumed hostilities on 27 September. A telegram announcing this intelligence appeared in The Times on 29 September, dated the previous day.

¹⁵³ A longer version of this letter appears in M&B, VI, p. 76.

¹⁵⁴ With the Queen; a rare honour for Derby.

¹⁵⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 76.

¹⁵⁶ Loftus had sent reports that Russia, ‘with the consent of Austria’, would occupy Bulgaria with 150,000 men. The rumours coincided with a marked change in Russia's official attitude in favour of Serbia, most notably the partial mobilization ordered by Gorchakov on 22 September. Unsurprisingly, Shuvalov denied all knowledge of the news. DD, 6 October 1876, p. 332.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Since the Russians have shown their hand, public feeling has changed in a singular way.’ DD, 10 October 1876, p. 332.

¹⁵⁸ The Queen wanted to send a special mission to Russia. Livadia was Alexander II's Black Sea retreat, a hotbed of pan-Slav intrigue.

¹⁵⁹ A postscript adds: ‘The news of today is good.’ Turkey had agreed to an armistice of five to six months.

¹⁶⁰ ‘Gladstone has written a strange letter, which nobody understands: in it he deplores the influence of “Judaic sympathies”, not confined to professing Jews, on the eastern question.’ DD, 13 October 1876, p. 333.

¹⁶¹ Shuvalov had, on his own initiative, signalled his agreement for a ceasefire of ‘not less than a month’, and was happy to accept the six-month armistice. But on 11 October Gorchakov angrily telegraphed in favour of a shorter armistice, giving Russia the flexibility to begin war if it wished.

¹⁶² H.P. Liddon (1829–1890), the high church canon of St Paul's, one of the first to write vivid accounts of impaled Bulgarians; a supporter of the Greek Christians and critic of the Government's policy. This remark later grew into Salisbury's claim to Carnarvon, in February 1877, that Derby had in fact tried to stop Liddon going to Highclere. Exchanges between Derby, Disraeli, and Salisbury about the irritation caused by Carnarvon, who in November was prepared to tolerate a Russian occupation of Turkish territory to protect Orthodox Christians, can be found in M&B, VI, pp. 94–96. See also DD, 18 November 1876, pp. 344–345.

¹⁶³ According to Derby, Disraeli had suggested occupying Constantinople, as a ‘material guarantee’, in the Cabinet of 4 October. DD, 4 October, p. 331.

¹⁶⁴ The Queen.

¹⁶⁵ Of the Turkish armistice proposal. The duration of the proposed armistice was the nub of the problem: Russia considered it too long a period.

¹⁶⁶ Alice Maud Mary (1843–1878), the Queen's third child, who had married Prince Louis of Hesse in 1862 and who, ironically, was the mother of the future Tsarina of Russia.

¹⁶⁷ Bismarck's dislike of Gorchakov dated back to the late 1840s and was well known in Europe's chancelleries. The reference to the previous year's ‘conduct’ was to the ‘War-in-Sight’ crisis.

¹⁶⁸ In early October both Russia and Austria had asked Bismarck whether Germany would remain neutral in the event of an Austro-Russian war. Bismarck, realizing that an answer either way would spell the end of the Dreikaiserbund, remained silent.

¹⁶⁹ The first (and less significant) half of this letter appears in M&B, VI, p. 94, but without the section reproduced here. The section in M&B immediately precedes the material here.

¹⁷⁰ It is unclear precisely what Disraeli meant here, though it seems likely that it was Elliot's part in persuading the Turks to put forward their offer of an armistice a few days before. See 374 and 375, above.

¹⁷¹ ‘high politics’; generally used in a diplomatic context.

¹⁷² This is one of the few extant references to the Russian alliance offer made to the fourteenth Earl of Derby in 1852. See above, 13.

¹⁷³ Alsace and Lorraine.

¹⁷⁴ The full text of this letter appears in M&B, VI, p. 81.

¹⁷⁵ Disraeli was anxious after receipt of intelligence from Colonel F.A. Wellesley, British military attaché in St Petersburg.

¹⁷⁶ Disraeli at this time believed that Constantinople was ‘the key of India’. See Memorandum by Lord Barrington, 23 October 1876, M&B, VI, p. 84.

¹⁷⁷ ‘In afternoon I had from Disraeli a letter which made me uneasy as it indicated greater alarm [. . .] than anything in our correspondence seems to warrant.’ DD, 22 October 1876, p. 336.

¹⁷⁸ Disraeli had asked Ward Hunt to order the fleet up to Constantinople in the event of a Russian ship going through the Bosphorus. According to Derby, ‘Hunt naturally demurs, and says he must have the authority of the F.O [. . .] I cannot quite believe that Disraeli would have directed this to be done, without consulting me.’ DD, 24 October 1876, p. 337.

¹⁷⁹ From Lord Eustace Cecil, Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. DD, 29 October 1876, p. 338.

¹⁸⁰ Disraeli assured Derby, the next day, that ‘he knew nothing about the matter of the guns’. DD 30 October 1876, p. 339. Hardy, ‘a good deal annoyed’, noted in his diary that he had merely sent an enquiry, and that Cecil had written ‘needlessly’ to Derby. DGH, p. 195.

¹⁸¹ A conference of the powers at Constantinople had been mooted since October, and was formally proposed by Britain in November. Disraeli and Derby agreed that Salisbury should be their representative. On 3 November, he formally agreed to ‘take my part in the comedy with all solemnity’. Salisbury departed for the conference on 20 November 1876, and en route conducted what Disraeli called ‘a serviceable reconnaissance’ of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

¹⁸² This letter is reproduced in full in Cecil, II, p. 95.

¹⁸³ A criticism of Lord Tenterden and his minions, rather than Derby.

¹⁸⁴ The Prince of Wales, who had suggested a diplomatic tour of the kind on which Salisbury embarked prior to Constantinople. This letter was written to persuade Salisbury to undertake it.

¹⁸⁵ Beust was speaking the truth, as far as he was aware, but only because Andrássy had not told him about the secret agreement he had reached with Russia at Reichstadt in July 1876. There, and at a series of subsequent meetings, Alexander II and Franz Josef effectively agreed to Austria's non-intervention in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. The question of whether an understanding existed between Russia and Austria became one of the most important disagreements between Derby and Disraeli. Disraeli refused to believe in the existence of any Austro-Russian deal, thus believing Austria to be more of a free agent than it was. Derby, on the other hand, increasingly believed in the possibility of an Austro-Russian agreement, not least because Shuvalov repeatedly told him about it.

¹⁸⁶ The letter in question, that of 23 November, is reproduced in Cecil, II, pp. 96–98.

¹⁸⁷ A Russo-Turkish war.

¹⁸⁸ As the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, had reported to Derby on 3 June 1876: ‘Bismarck has never liked England and Russia to become intimate because he fears that the Anglo-Russian sympathies of France might lead to an “entente a 3”’.

¹⁸⁹ The much longer letter from which this extract is taken is also reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 103–106.

¹⁹⁰ Letters of 25 November and 30 November, respectively; reproduced in Cecil, II, pp. 98–99 and 106–107.

¹⁹¹ He had heard from the Rothschilds.

¹⁹² Derby was unsurprised by this news, as his diary recorded on 16 January (DD, p. 367). He knew Shuvalov's methods, and had previously warned Salisbury ‘not to give credit to anything that Ignatieff may say he has heard from Schou as to my views, since he is sure to put something into my mouth that I never said’. DD, 12 December 1876, p. 351.

¹⁹³ This letter is reproduced in the same form (without ellipses marked) in Cecil, II, p. 123.

¹⁹⁴ Odo Russell had written with details of an interview with Bismarck, in which the Chancellor asked, among other things, whether Britain would remain neutral in a Franco-German war.

¹⁹⁵ There was much discussion as to what would happen in the event of the Russo-Turkish war now widely anticipated.

¹⁹⁶ Of the disposition of British forces.

¹⁹⁷ Salisbury.

¹⁹⁸ Parliament opened on 8 February. The Cabinet had already discussed the Queen's Speech on 31 January and 2 February.

¹⁹⁹ Full letter reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 126–127.

²⁰⁰ On 4 February, Gorchakov had issued a circular critical of Turkey but announcing Russia's intention to consult the other powers. In early March it was announced that Ignatiev would tour European capitals for this purpose.

²⁰¹ Disraeli then made a series of proposals as to desirable Turkish concessions in its internal government.

²⁰² ‘I did not answer, as we are sure to meet almost daily.’ DD, 9 February 1877, p. 376.

²⁰³ Richard Cobden (1804–1865), manufacturer and radical politician.

²⁰⁴ ‘It is short, & avoids controversy as far as possible.’ DD, 1 March 1877, p. 380. For details of the circular, see 401, above.

²⁰⁵ Of Turkey.

²⁰⁶ Disraeli had sent some general criticisms the previous day.

²⁰⁷ Ignatiev was the bearer of a protocol for the Porte, which Russia was proposing should be signed by the other powers. Derby had first heard of it when Ignatiev reached Berlin. On 13 March, the Cabinet had agreed to accept the protocol in principle and, on the basis of that discussion, Derby had indeed suggested amendments to Shuvalov on 15 March. At the Cabinet on 17 March, at Salisbury's prompting, Derby agreed to one amendment in the British position. DD, pp. 382–383.

The ‘Cardinal’ in question was, of course, Disraeli.

²⁰⁹ The Cabinet had met on 23 March to confirm their stance: they would not agree to Russia's latest version of its proposals without Russian disarmament. Disraeli made a thinly veiled attack on Salisbury and Carnarvon, the principal dissenters, in order to force them into line.

²¹⁰ Carnarvon noted that this letter was finished at Highclere.

²¹¹ This letter was reproduced, with minor changes, in Cecil, II, pp. 138–139.

²¹² ‘makes one think’.

²¹³ Salisbury was not quite correct. In effect, Russell had dismissed Palmerston in 1851, although there were differing accounts of the episode; but Russell's provocation was also considerable.

²¹⁴ Presumably Disraeli and Derby.

²¹⁵ After a series of exchanges, Shuvalov and Derby had agreed the draft protocol on 29 March and the Russians accepted that it would be ‘null & void’ if ‘peace & disarmament did not follow’. DD, 29 March 1877, p. 386.

²¹⁶ This is one of the very few references before late 1877 to anything unusual about Derby's private life, and its meaning is unclear. It seems to proceed from Carnarvon's pique. His feelings were reciprocated by Derby, who noted of Carnarvon that ‘in his personal relations he is vain, touchy, and egotistical: defects which were always visible in his character, and which power and responsibility have brought into prominence’. DD, 17 January 1878, p. 485.

²¹⁷ ‘little piece’.

²¹⁸ ‘aim’.

²¹⁹ Shuvalov's French exclamations are then recounted.

²²⁰ The Cabinet had met to consider what to do if war broke out in the east. Disraeli ‘pressed strongly for action’, which Derby was sure entailed a British ‘occupation of the Dardanelles’. There was pressure from the Queen to act. According to Derby, Manners wanted to defend Constantinople, while Cairns thought that action would have to be taken, and Salisbury and Carnarvon opposed helping Turkey. Derby, supported by Hardy, thought that any British occupation of Turkish territory was dangerous, and proposed consultation with the other powers. No decision was taken. DD, 21 April 1877, pp. 391–392.

²²¹ In his draft of the same date, IP, BL Add. MS 50018, fo. 22, Northcote had been blunter:

²²² Russia declared war on Turkey on 24 April 1877.

²²³ The contents of this letter were agreed in Cabinet on 2 May.

²²⁴ Derby himself wrote ‘May 11 (?)’, but his diary records, first, a meeting with Beust on 9 May (‘I made a note of what he said for the cabinet’), and then, on 10 May, a meeting with Disraeli. Beust discussed Austria's response to Russian advances, but ‘was vague, & he declared that he had no instructions’. DD, p. 399.

²²⁵ There had been much discussion in Cabinet that day as to Britain's response to the war and communicating with Austria as to a possible joint position. See, e.g., DD, p. 401.

²²⁶ A Cabinet of 16 May 1877 had agreed to ask Vienna what joint steps Austria might take with Britain to prevent a Russian occupation of Constantinople. See above, 416.

²²⁷ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 140.

²²⁸ ‘(i.e. the cabinet)’, DD, 23 May 1877, p. 402.

²²⁹ Sir William Harcourt (1827–1904), Liberal MP and one of the leaders of the party in the Commons during Gladstone's ‘retirement’ of the later 1870s.

²³⁰ On 14 May, Gladstone had moved a resolution criticizing the Government; it was defeated by 354 to 223 votes.

²³¹ Two brief sentences from this letter are reproduced in Cecil, II, p. 141.

²³² An Italian term for a gratuity in addition to the regular price.

²³³ Salisbury replied on 27 May. See below, 425.

²³⁴ Gout. The fourteenth Earl of Derby had suffered from the complaint for decades.

²³⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 141.

²³⁶ Cairns.

²³⁷ Disraeli quoted large section of Cairns's letter of 24 May, reproduced above, 421.

²³⁸ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 141–142.

²³⁹ The archivist's note on this letters suggests ‘?17 May 1877’, but it is not clear why. It seems clear that, as Buckle suggested (M&B, VI, p. 141), it was a reply to Disraeli's letter of 25 May, of which Derby noted receipt on 26 May (DD, p. 403).

²⁴⁰ In other words, presumably, to send a British expedition to the Dardanelles, as Disraeli wanted.

²⁴¹ Derby was under no illusions about who really wanted to have matters ‘considered’, noting on 26 May that the letter from which Disraeli quoted ‘in effect repeats and reflects his own ideas’. DD, p. 403.

²⁴² Despite these comments, Salisbury and Carnarvon were by now increasingly acting with Derby against Disraeli. The Foreign Secretary first noted in his diary on 21 April that it would ‘be singular if the course of events puts me on the side of Salisbury & Co. against Disraeli. Hitherto I have always tried to keep the balance.’ DD, p. 392.

²⁴³ Odo Russell.

²⁴⁴ Loftus.

²⁴⁵ Marked ‘secret’. Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 142–143.

²⁴⁶ A contrast with his earlier judgement: ‘Tho’ of unquestionable talents, he is prejudiced & passionate, and always [. . .] misinforms us’ (to Derby, 12 January 1875; see above, 287).

²⁴⁷ It is unclear precisely which letter.

²⁴⁸ John Thadeus Delane (1817–1879), editor of The Times, whose physical deterioration meant that control over his newspaper was by that stage largely nominal; he retired in 1877.

²⁴⁹ From Shuvalov.

²⁵⁰ The letter in question, of 11 June, is reproduced in LQV, series two, II, pp. 541–542. In it, Derby stressed the desirability of Britain remaining out of the war, that public opinion was against British involvement, and that ‘even unsatisfactory conditions of peace will be better for Turkey than none’.

²⁵¹ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 144–145.

²⁵² Shuvalov first told Derby of Russia's bases for peace on 8 June. They were amended on 14 June to include the demand that the whole of Bulgaria become a vassal state. Shuvalov insisted to Derby that not only was Andrássy aware of the peace terms, but that Russia and Austria had a ‘complete understanding on all points: which is absolutely incompatible with the language held by Andrássy. One of the two is lying: possibly both.’ DD, 11 June 1877, p. 408.

²⁵³ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 145–146.

²⁵⁴ According to Derby, Salisbury had declared in Cabinet on 16 June that ‘Russia at Constantinople would do us no harm’. DD, p. 410.

²⁵⁵ Of a military expedition.

²⁵⁶ Copy of deciphered telegram.

²⁵⁷ Deciphered telegram in Corry's handwriting.

²⁵⁸ Copy of deciphered telegram, ‘read July 11’.

²⁵⁹ Sir John Edmund Commerell (1829–1901), from 1877, second-in-command of the Mediterranean fleet; a close friend of Admiral Phipps Hornby. See above, 437.

²⁶⁰ Thomas Henry Sanderson. This defence would, of course, come back to haunt Derby.

²⁶¹ This was a questionable assumption, given the way in which tensions had escalated with fleet movements prior to the Crimean War.

²⁶² The Cabinet had not really made a decision, but Manners had been unable to persuade his colleagues that Russia's ‘approach’ to Constantinople should be a casus belli. DD, 21 July 1877, pp. 422–423.

²⁶³ Taken from M&B, VI, p. 156. It has not been possible to view the original.

²⁶⁴ Disraeli's puzzlement was understandable; the Cabinet had not made any clear decision.

²⁶⁵ Disraeli managed to persuade him not to resign.

²⁶⁶ This seems to be the record of a telegram received by Layard.

²⁶⁷ ‘Decypher [sic] telegram’.

²⁶⁸ In a scheme which appealed to both the Queen and Disraeli, Wellesley was to be sent on a secret mission to the Tsar. For his instructions, see below, 451.

²⁶⁹ Marked ‘secret’ and, in a significant omission, not published in M&B.

²⁷⁰ Translating Disraeli's rendering of a second-hand Franco-Russian colloquialism is not straightforward, but presumably a ‘misstep’ of some kind.

²⁷¹ In Cabinet.

²⁷² Reproduced with minor changes in M&B, VI, pp. 174–175.

²⁷³ Although Disraeli was, in fact, encouraging Layard to try and obtain just such a campaign, as his instructions of 6 August had stipulated. See above, 449.

²⁷⁴ Odo Russell.

²⁷⁵ ‘clean slates’, presumably to be written anew.

²⁷⁶ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 177–178.

²⁷⁷ The Turks, under Osman Pasha, were holding out at Plevna in Bulgaria.

²⁷⁸ Presumably that written by Disraeli on 4 September in which he bemoaned the lack of positive news from Wellesley.

²⁷⁹ Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton (1831–1891), created Baron Lytton 1873, first Earl Lytton 1880; son of the fourteenth Earl of Derby's Cabinet colleague in 1858, Edward Bulwer Lytton, and nephew of Sir Henry Bulwer; Viceroy of India, 1876–1880.

²⁸⁰ The Royal Titles Bill, making Victoria Empress of India.

²⁸¹ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 178–179.

²⁸² Sir Edward Harris, Malmesbury's younger brother. See above, 116. He retired on 19 November 1877.

²⁸³ Derby thought this letter ‘a most amusing denunciation of all our diplomatists, especially O. Russell, who just now is his favourite aversion’. DD, 14 September 1877, p. 437.

²⁸⁴ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 182–183.

²⁸⁵ 5 October.

²⁸⁶ Derby was unmoved: ‘Letter from Ld Beaconsfield [. . .] full of a scheme for intervention which he wants me to propose. It is characteristic of him that he should do this, knowing that the scheme is utterly opposed to my ideas.’ DD, 27 September 1877, p. 440.

²⁸⁷ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 183.

²⁸⁸ In Derby's record, at the Cabinet meeting on 5 October, Northcote ‘gave a hesitating opinion, neither for nor against’. DD, p. 442.

²⁸⁹ The last paragraph of this letter is reproduced in Cecil, II, p. 161, without its last sentence.

²⁹⁰ Marked ‘secret’.

²⁹¹ Andrassy declined to mediate between Russia and Turkey.

²⁹² Count Ferenc Zichy, Austrian ambassador at Constantinople. According to Layard, he was actively canvassing the idea of Austrian mediation.

²⁹³ The letter ‘of the 14^th’ not found.

²⁹⁴ The Queen.

²⁹⁵ Much of this letter reprises the points Disraeli had made to Corry on 20 October, about a meditated partition of France by Germany, Spain, and Italy.

²⁹⁶ That Britain would promise continued neutrality if Russia pledged not to occupy Constantinople. Northcote, like the rest of the Cabinet, was unaware that, through the Wellesley mission, Disraeli had already told the Tsar that Britain would not remain neutral if there were a second campaign.

²⁹⁷ In his letter to the Queen of the same date, Disraeli described this suggestion as constituting ‘the 5^th policy’ in the Cabinet. He thought Northcote's views ‘utterly futile’, and, in the assumption that Bismarck would associate himself with such an appeal, ‘they approach silliness’. M&B, VI, p. 194.

²⁹⁸ Disraeli had coined a story that there were ‘six parties in the Cabinet’, which had not included Northcote. Derby recorded one version of the story in his diary: ‘The party of war at any price: Hardy, J. Manners, Hicks Beach. The Party who are for declaring war if Russia reaches Constantinople: Cross, Smith and Cairns. The party who are for letting the Russians go to Constantinople but not stay there: Lord Salisbury. The party who are for having a Christian service in St. Sofia: Carnarvon. The party for peace at any price–Lord Derby. The party who are for reconciling all these parties, and standing by our political engagements: The Queen and himself. – In this ingenious summary he has left out Richmond, who may be classed as a follower of the [Lord] Chancellor wherever it pleases the latter to take him: and Northcote, I suppose, as undecided.’ DD, 21 October 1877, p. 446.

²⁹⁹ The Queen's. Kars, in the far east of Turkey near the border, faced the Russians’ second front.

³⁰⁰ Corry's marginal note indicates that this refers to the decision of the Cabinet of 5 November to send ‘a fresh communication’ to Russia. ‘It is so harmless that no one can object: and so useless, that one does not see why he prefers it.’ DD, 5 November 1877, p. 450.

³⁰¹ General Sir Collingwood Dickson, additional military attaché at Constantinople from 5 May 1877 to 10 September 1879.

³⁰² This treaty, signed by Britain, Austria, and France at the end of the Crimean War, guaranteed the ‘independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire’, and its second article stipulated that: ‘Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present treaty as a casus belli.’

³⁰³ The central question for the Cabinet at this point was the nature of what constituted a casus belli if the Turks’ military situation deteriorated further. The danger of a Russian occupation of Constantinople made the question a pressing one, and Cairns was in favour of offering British mediation. Since he was the Cabinet's senior legal authority, it fell to him to pronounce as to the nature of British treaty engagements. As this enclosure outlines, the status of the 1856 treaty was decidedly ambiguous by 1877.

³⁰⁴ To a deputation of 28 November, which, Derby noted, ‘has naturally disappointed & disgusted the war-party’. DD, 29 November 1877, p. 458.

³⁰⁵ Derby had reiterated the Government's commitment to ‘conditional neutrality’, and had stated his scepticism about Constantinople being in immediate danger. In his view, the notion that Russian occupation of Turkey's north-east Black Sea coast would threaten the Suez Canal seemed ‘somewhat difficult of proof’. See The Times, 29 November 1877. Manners drew a series of implications that went far beyond anything Derby had said.

³⁰⁶ Trébizonde, as it was known to contemporary diplomatists; modern-day Trabzon, on Turkey's Black Sea coast. Not claimed by Russia, even under the terms of San Stefano. The Turkish resistance prevented so dramatic an incursion, as Derby predicted in his address on 28 November.

³⁰⁷ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 199.

³⁰⁸ With regard to the conditions of Britain's continuing neutrality, upon which there had been much discussion in Cabinet on 4 December. For two contrasting accounts, see DD, p. 459, and Manners to Queen Victoria, 4 December 1877, M&B, VI, pp. 198–199.

³⁰⁹ ‘Unsatisfactory in tone’, thought Derby on 6 December (DD, p. 460). According to him, the Cabinet of 4 December had agreed not to make a Russian occupation of Constantinople a casus belli, for fear that the ultimatum would be refused, which ‘would only lead to unpleasantness’. DD, p. 459.

³¹⁰ Derby recorded on 8 December his fear that the Cabinet's proceedings were being leaked. DD, p. 461.

³¹¹ On 10 December, after a siege lasting almost six months.

³¹² On 13 December, Shuvalov was officially informed by Derby of Britain's hope that neither Constantinople nor the Dardanelles would be occupied, since such a step would alarm British public opinion and ‘seriously endanger’ relations between the two countries.

³¹³ Marked ‘secret’.

³¹⁴ Last month.

³¹⁵ The Turkish foreign minister.

³¹⁶ See above, 478.

³¹⁷ Phrases from this letter were reproduced in Cecil, II, p. 163.

³¹⁸ With respect to the ‘concluding sentence’, no corresponding letter from Salisbury has been found in Northcote's papers.

³¹⁹ A phrase meaning an inability or unpreparedness to act. In Latin, literally, ‘we cannot’.

³²⁰ This meeting had resulted in stalemate, with Carnarvon, Salisbury, and Derby resisting their colleagues, who wished to support Disraeli's proposed policy; this was to offer mediation to Russia and Turkey at the same time as asking Parliament to vote an extra £5 million for armaments and to increase British forces.

³²¹ This letter and the enclosed memorandum were reproduced, with a series of minor alterations, in Cecil, II, pp. 163–166.

³²² See above, 483.

³²³ The Queen was missed out of the version published by Cecil.

³²⁴ Cecil erroneously has ‘in’ for ‘by’.

³²⁵ The definition of ‘p.p.’ here is not clear, but the meaning of the sentence is that the scenario was not relevant to the situation as it stood.

³²⁶ The fall of Plevna had accelerated Disraeli's wish to summon Parliament to vote funds for a potential British expedition. In the event, on 17 December the summoning of Parliament was delayed, though not to as late a date as Salisbury or Derby would have preferred.

³²⁷ Smith had declared at the crucial Cabinet of 17 December that he was against sending an expedition to Constantinople in advance of any Russian designs on the city. Disraeli, according to Derby, ‘hinted broadly at his wish to resign’ (DD, 17 December, p. 465).

³²⁸ See above, 443.

³²⁹ Turkey had asked the other great powers, collectively, for mediation. This request was received by the Foreign Office on 14 December 1877.

³³⁰ This letter followed a stormy Cabinet on 17 December 1877, at which Disraeli had proposed an immediate summons of Parliament, a subsequent vote for increased military spending, and the pursuit of peace negotiations. Northcote's views lay somewhere between Disraeli on the one hand and Derby, Salisbury, and Carnarvon on the other. Northcote's main objection was to the sudden recall of Parliament. The Cabinet meeting resulted in stalemate, and it looked increasingly likely that the government would break up; at the end of the meeting, Disraeli threatened to resign. Northcote, a natural conciliator and the Cabinet's ‘go-between’, was – as usual – attempting to find an amicable way through the difficulties.

³³¹ The meeting on 18 December was ‘friendly & frank’. Derby noted that Disraeli ‘sees things in a way that is not intelligible to me’. Disraeli also spoke ‘of the constant pressure put upon him by the Queen, who has been in favour of war from the first’. DD, 18 December, pp. 465–466. This meeting preceded a compromise in Cabinet on 18 December, at which Salisbury shifted his position, after Cairns had visited Hatfield to persuade him. It was agreed that Parliament would be recalled for 17 January, later than initially proposed, that some armaments would be increased – with the details to be resolved later – and that Derby would work on a scheme for mediation in the war, using as his starting-point a suggestion by Cairns that the Russian peace proposals of June 1877 be its basis. For the last, see below, 493.

³³² The ‘plan’ to which Northcote referred was his own, contained in the enclosure. Salisbury noted on the letter ‘I think it will furnish a good basis. The [Lord] Chancellor has a proposition somewhat in the same sense.’ It was Cairns's scheme that was the basis of Cabinet discussion on 18 December, and for Derby's subsequent proposal, for which Austrian support was to be sought. Derby's draft of a proposal for mediation that might be presented to Russia was therefore first sent to Austria in a despatch of 19 December. On 21 December, the Foreign Office learnt from Buchanan in Vienna that the Austrians had rejected the suggestion, objecting partly on the grounds that the Russian proposals of June 1877 had not been agreed upon by Austria. That version of the plan was therefore abandoned; Cairns's memorandum of 21 December (see below, 493) was an attempt to resolve the impasse thus created.

³³³ The draft of 19 December, intended ultimately for Loftus in Russia, sent to Vienna first, but which the Austrians had rejected. See above, 492.

³³⁴ See above, 489.

³³⁵ Shuvalov had informed Derby on 8 June 1877 of what would be the Russian conditions for peace: (1) Russian acquisition of Batoum; (2) Russian acquisition of part of Rumania down nearly as far as the Danube mouth (effectively reversing the Crimean war losses); (3) a client Bulgarian state down to the Balkans; (4) provision for the Christians in the Ottoman Empire; (5) enlarged Serbian and Montenegrin states; (6) Austrian oversight in Bosnia; (7) a rearrangement of the situation in the Dardanelles. See DD, 8 June 1877, p. 407.

³³⁶ The news had been received on 21 December that Austria objected to Britain's proposal for mediation (see above, 492), but was officially communicated by Beust on 22 December. With the failure of this initial proposal for mediation, Cairns's memorandum was the result of a discussion between Cairns and Disraeli, attempting to circumvent Austrian objections with a unilateral British proposal.

³³⁷ This was clearly an attempt to ‘bounce’ Derby into accepting the scheme proposed in 493. Derby was determined not to act without the sanction of Cabinet, where he knew he could rely on the support of others. His diary recorded his resistance on this score when he had met with Disraeli that same day. See DD, 21 December 1877, p. 467. See also Derby's response below, 495.

³³⁸ A copy of the Cairns memorandum of 21 December (493) is then enclosed. Salisbury was by now the crucial figure in the Cabinet. Both Derby and Disraeli were well aware of this, which prompted letters 497 and 498.

³³⁹ Derby regarded this letter (reproduced in Cecil, II, pp. 170–171) as ‘a warning letter urging him [Salisbury] to look out for future danger’, DD, p. 469.

³⁴⁰ The Speech from the Throne (Queen's Speech) on Parliament's return.

³⁴¹ Derby was not necessarily taking a swipe at Disraeli's Jewish ancestry, as has been commonly assumed; rather, as he noted in his diary on 18 December, he regarded Disraeli's suggestion that Britain would lose out by not being consulted in any Russo-Turkish peace as ‘the foreign view, which treats prestige as the one thing needful in politics’. DD, p. 466.

³⁴² Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 210–211, but without the lines about Ladies Derby and Salisbury, and apparently copied from Disraeli's notes rather than the version sent to Salisbury.

³⁴³ Mary Derby, whose frequent meetings with Shuvalov had led to speculation that she was the source of Cabinet ‘leaks’. It has been incorrectly assumed that Derby and his wife deliberately leaked Cabinet decisions to Shuvalov, so ardent was their desire for peace. Shuvalov had only to read the newspapers for reports of Cabinet dissension, but it is clear that Mary Derby was viewed by the ambassador as a valuable ally, and that she did impart significant details to him. Derby appears only to have been guilty of naivety, as far as his wife was concerned.

³⁴⁴ Disraeli was warning about the wiles of Lady Derby by comparing her to the sorceress Canidia, described by the Roman poet Horace. Disraeli was far too shrewd to use Lady Derby's name directly; Salisbury would have understood the reference.

³⁴⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 211.

³⁴⁶ The Queen had first named Lady Salisbury, along with Mary Derby, as a possible source of the leaks.

³⁴⁷ Kabul in Afghanistan.

³⁴⁸ The Army Enlistment Act of 1870, introduced by Edward Cardwell, the Liberal Secretary of State for War, had dramatically reduced the time spent on active service by infantrymen, but required them to be added to a reserve force for a period thereafter. By the mid-1870s this had only had a limited time to develop.

³⁴⁹ Carnarvon, in a pacific speech on 2 January, had said that there was ‘nobody insane enough to desire a repetition’ of the Crimean War. Disraeli upbraided him in Cabinet on 3 January.

³⁵⁰ The precise nature of this reference is unclear, but there were any number of rumours in circulation, of which this was evidently one. As Chapter 3 also demonstrates, Disraeli was apt to set too much store by rumour.

³⁵¹ Derby had been taken ill on 9 January. See editorial note, ‘The Cabinet and the war’, after letter 505.

³⁵² Derby described his symptoms as ‘a sharp bilious attack’. DD, 9 January, p. 482. Carnarvon later recorded that rumours were ‘immediately set in circulation in the Carlton, and thence carefully disseminated through every drawing room in London, that he was suffering from drink’. John Vincent has suggested that he may have had gastric flu. See DD, 9 January 1878, p. 482, n. 23.

³⁵³ He did not attend Cabinet until 21 January.

³⁵⁴ Despite the Cabinet of 12 January, at which Derby and Carnarvon had resisted attempts to send an expedition to seize Gallipoli, their colleagues still wished to send the fleet to the Dardanelles.

³⁵⁵ Tenterden had attended Cabinet between 14 and 16 January to advise on foreign affairs as Derby's proxy, given the latter's absence through illness. Northcote had been irritated by Tenterden's advice to the Cabinet of 15 January, advising against moving the fleet as the Cabinet desired. There is no particular evidence of Tenterden's influence over Derby; rather the reverse, in fact, given his faithful transmission of his departmental chief's wishes. The decision to move the fleet awaited a Turkish response to the earlier request sent by Derby, which the Turks then refused anyway. See note, ‘The Cabinet and the war’, after letter 505.

³⁵⁶ This letter is signed with a very wobbly ‘Derby’.

³⁵⁷ Note at head of paper, in Corry's hand: ‘Copy of a note (in Lord Salisbury's writing) adopted in Cabinet Jan. 21. 78– as a suggestion for identic note to Russia to [sic – presumably ‘from’] Austria & England. The proposal went to Vienna the same evening. MC. Jan 22.’ This had presumably been drawn up in the absence of Derby, before it was known if he would attend Cabinet.

³⁵⁸ To Austria.

³⁵⁹ On 21 January, Derby believed that the proposal for an alliance and loan had been postponed pending further discussion and the Austrian answer to a more general enquiry as to a joint position. DD, p. 488.

³⁶⁰ Austria remained neutral during the Crimean War, despite mobilizing at its outset.

³⁶¹ ‘hand-in-hand’; or, more literally, ‘with equal step’.

³⁶² Andrássy rejected the idea of an identic note the next day, 23 January, along with Disraeli's idea of a subsidy for the Austrian army. This latter point revealed to Derby ‘that negotiations have been going on behind my back’. DD, 23 January 1878, p. 489.

³⁶³ Sir William Hart Dyke (1837–1931), seventh baronet; Conservative chief whip in the House of Commons.

³⁶⁴ Reproduced in M&B, VI, p. 228.

³⁶⁵ That the fleet be sent to Constantinople, with or without the Sultan's consent, and a large vote of credit be sought. DD, 23 January 1878, p. 490.

³⁶⁶ That ‘result’ was Derby's resignation. Carnarvon's resignation was also presented.

³⁶⁷ Northcote increasingly acted as the intermediary between Disraeli and Derby in this period, given their deteriorating relationship and the ‘curious reserve’ between them, as Buckle, curiously, described it. M&B, VI, pp. 232–233.

³⁶⁸ See following note for dating.

³⁶⁹ It had been suggested to Derby, via his brother Frederick, that he should take a lesser office ‘on the ground of health, [and] need of rest’. DD, 25 January 1878, pp. 491–492.

³⁷⁰ Disraeli and his colleagues had twice sent Northcote to see Derby on 26 January, ‘with a request that I should withdraw my resignation’. DD, p. 492. On 24 January, Layard had conveyed the news that the Porte had accepted Russian peace terms, in which case, as Derby noted, ‘all this trouble of the last few days has been taken for nothing’. DD, 24 January 1878, p. 491. The fleet had been recalled, and thus the grounds for his resignation no longer stood.

³⁷¹ The letter is dated 25 January (a Friday), but it is clear from DD (pp. 492–493) and other accounts that this must have been written on Saturday 26 January, Northcote having spent ‘the whole of Saturday in negotiation’ (M&B, VI, p. 233).

³⁷² Derby made this letter ‘purposely stiff and unconciliatory’. DD, p. 493.

³⁷³ Disraeli's demand for the fleet to be sent to Constantinople and an immediate, large vote of credit.

³⁷⁴ i.e. if he had accepted Derby's resignation.

³⁷⁵ Reproduced in M&B, VI, pp. 236–237.

³⁷⁶ Reproduced in part in Cecil, II, p. 194.

³⁷⁷ In the House of Lords, on 25 January 1878: see Parl. Deb., CCXXXVII, cols 436–446.

³⁷⁸ An instruction that was clearly ignored.

³⁷⁹ A Russian measure of length, the verst was equivalent to 1.07 kilometres or 0.66 miles.

³⁸⁰ There was no such telegram, and Disraeli's intelligence was false.

³⁸¹ Derby was bemused by this, noting ‘an odd letter from Ld B.’ DD, 1 February 1878, p. 497.

³⁸² Punic faith – an ironic reference to Carthaginian reliability, for Romans the worst form of treachery. The reference is presumably either to Russia or to Derby's own unreliability, although in what sense it could be defined as treachery is unclear, given that he had been obstinately consistent in his views.

³⁸³ Derby thought this ‘would be absurd, and a direct challenge to Russia’. DD, 1 February 1878, p. 497.

³⁸⁴ Layard reported that Russian troops had advanced towards Chataldja, on the outskirts of Constantinople. Some of his telegrams were missing, indicating that ‘the lines’ had been cut. The news caused panic in London, with the Morning Post reporting that Constantinople had fallen. The Queen sent Derby a number of telegrams, ‘mostly incoherent and excited’ (DD, 7 February 1878, p. 503). In fact, the advance had been agreed with the Porte during peace negotiations at San Stefano, where a treaty was ultimately signed on 3 March 1878. The date was deliberately chosen by Russia as the anniversary of the Tsar's accession, in less auspicious circumstances during the Crimean War.

³⁸⁵ That is, at the time of the Great Reform Act.

³⁸⁶ Dated by Derby at the bottom as ‘F.6’ but another hand gives ‘10 Feb 76’. Given the previous letter, however, 6 February seems most likely.

³⁸⁷ A note on the back of this letter dates it to 8 February, although letter 537, dated 7 February, appears to be the response. The date in Northcote's hand on the letter is unclear, although it might be read as 5, 6, or 8. There was no Cabinet on 5 February, although Derby's diary records a Cabinet ‘at 12’ the following day. On 7 February, the Cabinet met at 11 am, at which it was agreed to propose to France that the fleet would be sent up to Constantinople. But the Cabinet of 8 February, as per Northcote's letter, met at 2 pm, and agreed to send the fleet. Derby duly announced this to the House of Lords that evening. Thus it seems that 8 February is the likeliest date. See DD, pp. 500–503.

³⁸⁸ See above. This letter, evidently a response to 537, may have been misdated by Salisbury.

³⁸⁹ Reproduced in Cecil, II, p. 197.

³⁹⁰ The Porte had refused to allow the fleet up to Constantinople.

³⁹¹ Salisbury was right, although he cannot have known it. Tsar Alexander, in response to what he saw as British provocation in sending the fleet to Constantinople, ordered his forces to occupy Constantinople. Fortunately, his orders were not carried out. At the front line, the Russian general staff, headed by the Tsar's brother Grand Duke Nicholas, often received delayed and contradictory orders from St Petersburg.

³⁹² This is the first reference in Derby's correspondence to the question of Cabinet leaks since letter 441.

³⁹³ The proposed Congress was to include all the major powers. To this Derby saw ‘no objection’ (DD, 11 March 1878, p. 525), but the crucial point would come to rest on Disraeli's determination that Britain (alone among the powers) should press for each and every clause of the treaty to be submitted to the Congress.

³⁹⁴ Gorchakov and the Tsar, bridling at the presence of the British Navy off Constantinople, refused to submit every clause of the Treaty of San Stefano to a Congress. Shuvalov formally delivered Russia's rejection on 25 March 1878.

³⁹⁵ In fact, on at least one occasion Sanderson showed such documents to Lady Derby, whom the Queen and Disraeli suspected of leaking Cabinet secrets to Shuvalov. See B.G. Grosvenor, ‘Lord Derby and the Eastern Crisis’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2009), ch. 8.

³⁹⁶ This was untrue. Corry's correspondence with Disraeli, for example, reveals regular contacts with the press.

³⁹⁷ This was quite clearly directed at Derby and his habit of note-taking. In addition to the jibe at Sanderson, the implication may have been that Lady Derby was behind the leaks.

³⁹⁸ The Treaty of San Stefano, between Russia and the Porte. Its terms included the creation of a large and autonomous Bulgaria, complete with Mediterranean coastline.

³⁹⁹ İskenderun, on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

⁴⁰⁰ Following Russia's refusal to commit in advance to allowing every point of the Treaty of San Stefano to be open for review at the forthcoming Congress, Disraeli had proposed to ‘issue a proclamation declaring emergency, to put a force in the field and simultaneously to send an expedition from India to occupy Cyprus’. DD, 27 March 1878, p. 532. This prompted Derby's second and final resignation. In response to the announcement from London, the Tsar ordered the occupation of the Turkish forts on the Bosphorus. As before, however, his orders were not carried out. More time for European negotiation was gained when the Tsar replaced his cautious brother as commander-in-chief with General Todleben, who did not arrive at the front line until 14 April. By then, the situation had cooled once more, thanks in part to the offer of mediation by Bismarck.