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ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 1970S COLOMBIA: ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF LÓPEZ MICHELSEN’S GOVERNMENT AND THE COFFEE BOOM*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 April 2015
Abstract
In this article I build an analytic narrative to provide an integrated and analytical view of the economic reforms that took place in Colombia during the years 1974-1978. Through the use of basic game theory and historical evidence, I present the core of the strategic interactions between several players: Government is depicted as a committed but poorly endowed agenda setter, Coffee as the dominant player and Industry as the contending but relatively weak player. The analysis shows that the 1976 coffee boom changed the interaction between sectors from an assurance to a prisoner’s dilemma game, and identifies as the post-boom solution the Government–Coffee coalition, which carried out a soft version of the initial reforms.
Resumen
En este artículo elaboro una narrativa analítica que ofrece una mirada integrada y analítica de las reformas económicas en Colombia durante 1974-1978. A través del uso de teoría de juegos básica y de evidencia histórica, represento el núcleo de la interacción estratégica entre varios jugadores: el gobierno aparece como un jugador comprometido pero pobremente dotado en tanto ponente de la agenda, Café como el jugador dominante y la Industria como jugador contendiente pero relativamente débil. El análisis muestra que el boom cafetero de 1976 cambió la interacción entre los sectores de un juego de la confianza a un dilema del prisionero, e identifica como la solución de post-boom la coalición Gobierno-Café que implementó una versión moderada de las reformas iniciales.
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- Information
- Revista de Historia Economica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History , Volume 33 , Supplement 3 , December 2015 , pp. 487 - 519
- Copyright
- © Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2015
Footnotes
The author very much appreciate the research assistance of Juan Camilo Alvarez and Juan Gabriel Vanegas and thank Ivan Andrés Martinez for his assistance in newspaper reviews. The comments and suggestions of Paul J. Johnson and David Mares were especially useful. As always, the errors are exclusively mine. The author acknowledge the support of the Vicerrectoria de Docencia of the Universidad de Antioquia.
Department of Economics, Ciudad Universitaria, Calle 67 # 53-108, Bloque 13, Oficina 413, Medellín, Colombia. [email protected].