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PLURALISM IN LOGIC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2009

HARTRY FIELD
HARTRY FIELD*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, New York University
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 5 WASHINGTON PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10003. E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

A number of people have proposed that we should be pluralists about logic, but there are several things this can mean. Are there versions of logical pluralism that are both high on the interest scale and also true? After discussing some forms of pluralism that seem either insufficiently interesting or quite unlikely to be true, the paper suggests a new form which might be both interesting and true; however, the scope of the pluralism that it allows logic is extremely narrow.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 342 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2009

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References

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