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ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2008

HANNES LEITGEB
HANNES LEITGEB*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
*
*DEPARTMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 9 WOODLAND ROAD, BRISTOL BS8 1TB, UK E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(┌α┐) and α. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Special Issue 2: Mathematical Methods in Philosophy , August 2008 , pp. 218 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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References

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