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A LOGIC FOR ‘BECAUSE’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2011

BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER
BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER*
Affiliation:
University of Hamburg
*
*UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, VON–MELLE–PARK 6, 20146 HAMBURG, GERMANY. E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective ‘because’ has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for ‘because’ based on systematic connections between ‘because’ and the truth-functional connectives.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 445 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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