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INEFFABILITY AND REVENGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

CHRIS SCAMBLER
CHRIS SCAMBLER*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University
*
* DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NEW YORK UNIVERSITY NEW YORK CITY, NY 10003, USA E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon.

Keywords

03A99paradoxesrevenge paradoxesnon-classical logicsaving truth from paradox
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 797 - 809
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Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2018 

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References

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