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CUT FOR CORE LOGIC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2012

NEIL TENNANT
NEIL TENNANT*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, OH 43210 E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

The motivation for Core Logic is explained. Its system of proof is set out. It is then shown that, although the system has no Cut rule, its relation of deducibility obeys Cut with epistemic gain.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 450 - 479
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

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References

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