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COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2018

ERIC RAIDL
ERIC RAIDL*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ POSTFACH D6, 78457 KONSTANZ, GERMANY E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Standard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID ($\varphi > \varphi$) or even CN ($\varphi > \top$) are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries.

Keywords

03A0503B4503B4203B4703B6568T3791F20conditionalsconditionalisationranking theoryranking semanticscounter-possiblesvacuismnonvacuism
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 861 - 891
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2018 

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