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THE CLOSING OF THE MIND: HOW THE PARTICULAR QUANTIFIER BECAME EXISTENTIALLY LOADED BEHIND OUR BACKS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

GRAHAM PRIEST
GRAHAM PRIEST*
Affiliation:
Universities of Melbourne and St Andrews
*
*SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3010, AUSTRALIA. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

The paper argues that the view that the particular quantifier is ‘existentially loaded’ is a relatively new one historically and that it has become entrenched in modern philosophical logic for less than happy reasons.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , June 2008 , pp. 42 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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