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BELIEVING EPISTEMIC CONTRADICTIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 August 2017

BOB BEDDOR  and
SIMON GOLDSTEIN
BOB BEDDOR*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore
SIMON GOLDSTEIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE SINGAPORE E-mail: [email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY LINGNAN UNIVERSITY HONG KONG E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

Keywords

03B65epistemic modalsdynamic semanticsprobabilitybelief reports
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 87 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017 

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