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PARADOXES OF INTENSIONALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2011

DUSTIN TUCKER  and
RICHMOND H. THOMASON
DUSTIN TUCKER*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan
RICHMOND H. THOMASON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MI 48109, E-mail:[email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MI 48109, E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly accepted methods for dealing with the logical paradoxes.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 394 - 411
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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