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FOUR BASIC LOGICAL ISSUES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2009

ROSS BRADY  and
PENELOPE RUSH
ROSS BRADY*
Affiliation:
La Trobe Univeristy
PENELOPE RUSH*
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LATROBE UNIVERISTY, VICTORIA 3086, AUSTRALIA E-mail:[email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA, TASMANIA 7001, AUSTRALIA E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

The paper addresses what we see as the four major issues in logic. The overriding issue is that of the choice of logic. We start with some discussion of the preliminary issue of whether there is such a ‘one true logic,’ but we reserve the main discussion for the first issue of ‘classical logic versus non-classical logic.’ Here, we discuss the role of meaning and truth, the relation between classical logic and classical negation, and whether and, if so, how classical logic should reside at the base world. Given the argument in favor of an overall use of non-classical logic, the second issue is that of the choice of non-classical logic. Brady’s logic MC of meaning containment is argued for, with some comparison made with other relevant logics. For the remaining two issues, we make a case for relevant deduction, in comparison with classical deduction, and we explore possibilities for the appropriate meta-logic, comparing classical and non-classical approaches.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 488 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2009

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