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FIELD’S SAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX: SOME THINGS IT DOESN’T DO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2011

DONALD A. MARTIN
DONALD A. MARTIN*
Affiliation:
Departments of Mathematics and Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles
*
*DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 520 PORTOLA PLAZA, BOX 951555, LOS ANGELES, CA 90095–1555
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Abstract

I will discuss Field’s book mainly by comparison with Saul Kripke’s Outline of a Theory of Truth. I will point out important properties of Kripke’s “least fixed point” that are absent from Field’s constructions and theory. I do this not to demean Field’s superb work on truth but rather to suggest that there may be no really satisfactory conditional connective for languages containing their own truth predicates.

Type
Author meets his critics Forum
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 339 - 347
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Field, H. (2008). Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. (1975). Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 690–716.Google Scholar
Welch, P. (2008). Ultimate truth vis à vis stable truth. Review of Symbolic Logic, 1, 126–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Welch, P. (2009). Games for truth. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 15, 410–427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar