The question implies that the First Amendment's “separation of church and state,” as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is an insufficient solution to the old conflict between American democracy and Catholicism. Catholicism has become unsafe in contemporary American democracy in ways that the original constitutional arrangement, of which the First Amendment was only a part, does not help. The contemporary danger is rooted partly in the old conflict between classical liberalism and revealed religion as such. But the more proximate danger is the secular “civil liberties” regime that has been instituted by the Supreme Court since 1940. That regime permits Catholics to follow their religion in public affairs only insofar as it is in agreement with the secularism which the “civil liberties” regime both instituted and understands liberal democracy to require.

I am sympathetic to the problem enunciated by Professors Glenn and Stack, viz., “that contemporary American democracy, by constitutionally privileging secularism, offers Catholics in public life a strong inducement to abandon, relativize, or remain silent about, their moral beliefs, insofar as these conflict with secularism. Catholics have to act like, not necessarily be, secularists. That makes it spiritually and politically unsafe, not to say impossible, for Catholics to be democrats now.” However, while they have circled in on an important problem—the totalitarian impulse of contemporary liberals—they have not hit the bull's-eye exactly

As a protest, the argument of Professors Glenn and Stack is valid and important. That the realm of public debate is largely closed to those who stand explicitly on Judaic and Christian principles is an intellectual scandal. This closure, of course, is the doing not of the courts (even though it accords with attitudes quite evident in the courts) but of academicians, journalists, and various political activists who are quick to rule any appeal to religious premises, as well as any moral judgments thought to derive therefrom, such as the evil of abortion, out of order. Their ostensible justification is that public discourse must be based on premises common to all participants. Such a justification may be superficially plausible, but it is worse than dubious. It enables opponents of religion to narrow their minds without compunction and to constrict the public realm. In effect, contemporary secularists say to would-be religious interlocutors, “Yours are arguments we refuse even to face or consider.”

Gary D. Glenn and John Stack advance two important claims; one explicit, the other implicit. Their explicit claim is that the “new regime of civil liberties” is dangerous to Catholicism. Here I am in qualified agreement, though important ambiguities cloud the argument. Their implicit claim is that it is a bad thing for Catholicism to be in danger. This proposition is flawed. Glenn and Stack cite (without irony) American Catholics “who have spent several generations seeking to become accepted and acceptable to the American democratic culture.” A large part of the danger seems to be “the punishment of exclusion from respectability in the culture.” This assumes that the “normal” mode for Catholicism is comfortable accommodation to political culture and institutions.

We are grateful that the editors secured three thoughtful though critical responses to our essay. Such responses perform a service by calling to our attention matters we have insufficiently considered, pushing us to greater clarity, and perhaps revealing to us errors that we have overlooked.

The relationship between philosophy, revelation, and politics is a basic intellectual theme, either at the forefront or in the background, of all political philosophy. The 1998 publication of John Paul II's encyclical Fides et Ratio occasioned much reflection on the relation of reason and revelation. Though not directly concerned with political philosophy, this encyclical provides a welcome opportunity to address many theologicalpolitical issues that have arisen in classic and contemporary political philosophy. The argument here states in straightforward terms how philosophy and theology, as understood in the Roman Catholic tradition, can be coherently related to fundamental questions that have legitimately recurred in the works of the political philosophers.

Leo Strauss's writings reveal a subtle but consistent set of accusations against the influence of Christian thinkers on political philosophy. These accusations may be summarized in three charges. First, the attempt by Aquinas and other Christian scholastics to synthesize faith and reason led later philosophers to eschew prudence in favor of a humane project to employ science to transform political life. The result was the destruction of the modus vivendi, safeguarded by classical political philosophy, between pious citizens and diffident but inwardly free philosophers. Second, the rationalization of political life implies that a universal regime is possible. But, unless all men become philosophers, this universal regime can be only a universal tyranny, ruled by means of perverted faith in the guise of a final philosophy. Third, Christian thinkers must bear ultimate responsibility for precipitating the early modern rejection of classical political philosophy. Without the Christian appropriation of Aristotle, there might never have been a Machiavelli or a Hobbes.

Disorder is a constant theme in John Calvin's political work. Calvin describes politics as a chaotic arena, precariously held together by contending forces. However, few who write on Calvin recognize how disorder shapes his political reflections. Calvin analyzes disorder by tracing it to unfaithfulness, the failure to acknowledge God's goodness. Created in the image of God, human beings reject divine goodness ungratefully, plunging themselves into sin. In leaders, this unfaithfulness produces pride and mistrust which create conflict within and among political communities. In groups, unfaithfulness spawns cruelty, leading violent mobs to kill the innocent and denigrate the image of God. By exploring mob and political violence, Calvin draws attention to those forces sustaining order. Natural sensibilities, conscience, and divine providence restrain the worst excesses in human beings.