The article evaluates Michael Novak's theory of the common good by comparing it with Yves Simon's writings. Simon's insights reveal that Novak's argument for a “new concept” of the common good, incorporating liberal claims, falters on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, Novak's version of the common good opens the door to considerable exclusion from participation in the material benefits of society. Related to this is Novak's problematic contention that political authority should not intend the common good materially considered. Practically, his idealized version of capitalism plays down or ignores problems raised by Simon, particularly “one-way” exchanges, unequal exchange, and “illusory services”.

When the Whigs define themselves as the Party of Liberty, furthermore, they define liberty in a special way. They do not mean libertinism or any other disordered form of liberty, such as a supposed “liberty to do whatever one feels like doing.” For them, a liberty undirected by reflection and choice is slavery. For them, liberty must be achieved through a self-mastery that nourishes reflection and choice. Such self-mastery is won by slowly gaining dominion over appetite, passion, ignorance, and whim. For them, the enabling agent and protector of liberty is virtue—indeed, a full quiver of virtues. (This Hemisphere of Liberty, 1992, pp. 9–10)

What is most striking about Michael Novak's response to my article is that he chooses for the most part to bypass the core of the argument. I compared Novak's and Simon's understandings of the common good and authority. In addition, rooted in Simon's work (which I find to be no less relevant today than forty years ago), I proceeded to critique Novak's understandings of the common good and what I find to be his unjustified conclusions about economic liberalism and the realization of the common good materially considered. (My use of Simon as a reference point is based on my judgment that he is the richest Catholic theorist on the subjects of the common good and authority.) I am trying to bring Simon's highly relevant work to bear upon the evaluation of Novak. Moreover, I try to show why Simon's criticisms of the market system are in fact more relevant now than when they were originally articulated by giving some contemporary examples. Novak elected not to engage these core points of my article, except for an outrageous statement, based on no evidence or argument (under point “f”), that most of the claims are false and are drawn from ““left-wing, anticapitalist tracts.” Again, Novak cleverly bypasses the fact that the examples I give are simply contemporary manifestations of points raised long ago by Simon.

This study argues that the self-described “malaise” in the study of political development theory is in part the product of the early attempt to strip judgments of value from those of fact in the interests of a more scientific comparative politics; that the resulting science has been inclined to ignore or neglect what may be the most fundamental difference between the modern and premodern worlds, namely the elimination of all religious concerns from those of politics proper (the “separation of church and state”); and that this neglect is in turn linked with the crisis in self-confidence characteristic not only of the science of comparative politics but of science or rationalism simply.

Despite growing interest in the ideas of Carl Schmitt, twentieth-century Germany's premier right-wing authoritarian political thinker, most American scholars continue to downplay the centrality of Schmitt's legal thinking to his overall theory. This article attempts to overcome this lacuna by critically scrutinizing Schmitt's influential critique of liberal constitutionalism. However provocative, Schmitt's critique ultimately proves untenable because (1) it relies on an overly selective, even caricatured reading of the history of liberal jurisprudence and (2) it reproduces the most worrisome methodological claims of Schmitt's main intellectual opponent, Hans Kelsen's legal positivism.

It has become common to locate the origins of the modern notion of subjective rights theory in late medieval scholastic and juristic writings. But comparatively little effort has been made to connect medieval ideas of individual rights to some of the other key political ideas associated with it in early modern thought, such as consent, limited government, and resistance to illegitimate power. This article argues that a little-known work by the English churchman William of Pagula, known as the Speculum Regis Edwardi III (1331–1332), constructs such a connection. Starting with the concept of a basic human right to property and its free use, William argues that the ruler must respect the individual lordship of his subjects if he is to gain and retain their love and approval. He also asserts in a rudimentary way the legitimacy of popular revolt against a government which violates their subjective rights.