Plato's Lysis addresses the problem of Plato's Republic—the tension between individual and communal good—by exploring the question of what or who is the friend. Friends, I argue, experience another as their own, and themselves as not wholly their own. Unlike the guardians of Plato's Republic, friends say both mine and not mine of one another. Grounded in both self-awareness and belonging, friendship serves as a model for philosophy, and demonstrates the possibility of associations that support our complex identity as human beings and citizens.

Examining the special relations between On the Social Contract and the Constitutional Project for Corsica, this essay argues that Rousseau conceives of constitutionalism on the basis of his understanding of the “natural development” of any state. What is “natural” is a certain order in which developmental periods best emerge, such that any state's disordered development will always result in its premature “death.” The essay explains four aspects of Rousseau's conception of properly ordered political development: the nature of a state's beginning; the relation between the two “great springs” of human conduct; the influence of external nature on human nature and justice; and the inevitable “end” of even the best state.

Contemporary theorists critical of the current vogue for compassion might like to turn to Friedrich Nietzsche as an obvious ally in their opposition to the sentiment. Yet this essay argues that Nietzsche's critique of compassion is not entirely critical, and that the endorsement of one's sympathetic feelings is actually a natural outgrowth of Nietzsche's immoralist ethics. Nietzsche understands the tendency to share in the suffering of their inferiors as a distinctive vulnerability of the spiritually strong and healthy. Their compassion, however, is an essential element of the imaginative creativity that Nietzsche holds to be the goal of human existence. Although shared suffering may prove debilitating for some, great individuals must come to affirm their compassion as necessary in achieving accurate knowledge of the human condition.

Should judges play a prominent policymaking role through their exercise of judicial review, or should judicial review be exercised to strike down only those acts that clearly violate the Constitution's text or historical context? Prevailing scholarship maintains that the Constitutional Convention debates provide little relevant guidance with which to answer this question. The truth is essentially the opposite: the Convention delegates extensively considered the role that judges should play in policymaking, particularly during their debate over a proposed council of revision. This essay revisits the council of revision debate. It argues that beneath the delegates' clear disagreements lies an apparent consensus, one heretofore largely unrecognized: that whether or not judges should have been invited to play the policymaking role they would have played as members of a council of revision, they should not play a policymaking role while serving on the judicial bench.

Philosophers and lawyers have long argued about the relation of law to politics: “does the king make law” or “does law make the king”? This persistent debate stems from two different perspectives on the nature of law. Professors of law have long noted that laypersons tend to speak of “a law” and the “laws” while lawyers tend to speak more holistically of “the law.” After discussing how rival perspectives in legal theory can be compared and evaluated, several dimensions of this contrast between the lay and the lawyerly conceptions of law: the individuation of laws, the sources of law, the ethical and imperative aspects of law, and the nature of the rule of law are analyzed. The distinction between a lawyerly and a lay perspective on law is reflected in the traditional linguistic and conceptual distinction between ius and lex. Many of the classic philosophers of law, from Plato to Hobbes, are rank laymen when it comes to their descriptions of law since the lawyerly understanding of law has only very recently achieved philosophical articulation.