This article critically examines the widely accepted thesis that because of basic theoretical differences between Hamilton and Madison the Federalist is best read as the product of a “split personality.” An examination of the areas and concerns identified by leading proponents of this thesis (Douglass Adair and Alpheus T. Mason) fails to reveal any significant differences between Hamilton and Madison writing as “Publius.” In fact, this analysis reveals a very close correspondence in their views on the basic principles of the proposed system. These findings strongly support the proposition that the Federalist is a consensual work whose contradictions and tensions reflect more basic difficulties endemic to the proposed system and principles of republicanism rather than theoretical differences between its authors.

Despite its enduring appeal, the republican vision of political life has been the subject of numerous recent criticisms. Both its relevance to an age of large-scale organizations and its desirability in an era which professes concern for individual autonomy has been questioned. However, a reconsideration of these challenges to republicanism suggests that they can be effectively met without sacrificing the core values of republicanism. Consequently, by adapting it to contemporary political realities the republican ideal can in fact serve as an apt antidote against many current political ills. Admittedly, though, any form of republicanism that is going to be viable today will assume a character at odds with either republicanism's classical or commercial modes.

This study examines the ideological and truth-seeking aspects of Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State. Ackerman begins in a truth-seeking fashion by requiring all power and all distributive claims to be justified. In developing principles of social justice from imaginary dialogues that are assumed to be neutral toward the good, he defends the “neutrality principle” inadequately and employs it ideologically. The fundamental distributive principle, undominated equality, is derived from dialogues that are manipulated to prevent other principles from passing the “neutrality test.” Although Ackerman discusses issues of citizenship and birthrights that are ordinarily ignored, his attempt to protect the liberal state leads to ideological formulations.

An important strand of the republican tradition warns that liberal education harms republics by promoting aristocracy, breeding an idle and skeptical class of philosophers and undermining the civic virtues on which republics depend. The American Founding generation, in its writings on education, rejected this warning and maintained instead that the open cultivation and wide dissemination of liberal learning is favorable to republican government, if not essential to its very existence. The aristocratic tendencies of liberal education would by mitigated by the diffusion of knowledge. Philosophy would show its usefulness by increasing man's power over nature and multiplying the conveniences of life. The republican virtues would be strengthened by the elucidation of their rational ground.

This essay strives to counter conventional wisdom about the alleged secondary role of Congress in foreign policymaking. With the post-Vietnam era serving as the immediate backdrop, certain “lessons” are drawn regarding postwar congressional ascendency, both in terms of procedural manifestations and policy outcomes. A central conclusion is that Congress will always remain an essential component in the decision-making process, becoming involved in substantive policy on a selective basis. Some sixteen variables affecting the degree of involvement and likelihood of success are identified and rank ordered. The entire process of congressional-executive relations in foreign policymaking is ultimately viewed as highly untidy but fairly effective in maintaining some semblance of institutional balance throughout history.