¹ For the system of public diplomacy introduced by the League of Nations see, Kertesz, Stephen D., “Diplomacy in the Atomic Age,” Review of Politics, XXI (1959), 157–167Google Scholar.

² Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 785Google Scholar.

³ At the first session of the General Assembly Prime Minister Attlee emphasized the importance of the social tasks of the United Nations:

“In the purposes of the United Nations we have linked with the achievement of freedom from fear, the delivery of mankind from the peril of want. To the individual citizens the spectre of economic insecurity is more constant, more imminent than the shadow of war. Every individual can be brought to realize that the things that are discussed in conference here are the concern of all and affect the home life of every man, woman and child. Without social justice and security there is no real foundation for peace, for it is among the socially disinherited and those who have nothing to lose that the gangster and aggressor recruit their supporters.

“I believe, therefore, that important as is the work of the Security Council, no less vital is it to make the Economic and Social Council an effective international instrument. A police force is a necessary part of a civilized community, but the greater the social security and contentment of the population the less important is the police force.” Journal of the General Assembly (January 11, 1946), 25.

⁴ Cf. Schwebel, Stephen, The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Power and Practice (Cambridge, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bailey, Sydney D., The Secretariat of the United Nations (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; Lie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York, 1954)Google Scholar; Siotis, Jean, Essai sur Le Secrétariat International (Genève, 1963)Google Scholar. Cf. below footnote 10.

⁵ Peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania were signed in February, 1947, but these treaties did not settle major problems between the Soviet Union and its former Allies. Their provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms were soon violated by the satellite governments and the specific legal remedies provided in the treaties could not be applied because the satellite governments, supported by the Soviet Union, blocked them and rejected consideration of the advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice to the General Assembly.

⁶ See for the characteristics of the parliamentary diplomacy in the United Nations, Kertesz, Stephen D., op. cit., 365–381Google Scholar.

⁷ There are numerous scholarly proposals for radical revisions of the Charter. The most comprehensive plan is World Peace Through World Law by Clark, Granville and Sohn, Louis B., Second Edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1962)Google Scholar. Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, delivered an address before the American Society of International Law on April 26, 1963, on “The Development of the Peacekeeping Capacity of the United Nations.” He appraised the importance of United Nations peace-keeping operations and outlined ten points which represent the commitment of the United States to the progressive strengthening of the United Nations peace-keeping capacity. Cf. below footnote 13.

⁸ Acceptance of the “troika” proposal would have violated Article 100 of the Charter which provided:

“1. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

“2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.”

Despite these clear provisions, several Soviet citizens employed in the United Nations have been arrested as spies. Some of them were convicted; others were expelled or left the country under implications of espionage. Their United Nations assignment was apparently connected with intelligence duties. Arrest and conviction for spying do not violate international law because officials of the Secretariat enjoy only those privileges and immunities which are “necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.” (Article 105).

⁹ When Khrushchev launched his attack on the Secretary General's office. Hammarskjöld replied in a statement before the General Assembly on September 26, 1960:

“I would rather see that office break on strict adherence to the principle of independence, impartiality and objectivity than drift on the basis of compromise. That is the choice daily facing the Secretary-General. It is also the choice now openly facing the General Assembly, both in substance and in form. I believe that all those whose interests are safeguarded by the United Nations will realize that the choice is not one of the convenience of the moment but one which is decisive for the future, their future.”

¹⁰ Miller, Richard I., Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (Washington, D.C., 1961)Google Scholar; Lash, Joseph P., Dag Hammarskjöld: Custodian of the Brushfire Peace (New York, 1961)Google Scholar; Foote, Wilder, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld (New York and Evanston, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹¹ This view was reiterated forcefully by Premier Khrushchev in a letter addressed to Russell, Bertrand. New York Times, 07 14, 1963Google Scholar.

¹² Cf.Gross, Leo, “Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice,” International Organization, XVII (1963), 1–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ For the many intricate problems of United Nations peace-keeping operations see “International Force — A Symposium” in the spring 1963 issue of International Organization. Cf. above footnote 7.

¹⁴ For the purposes of the resolutions providing for additional assessment, “economically less developed countries” mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

¹⁵ For Soviet policy see, Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; Nogee, Joseph L., Soviet Policy Toward the International Control of Atomic Energy (Notre Dame, 1961)Google Scholar; Jacobson, Harold Karan, The USSR and the UN's Economic and Social Activities (Notre Dame, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ For the voting pattern of the nonaligned states see, “The Nonaligned States and the United Nations” by Wilcox, Francis O., in Neutralism and Nonalignment, edited by Martin, Laurence W. (New York, 1962), pp. 126–133Google Scholar. Cf. Hadwen, John G. and Kaufmann, Johan, How United Nations Decisions Are Made (Leyden, 1960)Google Scholar and Hovet, Thomas Jr, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Despite this seemingly absurd situation, change of the present voting system does not seem to be advisable even if voting reform were a practical possibility. The State Department tried out through computers 15 varieties of weighted voting systems which took into consideration such factors as population, national income, and United Nations assessment. It appeared that those systems would have produced worse results from the point of view of the United States than the existing one-country-one-vote system. New York Times, June 3, 1963.

¹⁸ Besides grave political questions, the United Nations will have to solve some technical problems connected with its operational efficiency. One of the problems originates from the increasing number of meetings of the General Assembly and its committees. The original procedure was probably satisfactory for the 51 states but not for a world body which has more than doubled its membership and has become much more heterogeneous. The membership is still increasing. United Nations membership is a prestige and status symbol for the new nations. Many speeches are delivered for home consumption and some representatives of new members are prone to indulge in verbose speeches — apparently a kind of self-assertion for them.

All questions are discussed at least twice: in a committee and in the general session and most delegates want to participate in the discussion of questions of any importance. Debate on a general question is usually followed by a debate on the specific resolution and delegates may comment on points of order any time. Moreover, each speech is reproduced in three working languages: English, French, and Spanish; final resolutions and documents are reproduced also in Russian and Chinese.

Mongi Slim of Tunisia, President of the Sixteenth Session of the Assembly, submitted a plan which with Andrew Cordier he prepared for the rationalization of United Nations sessions. If this or a similar plan is not accepted, United Nations meetings will become unmanageable and in some respects counter-productive. The torrent of inconsequential speeches and general boredom may bury many constructive ideas.

¹⁹ General Assembly, Agenda item 41, Annexes, Sixth session Palais de Chaillot Paris, (1951–1952), 55–56.