Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
F. A. Hayek's theory of spontaneous order applies to more than the market. One implication is that different systems of rules generating different spontaneous orders are biased in favor of different values. Markets serve the values of consumers; democracies serve the values of citizens. No spontaneous order perfectly reflects human values because they simplify the context of choice in favor of core systemic values. This insight enables us to distinguish between systemic and individual resources, and tensions between them. It also enables us to develop models of systemic conflict. Of particular interest are interactions between democracies and markets whose rules reflect different values but influence one another. The increasing commodification of the press shifts this institution from reflecting both democratic and economic values more and more to purely economic values, undermining its capacity to serve citizens. Examples illustrating this argument are explored.
I am grateful to Chirag Kasbekar, James Hess, the George Mason Workshop in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, and referees for the Review of Politics for valuable criticisms and insights that have made this a better essay than it otherwise would have been.
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