¹ In this respect, consult, for example, Huntington's, Samuel P.The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, 1957)Google Scholar and The Common Defense (New York, 1961)Google Scholar. For an appraisal of congressional decision-making, see Schilling, Warner, ed., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962)Google Scholar, especially Schilling's essay on Congress' handling of the defense budget for the fiscal year 1950, pp. 5–266. Consult also Robinson, James A., Congress and Foreign Policy Making (Homewood, 1962)Google Scholar, including an extensive bibliography. For a valuable set of case studies on civil-military relations, read Stein, Harold, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions (Twentieth Century Fund: University of Alabama Press, 1963)Google Scholar. These citations are merely representative, not definitive.

² The Federalist, ed. Earle, Edward M. (New York, n.d.), p. 337Google Scholar.

³ The President's power implied by his functions as commander-in-chief, as Chief Executive, and as the principal organ of United States foreign policy were combined by Lincoln to form the broad and undefined war powers which he exercised during the Civil War in carrying out his oath of office “to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. …” Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman also relied on these farreaching war powers for much of their authority during, respectively, World Wars I and II and the Korean conflict. Presidential exercise of broad governmental powers during the nation's four most costly wars helped a great deal to shift the locus of power over questions of military policy from the Legislative to the Executive branch of the federal government, notwithstanding the original intention of most of the Founding Fathers who hoped to make Congress preeminent within this area of policy-making. It took the genius of Lincoln to formulate an interpretation of the Constitution which made it possible for him to circumvent Congress' more extensive Constitutional powers over military matters. The following represent some of the more important works dealing with the growth and scope of the President's military powers: Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1957 (4th ed. rev., New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Corwin, Edward S. and Koenig, Louis W., The Presidency Today (New York, 1956)Google Scholar; Rossiter, Clinton L., The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief (Ithaca, 1951)Google Scholar; Berdahl, Clarence A., War Powers of the Chief Executive in the United States (Urbana, 1921)Google Scholar. A penetrating analysis of the President's political and persuasive powers may be found in Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York, 1961), especially pp. 9–32, 152–95Google Scholar.

⁴ The trend towards increasing federal control of the reserves began in 1903 with the Dick Act which provided for dual federal and state direction of the militia in peacetime. It has grown apace ever since, aided and abetted by two world wars which necessitated the close integration of reserve and active armed force units. The expanding power of the federal government in this area culminated recently in the sweeping reorganization of the National Guard under Secretary of Defense McNamara over the strong protests of the National Guard Association and many state officials who are responsible for reserve activities. See Galloway, Eilene, History of United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 1775–1957, prepared for House Committee on Armed Services (HCAS), 02, 1957Google Scholar; (HCAS), Hearings, Military Reserve Posture, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962 (hereafter cited 87/2, 1962, for similar congressional hearings and reports); HCAS, Report of Subcommittee No. 3 on Military Reserve Posture, August 17, 1962; House, Hearings, Defense Appropriations for 1964, Part 1, 88/1, 1963, pp. 134–36. See also Eliot, George Fielding, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy (Harrisburg, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State, pp. 169–77Google Scholar; Derthick, Martha, “Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Politics of the National Guard,” Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Huntington, Samuel P. (New York, 1962), pp. 190–235Google Scholar; and Brogan, D. W. “The United States: Civilian and Military Power,” Soldiers and Governments, ed. Howard, Michael (London, 1957), pp. 167–85Google Scholar.

⁶ The published papers of Senator Arthur Vandenberg and James Forrestal provide a rich storehouse of information and insight into the intricacies and frustrations of Congressional-Executive collaboration in military and foreign policy. Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr, ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Forrestal, James, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Millis, Walter (New York, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁷ The term perspective refers to the subjective conception of what an individual or group considers to be in their best interests as distinguished from what might objectively be best for them.

⁸ Interpreting the American voter has now become a highly complicated and technical enterprise. Yet the most distinguishing feature of the writing in this area is its controversial and inconclusive character. See, for example, Burdick, Eugene and Brodbeck, Arthur, eds., American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, 1959)Google Scholar; Berns, Walter, Essays in the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Storing, Herbert (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; and Campbell, August et al. , The American Voter (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁹ The Federalist, p. 337.

¹⁰ Farrand, Max, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1911–1937), II, 329–30Google Scholar.

¹¹ The Federalist, p. 142.

¹² Ibid., p. 190.

¹³ See Farrand, , The Records of the Federal Convention, IIGoogle Scholar, proceedings of August 6, 17, 18, 21, 23, and September 5, 12, 14, 17. Smith, Louis, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago, 1951), pp. 17–36Google Scholar, discusses the considerations that were weighed by the Philadelphia Convention in its deliberations on the military clauses of the Constitution.

¹⁴ The Federalist, pp. 262–63.

¹⁵ See Smith, loc. cit.

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington cogently argues that the principles of the separation of powers and the federal system of government have failed to provide for civilian control of the military establishment, for the Constitution “mixes political and military functions, interjecting politics into military affairs and military affairs into policies.” See Huntington, , The Soldier and the State, pp. 163–92Google Scholar. Smith, , op. cit., pp. 24–36Google Scholar, suggests a contrary view.

The point of view here differs from both these works in that its major concern is with the response of the United States to strategic policy problems, and not with the derivative problem of civil-military relations. Moreover, the question of civil-military relations is seen as a part of the greater problem of controlling the government which is invested with military powers. Civilian officials may pose a greater threat to a nation's liberties than a standing army.

¹⁷ Farrand, , ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, IIGoogle Scholar, proceedings of August 6, 18, 21, 23, and September 12, 14, 17.

¹⁸ Osgood, Robert E., Limited War (Chicago, 1956), pp. 41–43Google Scholar. An excellent interpretation of the effect of America's historical experiences on the American popular attitude towards war and foreign relations may be found in Niebuhr's, ReinholdThe Irony of American History (New York, 1952), pp. 1–42, 65–88Google Scholar. See also Kennan, George, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (New York, 1952 printing), pp. 55–90Google Scholar; and Morgenthau, Hans, In Defense of the National Interest (New York, 1951), pp. 3–33Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The military ideas of Hamilton are summarized in Earle's, Edward Meade “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Powers,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, Edward Meade (Princeton, 1952), pp. 128–38Google Scholar.

²⁰ The Federalist, p. 165.

²¹ Ibid., p. 266.

²² White, Leonard D., The Jacksonians (New York, 1954), p. 188Google Scholar and The Republicans (New York, 1956), pp. 134–35Google Scholar.

²³ White, , The Jacksonians, p. 189Google Scholar.

²⁴ Huntington, , The Soldier and the State, pp. 226–30Google Scholar. Professor Huntington's book should also be consulted for an overall discussion of the relations of the military establishment to civil authority in the United States from 1789 to 1940, pp. 193–312. Examine also Weigley, Russell F., Towards an American Army (New York, 1962)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 1960)Google Scholar. On p. 204 Janowitz writes: “Despite its increased size, and its elaborate organizational alliances with other civilian leadership groups, the military profession and its elite members are not effectively integrated, on a social basis, with other leadership groups. There is little evidence to support the argument that the military forms an integral part of a compact social group which constitutes the power elite. Rather, in fact, the contrary seems to be the case: namely, the political behavior of the military in the United States is still deeply conditioned by its social isolation.”

²⁶ H. Doc. 227, 86/1, 1959, p. 125.

²⁷ Harold D. Lasswell is the most prominent representative of the “garrison state” thesis, and coined the term itself. Of the articles and books presenting his thesis the following are especially useful: National Security and Individual Freedom (New York, 1950), pp. 23–49Google Scholar; “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (1941), 455–68Google Scholar; “Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State,” China Quarterly, XI (1937), 643–49Google Scholar; and “The Garrison State Hypothesis Today,” in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Huntington, Samuel P. (Glencoe, 1962), pp. 51–70Google Scholar. Perhaps the most extensive attack on Lasswell's position may be found in Huntington, , The Soldier and the State, pp. 346–50Google Scholar. These pages can be read with profit in conjunction with Lasswell's writings in order to provide some balance to the latter's point of view.

²⁸ Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, (New York, 1956), passim.Google Scholar, but especially pp. 198–297. Again see Janowitz, , op. cit., pp. 204–11Google Scholar, as well as Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology (New York, 1961), pp. 47–74Google Scholar, for a contrary view.

²⁹ Cook, Fred J., The Welfare State (New York, 1962), p. 351Google Scholar. For similar extreme view, see Coffin, Tristram, The Passion of the Hawks: Militarism in Modern America (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Cook, , op. cit., p. 350Google Scholar.

³¹ Janowitz, , op. cit., pp. 355–56Google Scholar.

³² Congressional Record, 80/1, 1947, Part 7, 8308.

³³ See Senate Armed Services Committee, National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Committee Print, 85/2, 1959Google Scholar.

³⁴ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The National Security Organization, A Report to Congress, 02, 1949, pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

³⁵ Farewell Address of President Eisenhower, Dwight D., New York Times, 01 18, 1961, p. 22Google Scholar.

³⁶ For an elaboration of this theme, see Anderson, William, “Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 340–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ See, for example, Burnham, James, Congress and The American Tradition (Chicago, 1959)Google Scholar.

³⁸ See, for example, Furniss, Edgar Jr, De Gaulle and The French Army (New York, 1964)Google Scholar and Meisel, James H., The Fall of the Republic (Ann Arbor, 1962)Google Scholar.

³⁹ See Huntington, , Changing Patterns of Military Politics, pp. 261–66Google Scholar, and works cited there, and Johnson, John, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Kaufmann, William W., The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964), pp. 204–250Google Scholar.

⁴¹ H. Rept. 439, 88/1, 1963, p. 70; Bureau, Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1964, p. 16Google Scholar.

⁴² The Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations has prepared a group of readings on this theme. See the committee print entitled Administration of National Security, Selected Papers, 87/2, 1962, especially pp. 8–16, 102–16, 137–48, 153–71, 190–201. Most relevant is the article by Gene M. Lyons on pp. 102–16, reproduced from his “The New Civil-Military Relations,” American Political Science Review, LV (1961), 53–63Google Scholar.

An excellent example of the close working relations that now must be developed between civilian and military bureaucrats and between these groups and elected and appointed political leaders may be seen in the Senate hearings which reviewed the Kennedy administration's test ban agreement with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. All these officials, including interested and knowledgeable people from private and semiprivate organizations, are joined together in a discussion of the implications of the test ban treaty. Public policy on important strategic questions of such far-reaching implications requires that all of these individuals and groups be consulted and their approval elicited before a position can be legitimately and effectively adopted. See Senate, , Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963Google Scholar.

⁴³ Almond, , op. cit., p. 69Google Scholar.