1 On society in days of normalcy as contrasted to plastic society see my article “Revolution and Competition for Power,” Thought, Sep. 1943, pp. 435–6.Google Scholar

2 These statements were made in a lecture delivered March 15, 1946; reported in New York Times, March 20, 1946.Google Scholar

3 Pravda, May 1, 1946,Google Scholar In this order of the day, Stalin repeated the statement he made to a representative of the Associated Press, March 22, 1946, in the midst of the dispute over the presence of Soviet troops in Iran.

4 Information Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy,May 16, 1946.Google Scholar

5 The earliest statements known to the writer are these: Izvestia, 09 8 and 9, 1945Google Scholar; Red Star. 09 14, 1945Google Scholar; and New York Times, 11 18, 1945.Google Scholar

6 Tarle, E., in lzveslia, 03 12, 1946.Google Scholar

7 Zaslavsky, D. in Ogenek; reported in New York Times, 03 9, 1946.Google Scholar

8 Izvestia, 07 5, 1933.Google Scholar

9 Izvestia, 09 18, 1939.Google Scholar

10 Izvestia, 11 28, 29 and 30, and 12 2 and 3, 1939.Google Scholar

11 On the legal aspect of the prosecution of the Nazi leaders for “crimes against peace” see Hula, E., “Punishment for War Crimes,” Social Research, 03, 1946,Google Scholar and Glueck, Sheldon, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, (1946).Google Scholar

12 The terms “peace loving nations” and “freedom loving nations” have become stereotypes used by Soviet authorities to designate the members of the anti-German coalition.

13 In this particular case, lip service to inter-allied unity was rendered by agreeing (at Yalta) to a slight rectification of the boundary in favor of Poland and to the addition of a few democratic leaders to the Moscow sponsored government of Poland.

14 In terms of international law, the transfer of Carpathorussia was impeccable. But a plebiscite which had been announced by Czech authorities never materialized.

15 The promise given, at Potsdam, by the United States and Great Britain, to support the Soviet claim on the northeastern part of Eastern Prussia is not tantamount to the transfer of sovereignty in terms of international law. Nevertheless, in East Prussia (now “the province of Kaliningrad”) as well as in all areas annexed by the Soviets, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Union were held on February 10, 1946.

16 To the number of delegates to the Paris peace conference (July, 1946) the Soviet government appointed the foreign ministers of the three Baltic republics (such ministries were created in accordance with the constitutional amendment of February 1, 1944). But Molotov has not dared to introduce them as representatives of these states. The purpose of the appointment has been probably that of preparing recognition by a few states whose representatives would have got accustomed to see representatives of the Baltic states in Soviet garb.

17 The Soviet claims against Turkey were first formulated in September 1939, when the Turkish minister of foreign affairs visited Moscow. They were repeated in December, 1945, and in February, 1946.

18 With a population ethnically different from the rest of Iran and closely related to that of the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. The name of the latter had been chosen in the long range view of provoking a separatist movement in Iran.

19 The clause reads as follows: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” In the preamble, “suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of peace” is mentioned as one of the main purposes of the new organization.

20 July 30, and December 31, 1941. On the Russo-Polish affairs, see my “The. Russo-Polish Dispute,” Review of Politics, 04, 1944.Google Scholar

21 An agreement as to the maintenance of the status-quo in the Trieste area was signed June 9, 1945.

22 On the changes in the Marxian doctrine, especially on the role of great men, see Timasheff, N. S., The Great Retreat, (1946), pp. 251–2.Google Scholar

23 This was, for instance, one of the major propositions in Lavrev-Mirtev's, P. A.Historical Letters, (1870).Google Scholar

24 On change in the interpretation of internationalism see my Great Retreal, pp. 156 ff.Google Scholar

25 They had to do this twice, first in 1935 (when Stalin signed the mutual assistance pact with Laval), and in 1944, after liberation. But in 1939–41, when Stalin was Hitler's ally, they could go back to anti-militarist propaganda, so essential in Lenin's program.

26 The new doctrine on the subject was formulated in an article by ProfessorLeontieff, A. and others, published in Under the Banner of Marxism (in Russian), 08, 1943.Google Scholar

27 Izvestia, 02 10, 1946.Google Scholar

28 On June 25, 1945, a manifesto was published by the Communist Party of Germany rejecting the Soviet system for present day Germany and asking for a “coalition parliamentary government.”

29 In a report in New York Times (07 23, 1946),Google Scholar W. H. Laurence says that, in Poland, the nationalization of industry is being accomplished with less revolutionary overtones than in Great Britain under the Labor Government. The difference with western democracy is in the field of politics and is manifested in the one-party system, the omnipotence of the secret police and the denial of individual rights (including religious freedom).

30 NeW York Times, 08 2, 1946.Google Scholar

31 After the retreat of the Russian armies, the majority of the Armenians were exterminated by the Turks.

32 The term “national spirit” is used in the text to designate predominant attitudes of an ethnic group fixed as the result of its life history and subject to change with the accumulation of further experience.

33 Only steps to protect the “little Slavic brothers” were supported by a minority of the intelligentsia of the Slavophile trend; in the early twentieth cenury, this group was rather insignificant.

34 After the two Balkan wars (1912–13) the Russian government was resolved not to yield to further German challenges as had been done in 1909. The famous Durnovo memorandum of February, 1914, (cf. Aldanov, M., “P. N. Durnovo, Prophet of War and Revolution,” The Russian Review, vol. II, pp. 31 ff.)Google Scholar was directed against that attitude and advocated agreement with Germany on any terms. This is in the appeasement style, and a policy rejecting such attitude does not make its promoters a “war party.” Cf. my Great Retreat, pp. 58–59.Google Scholar

35 An exception appeared in the course of the Japanese war. But that war was considered by Russian public opinion as an unjust war provoked by the Russian government to divert public opinion from the deplorable state of internal affairs.

36 Cf. my Great Retreat, pp. 166 ff.,Google Scholar and my article “What does this war mean to Russia,” Current Affairs, 05, 1945.Google Scholar

37 The magnificent resistance of the Russian nation to Napoleon's invasion (1812) is known in Russia as the Patriotic War.

38 On the zigzag course of Soviet diplomacy see my paper “Behind the Iron Curtain,” Thought, 06, 1946.Google Scholar

39 The rank of generalissimo (quite unusual in Russia) was probably chosen by Stalin because it had been that of Suvoroff, the greatest among Russia's military leaders. An equation Stalin = Suvoroff was obviously implied.

40 Which implied the preventive military occupation of Eastern Poland and the Baltic states by the Soviets.

41 On the class structure of pre-revolutionary Russia see my article “Vertical Social Mobility in Communist Society,” Amer. Journ. Sociology, 07, 1944.Google Scholar

42 Spending money on lavish festivals was one of the usages of rich merchants belonging to the upper middle class.

43 New York Times, 07 22, 1946.Google Scholar

44 The impact of the life stories of the Soviet leaders on their foreign policy is well recognized in the three excellent articles published by Brooks Atkinson in New York Times, 07 7–9, 1946.Google Scholar

45 A contrary recommendation of Hoover, H., The Problems of Lasting Peace, (1942),Google Scholar according to which peace should be preceded by a long cooling off period, materialized and proved to be disastrous.

46 As on many other occasions, Stalin applied one of Trotsky's ideas—neither war nor peace (invented in the course of the notorious peace negotiations in Brest Litovsk, 1917–18).

47 This record has been carefully checked by Florinsky, M., “The Soviet Union and International Agreements,” Political Science Quarterly, 03, 1946,Google Scholar and found by far not blameless.

48 On the three cornered situation see my Three Worlds: Liberal, Communist and Fascist Society, (1946).Google Scholar

49 They could have stayed in Iran, but the enduring occupation of Azerbaijan did not belong to the Soviet plan. The Soviet leaders rely on ethnic affinity and the misrule of the province by Teheran as forces sufficient to bring it finally under Soviet dominance.