¹ Books in the public choice genre which are most critical of bureaucratic arrangements include Niskanen, William A., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar , also published in condensed and less Americanspecific form as Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? (London, 1973)Google Scholar ; a less theoretically explicit monograph by Niskanen, , Structural Reform of the Federal Budget (Washington, D.C., 1973)Google Scholar ; Tullock, Gordon, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C., 1965)Google Scholar ; Borcherding, Thomas E., ed., Budgets and Bureaucrats: Sources of Government Growth (Durham, N.C., 1977)Google Scholar ; Ostrom, Vincent, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Alabama, 1973)Google Scholar ; and Tullock, Gordon and Wagner, Richard, eds., Deductive Reasoning in the Analysis of Public Policy (Lexington, Mass., 1978)Google Scholar . While these writers share features of a common approach, they often differ in the definition of constructs, inclusion of variables, statement of problems, and conclusions. A succinct overview (with bibliography) is available in Ostrom, Vincent and Ostrom, Elinor, “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration,” Public Administration Review, 31 (03/04, 1971), 203–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar is largely positive in intent, as is Breton's, Albert treatment of bureaucracy in The Economic Theory of Representative Government (Chicago, 1974)Google Scholar, chap. 9, although Downs does allow himself the evaluative observation that bureau expansion has been controlled adequately (absent the election of a bureau-reducing party) by existing institutions (p. 258). Beyond that, Downs recognizes that it is “almost impossible” to determine the value of bureaus, since, “With different values existing in society, bureau outputs worthless to some people may be extremely beneficial to others” (p. 257). These conclusions are very different from Niskanen's.

Criticisms of public choice analysis in public administration include Baker, Keith, “Public Choice Theory: Some Important Assumptions and Public Policy Implications,” in Golembiewski, Robert T., Gibson, Frank and Cornog, Geoffrey Y., eds., Public Administration, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 1976), pp. 42–60Google Scholar ; Golembiewski, Robert T., “A Critique of ‘Democratic Administration’ and Its Supporting Ideation,” American Political Science Review, 71 (12, 1977), 1488–1507Google Scholar (with reply by Ostrom, Vincent, same issue, pp. 1508–1525)Google Scholar ; and DeGregori, Thomas R., “Caveat Emptor: A Critique of the Emerging Paradigm of Public Choice,” Administration and Society, 6 (08, 1974), 205–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Niskanen, , Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p. 8Google Scholar.

³ See e.g., Holden, Matthew Jr “‘Imperialism’ in Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review, 40 (12, 1966), 943–951CrossRefGoogle Scholar . A useful criticism of the parsimonious thrust of public choice analysis in public administration is Thayer, Frederick C., “Productivity: Taylorism Revisited (Round Three),” Public Administration Review, 32 (11/12, 1972), 833–840CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

This essay is not directed at the use of the public choice approach by those whose analyses are more contingent, sensitive to the empirical literature of political science and normatively tentative. In such cases, the approach is useful as a way of organizing data and initiating insights. As examples, see Mitchell, William C., Public Choice in America (Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar ; and, immodestly, Meek, R. L. and Wade, L. L., Democracy in America: A Public Choice Approach (North Scituate, Mass., 1976)Google Scholar.

Niskanen's and Tullock's views are not identical. Tullock argues that bureau expansion “to a very large extent” is occasioned by the fact that “the factor suppliers are permitted to vote” (Borcherding, , Budgets and Bureaucrats, p. 285Google Scholar). And, “We, as the sovereign people, have established a gigantic system of bureaucratic free enterprise and, as is the rule with such a system, we have little control over its activities” (Tullock, , Politics of Bureaucracy, p. 223Google Scholar). Since it is precisely a free enterprise analog which Niskanen seeks to install in the bureaucracy, these two political economists evidently mean different things by the term “free enterprise.”

⁴ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 7Google Scholar, fn. 2.

⁵ Niskanen, , Structural Reform of the Federal Budget Process, p. 6Google Scholar.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 16–25.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 37–44.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 49–53.

⁹ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

¹¹ Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, 1967), pp. 78–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar . It is interesting to note the factors identified by various writers as motivating maximizing behavior. Niskanen includes a concern for the “public interest,” pecuniary interests, reputation, power, patronage, the ease of management, office perquisites, the bureau's output. He does not mention fun, or delight in the game itself, playing in the big leagues, although it is intuitively important to many people. Wilson, James Q., a political scientist, in his widely acclaimed Political Organizations (New York, 1973)Google Scholar has sought to extend the narrow theory of motivation expressed in the public choice literature, but, in the process, fails in his analysis to mention the desire for personal power. I am indebted to my colleague Charles Hardin for bringing this curiosity to my attention.

¹² Niskanen's, argument is most succinctly expressed in Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, pp. 7–27Google Scholar. The more complex argument is presented in Bureancracy and Representative Government, pp. 45–86, and extended in pp. 87–186.

¹³ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 31Google Scholar; Representative Government and Bureaucracy, p. 77.

¹⁴ Lowi, Theodore J., American Government: Incomplete Conquest (Hinsdale, Ill., 1976), p. 462Google Scholar . Arnold, Peri, “Herbert Hoover and the Continuity of American Public Policy,” Public Policy, (1972), 525–544Google Scholar, traces the Department of Commerce's long-time service as a channel of representation for business interests.

¹⁵ U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1972/73, p. 93.

¹⁶ Lowi, , American Government, p. 465.Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, pp. 31–32Google Scholar , Bureaucracy and Representative Government, pp. 138–168. See Matthews, Donald R. and Stimson, James A., Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives (New York, 1975)Google Scholar for the best empirical qualification of this assertion.

¹⁸ This disproportion between tax incidence and benefits, which is vital to Niskanen's entire critique, is based on his analysis of the American system, where roughly 80 percent of taxpayers are in the 28 percent bracket. Thus, the argument may be specific to the American system and not generalizable to other democracies with different fiscal systems. However, his statement in Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? indicates it is intended to be applicable to others, including the United Kingdom, although the grounds for this, absent a discussion of British or other fiscs, are unclear. The same may be said, perhaps with less force, of institutional relationships. Niskanen, in Bureaucracy and Representative Government is concerned with the American Congress and its committee system. In Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, dynamics based on his congressional analysis are extended without discussion to reviewing authorities (“sponsors”) in other polyarchies. Again, no justification is given for this transposition, although the congressional committee system is unique among parliaments. However, Niskanen's proposition concerning the drift of members to particular committees is entirely consistent with the American data. See Rohde, David W. and Shepsle, Kenneth A., “Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process,” American Political Science Review, 68 (09, 1973), 889–905CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Intensity, especially in nonbargaining situations, is exceedingly difficult to deal with via the public choice approach. In Niskanen's analysis, voting by constituents and representatives is a key element and little attention is given to the intensity issue (all participants have equal impact on an outcome regardless of their interest in the question). An important discussion of intensity and its centrality to pluralistic democracy is Dahl's, RobertPreface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956)Google Scholar. As Dahl writes approvingly: “I define the normal American political process as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision.… When I say a group is heard effectively I mean more than the simple fact that it makes a noise; I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members” (p. 145). Niskanen's view that only the median voter (or representative) should be heeded is simply primitive as political theory.

²⁰ Rapoport, Anatol, Strategy and Conscience (New York, 1964), p. 84.Google Scholar.

²¹ Quoted in Lang, D., “Profiles: A Scientist's Advice II,“ New Yorker, 26 01 1963.Google Scholar.

²² Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 32.Google Scholar.

²³ See Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest (New York, 1960)Google Scholar ; and Flathman, Richard, The Public Interest (New York, 1966).Google Scholar.

²⁴ See Zeckhauser, Richard, “Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality,” American Political Science Review, 67 (09, 1973), 934–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; and Sirkin, Gerald, “The Anatomy of Public Choice Failure,” in Leiter, Robert D. and Sirkin, Gerald, eds., Economics of Public Choice (New York, 1975)Google Scholar . Niskanen, acknowledges the Pareto criterion as his normative standard in Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p. 190Google Scholar. In Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, the Pareto measure of the “public interest” is merely implied.

²⁵ Zeckhauser, , “Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality,” p. 946Google Scholar. “… any social choice mechanism that elicits honest preferences automatically leads to non-Pareto-optimum outcomes.” This is so even though all practical mechanisms elicit dishonest preferences.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 38.Google Scholar.

²⁸ Seidman, Harold, Politics, Position and Power (New York, 1970).Google Scholar.

²⁹ Truman, David, The Governmental Process, 2nd ed. (New York, 1971).Google Scholar.

³⁰ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 39.Google Scholar.

³¹ Lowi, Theodore J., The End of Liberalism (New York, 1969).Google Scholar.

³² Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 42Google Scholar; also Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p. 200.

³³ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 43, pp. 43–50; Bureaucracy and Representative Government, pp. 195–218.

³⁶ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 44Google Scholar; Bureaucracy and Representative Government, pp. 201–203.

³⁷ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 45Google Scholar; Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p. 203.

³⁸ An interesting colloquy among members of the House on this subject may be found in Committee Organization in the House, Hearings before the Select Committee on Committees, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. (1973), Vol. 1, part 1, pp. 41–45Google Scholar.

³⁹ Mayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, 1974)Google Scholar . As Morris S. Ogul writes, “A sense of realism demands recognition of the fact that most members [of Congress] are relatively satisfied with the conduct of legislative oversight of the bureaucracy. They feel little stimulus to alter the existing pattern” (“Legislative Oversight of Bureaucracy,” in Ripley, Randall B. and Franklin, Grace A., eds., National Government and Policy in the United States [Itasca, Ill., 1977], p. 219Google Scholar ). Masters, Nicholas A., in “Committee Assignment” in Polsby, Nelson, ed., Congressional Behavior (New York, 1971), pp. 153–171Google Scholar, shows that whether committee membership will help win reelection is a crucial factor in committee assignments.

⁴⁰ Hanna Pitkin, ed., Representation surveys the diverse and complex meanings of representation in democratic theory, with some traditions arguing that acting as a delegate for the median voter (Niskanen's version) is unsatisfactory. The delegate concept has in any case been shown to be flawed empirically. Miller, Warren and Stokes, Donald, “Constituency Influences in Congress,” American Political Science Review, 67 (03, 1963), 45–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar , indicate that constituency influences vary greatly across districts; and Dexter, Lewis A., “The Representative and His District,” in Lowi, Theodore and Ripley, Randall, eds., Legislative Politics U.S.A. (Boston, 1973), pp. 175–184Google Scholar, shows that members of Congress have great latitude in choosing which voices to hear and which interests to advance. If these empirical findings are so at odds with Niskanen's behavioral assertions, how valid can his policy conclusions be? And why are not his behavioral assumptions taken from the best available literature? This is not a matter of an aesthetic preference for simplicity over complexity but of simple accuracy.

⁴¹ Niskanen, , Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, p. 62Google Scholar; Bureaucracy and Representative Government, p. 222.

⁴² Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁴³ See, e.g., Gawthrop, Louis C., Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch: An Analysis of Organizational Change (New York, 1969).Google Scholar.