1 Cf.Welles, Sumner, Where Are We Heading? (New York, 1946), p. 151;Google ScholarByrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), pp. 49–56, 60–6171–75, 98–101, 107–108, 115–117, 159–166;Google ScholarCampbell, John C., The United States in World Affairs (New York, 1947), pp. 13–14;Google ScholarThe Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), Vol. II, pp. 1165–1174, 1451–1458.Google ScholarMosely, Philip E., Face to Face With Russia (Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, 07 1948, pp. 5 and 23;Google ScholarCiechanowski, Jan, Defeat in Victory (New York, 1947);Google ScholarLane, A. B., I Saw Poland Betrayed (New York, 1948).Google ScholarMikolajczyk, Stanislaw, The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York, 1948).Google Scholar

2 Prime Minister in 1920–1921 and in 1939–1941.

3 Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1943–1944.Google Scholar

4 Prime Minister in 1938–1939.

5 Prime Minister in 1941–1942.

6 Prime Minister in 1944.

7 Prime Minister in 1921–1931.

8 Regent of Hungary, March 1920–October 1944.

9 Prime Minister in 1942–1944.

10 Louis Jagiello, King of Hungary and Bohemia, was killed in the fateful battle of Mohács in 1526. Aftercirc; that time both countries were ruled by the Habsburgs. The Habs-burg Empire was essentially a multi national state and was thus greatly affected by the new driving force of the nineteenth century: the ever increasing ambition of the small nationalities to achieve national independence. The compromise of 1867 established the system of the double Monarchy. The kingdom of Hungary was placed by this act on a par with Austria. At the basis of the compromise was the establishment of three common services: foreign policy, finance, and war. A minister common to both countries was appointed to control each of the three ministries, and was made responsible to the delegations, elected annually by the two parliaments of Austria and Hungary. The legislation necessary to give effect to their decisions was passed by each parliament separately.

The compromise of 1867, giving the upper-hand in political matters to the Germans and Hungarians, coupled with the anachronistic political structure of the Monarchy, was the cause of growing dissatisfaction particularly among the Slav nationalities. Jászi claims in his fundamental book on the subject that the dissolution of the Monarchy was not a mechanical but an organic process. Jaszi, Oscar, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929).Google Scholar Cf.Macartney, C. A., National States and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 113–122 and 140–152.Google ScholarSeton-Watson, R. W., The Southern Slay Question and the Habsburg Monarchy (London, 1911).Google Scholar

11 At the same time the U. S. A. had 91,972,266 inhabitants.

12 Of course, the extreme nationalism of the new states still remained as an obstacle. But it would not have been difficult to make their recognition dependent on the maintenance of the Danubian unity.

13 Hertz, F., The Economic Problem of the Danubian States (London, 1947), p. 220.Google Scholar Concerning the general Danubian evolution between the wars see: Seton-Watson, Hugh, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941 (Cambridge, 1945).Google ScholarSouth-Eastern Europe, a Political and Economic Survey prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1939).Google ScholarMacartney, C. A., Hungary and Her Successors (London, 1937).Google ScholarMacartney, C. A., Problems of Danube Basin (Cambridge, 1942).Google ScholarGathorne-Hardy, G. B., A Short History of International Affairs, 1920–1938 (London, 1938).Google ScholarCarr, E. H., International Relations Since the Peace Treaties (London, 1940).Google Scholar

14 During the Peace Conference, chaos and confusion prevailed in the country. King Charles IV of Habsburg surrendered “provisionally” the reins of government on November 13, 1918. A belated endeavor of Count Michel Karolyi's government (October 31, 1918) and later “People's Republic” (November 16, 1918) to find a compromise with the nationalities within a democratic Hungarian state, did not succeed. Károlyi, not having received support from the Allies either, resigned as President of the Republic. The succeeding Communist regime of Béla Kun (March 21, 1919—July 31, 1919) created general fear of the spread of Bolshevism all over Europe. Besides, the Communist Republic, to win popular support, lost no time in organizing an army and overran most of Slovakia (at that time Northern Hungary) occupied by Czechoslovak troops, and fought against the invading Rumanians. All these happenings, particularly the Bolshevist rule and the subsequent reaction, did not make Hungary popular in Western Europe, to say the least. Cf.Jászi, O., Revolution and Counter-Revolution m Hungary (London, 1924).Google Scholar

15 One outstanding chronicler of the Peace Conference, Nicolson, Harold, points out “that the Conference approached its problems in terms, not of the enemy Powers, but of the respective ‘claims’ of the succession and smaller States.” Peacemaking (London, 1933), pp. 116–117).Google Scholar Dealing with the problem of the Territorial Committees, Nicholson shows clearly the drawbacks of this procedure: “The main task of the Committees was not, therefore, to recommend a general territorial settlement, but to pronounce on the particular claims of certain States. … The Committee on Rumanian claims, for instance, thought only in terms of Transylvania, the Committee on Czech claims concentrated upon the southern frontier of Slovakia. If was only too late that it was realized that these two entirely separate Committees had between them imposed upon Hungary a loss of territory and population which, when combined, was very serious indeed. Had the work been concentrated in the hands of a Hungarian Committee, not only would a wider area of frontier have been open for the give and take of discussion, but it would have been seen that the total cessions imposed placed more Magyars under alien rule than was consonant with the doctrine of Self-Determination.”(Ibid. pp. 127–128).

16 Cf. The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, 3 vols, and maps (Budapest, 1920–1922), published by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.Google ScholarThe primary study of the diplomatic history of the Treaty of Trianon is Francis Deak's book: Hungary at the Paris Conference (Columbia University Press, 1942).Google Scholar As for documents concerning the first international activities of the Hungarian state see: Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, published by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vol. I (1919–1920) (Budapest, 1939); Vol. II (1921), (Budapest, 1946).Google Scholar

17 Negotiations took place in Bruck between Teleki and Benes in March 1921, among other things for a territorial revision of the Trianon Treaty as a prelude of collaboration between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Vol. II (Budapest, 1946), pp. 225–231 and 233–241.Google ScholarCf. Deák, , op. cit., p. 342. These negotiations, however, like later semi-official conversations between Hungarian and Czechoslovak statesmen, did not bring any results. In 1926, Hungary made a tentative gesture towards Yugoslavia and, in 1935–1937, there were constant Hungaro-Yugoslav negotiations, which, at least, ameliorated somewhat the relations between the two countries. In the period preceding the Anschluss, Hungary took semiofficial tentative steps in Prague, suggesting the formation of a Hungaro-Austrian-Czecho-slovak collaboration, if possible, union. The leaders of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy administered a stiff rebuff to these openings and claimed not to be afraid of the German expansion. Negotiations in 1938 led to the Bled declaration of the Little Entente, August 23, 1938, recognizing Hungary's right to rearm. This one concrete result was swept away by the events of the following month. Cf. note 22.Google Scholar

18 In 1927, the British Daily Mail and its owner, Lord Rothermere, launched an ardent campaign for revision of the Trianon Treaty. This campaign excited much enthusiasm and was falsely interpreted in Hungary as a British move for revision of Hungary's frontiers. In fact, the leading political factors in Great Britain remained uninterested towards the Hungarian complaints. Concerning the Hungarian revisionist thesis see: SirDonald, Robert, The Tragedy of Trianon (London, 1928);Google ScholarJustice for Hungary by Count Albert Apponyi and others (London, 1928);Google ScholarBethlen, Count Stephen, The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace (London, 1934).Google ScholarCf. Seton-Watson, R. W., Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers (London, 1934).Google Scholar

19 Einzig, J., Bloodiest Invasion, German Economic Penetration Into the Danubian States and the Balkans (London, 1938).Google ScholarWiskemann, E., Prologue to War (New York, 1940).Google ScholarBasch, A., The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere (New York, 1943).Google ScholarJócsik, J., German Economic Influences in the Danube Valley (Budapest, 1946).Google Scholar

20 The Arrow-Cross Party was the Hungarian version of Nazism.

21 The first anti-Semitic legal measure in Hungary was a bill passed in 1921, restricting the admission of Jewish students by the universities to a proportion corresponding to the percentage of Jews in the country. This restriction was later liberally applied but die anti-Jewish demonstrations of students were yearly recurring phenomena, fostered by agents of extremist political parties.

22 Hitler registered these happenings in the following way: “Compte-rendu de l'entretien de Hitler avec Csáky, 16 Janvier, 1939. Le Führer … Malheureusement, sur les relations entre l'a11emagne et la Hongrie, plane une ombre à la quelle il est difficile à un grand Etat comme l'a11emagne, de rester indifférent. … Le Führer a fait le point du développement de la situation en Hongrie avant les décisions de sep-tembre. D'après ses paroles, il a toujours consideré Kánya comme un ennemi de l'allemagne. Au moment même ou il poursuivait avec Horthy, au cours de la visite de ce dernier, des pourparlers sur la collaboration germano-hongroise, à Bled, Kánya n'a pas craint d'aider à nouveau la Petite Entente à se relever et, qui plus est, contre l'Allemagne. Cest pour cette raison que, dans les moments décisifs (le Führer) avait convoqué Imrédy et Sztójay, et les avait conjurés, dans leur propre intérêt, d'exposer devant le monde entier, les exigences de la Hongrie. Quand enfin, on en est venu à le faire, la Pologne a commencé à s'agiter cependant que la Hongrie s'endormait, en se contentant de quelques démarches insignifiantes. L'Allemagne ne s'apprête nullement à se sacrifier pour des amis qui, au moment décisif, la laisse sans appui. … Si la Hongrie, en temps opportun, avait agi de pair avec lui, il aurait pu rire au nez (sic) de Chamberlain.” La Politique Allemande (1937–1943), Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'Allemagne traduit du Russe (Hongrie, Edition Paul Dupont, 1946), p. 74–76. Cf. note 24.Google Scholar

23 Hitler's dislike of Hungary was well-known and has been proved by many documents. He indicated his feelings frankly to the Rumanian Foreign Minister, G. Gafencu, on April 19, 1939. “They say that I want to restore the grandeur of Hungary. Why should I be so ill advised? A greater Hungary might be embarrassing for the Reich. Besides, the Hungarians have always shown us utter ingratitude. They have no regard or sympathy for the German minorities. As for me, I am only interested in my Germans. I said so frankly to Count Csaky … And I have said so without equivocation to the Regent Horthy and Imrédy; the German minorities in Rumania and Yugoslavia do not want to return to Hungary; they are better treated in their new fatherland. And what the German minorities do not want, the Reich does not want either.” Gafencu, G., Last Days of Europe, A Diplomatic journey in 1939 (Yale University Press, 1948), p. 68–69.Google ScholarCf. the German documents published by the Soviet government in 1946, the respective passages of Goebbels Diaries (New York, 1948),Google Scholar and Kordt, Erich, Wahn und Wirk-lichkeit, Die Auszenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart, 1947), pp. 252–253, 377. Cf. notes 22, 24, 36, 54.Google Scholar

24 One of the annexes to the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, provided: “The problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.” On October 1, the Prague government had accepted all the demands made in a Polish ultimatum of September 28, and Polish troops subsequently occupied the Teschen district. Hungary desired to solve the frontier problem by direct negotiations and plebiscite. After protracted negotiations and exchanges of notes, the Hungarian government in a note of October 24, suggested plebiscite in the disputed areas. In the event that the Czechoslovak government did not agree to a plebiscite's being held in the areas under dispute, the Hungarian note proposed international arbitration. The government of Prague having chosen the arbitration of the Axis, Ciano and Ribbentrop arbitrated the Hungarian claims in Vienna, on November 2, 1938. The award was based mainly on ethnographic factors and restored to Hungary 4,605 sq. miles of territory with one million population. For the Hungarian-Czechoslovak exchange of notes and other connected documents see, La Documentation Internationale Politique, Juridique et Eco-nomique (Paris, 1939). Cf. note 22.Google Scholar

25 Following the Russian ultimatum of August 21, 1940, Rumania evacuated Bessarabia and on August 21, in Craiova, agreed in principle with Bulgaria concerning the retrocession of South-Dobrudja. The Rumanian and Hungarian delegations could not agree in the course of the negotiations in Turnu-Severin, August 16–24, and both countries mobilized. The Rumanian government asked for the decision of the Axis Powers. The second Vienna award, of August 30, 1940, restored the northern portion of Transylvania to Hungary, having an area of 16,642 sq. miles with a population of 2,400,000. According to Hungarian censuses of 1910 and 1941, the number of the Hungarians surpassed the Rumanians in this territory, while the Rumanian census of 1930 demonstrated a slight Rumanian majority. After this award, Rumania still retained the major part of Transylvania with a minority of more than a half million Hungarians.

26 Following the establishment of a German Protectorate in Bohemia-Moravia and the proclamation of Slovakian independence, Hungary occupied Ruthenia, on March 15–18, 1939. Thus came into being the long coveted common frontier between Poland and Hungary, through which 140,000 Poles escaped into Hungary a few months later. Ruthenia had a territory of 4,690 sq. miles and 700,000 population, the majority of which was Ruthenian. According to the 1930 Czechoslovak census, the number of the Hungarian minority was 121,000.

27 Hungarian troops occupied the Backa, the triangle of Baranya and two small territories along the river Mura. The size of these areas was 11,475 sq. kilometres with about one million mixed population. More than one-third, that is the relative majority of the population, was Hungarian, and the rest Serb, German, Croatian, Rumanian, and other nationalities.

28 “Hopeless or not, the world has to cry out against the awful fate that threatens the Jews in Hungary … It must count in the score of Hungary that until the Germans took control it was the last refuge in Central Europe for the Jews able to escape from Germany, Austria, Poland and Rumania. Now these helpless people are exposed to the same ruthless policy of deportation and extermination that was carried out in Poland. But as long as they exercised any authority in their own house, the Hungarians tried to protect the Jews.” MrsMcCormicfc, Anne O'Hare, the New York Times, 07 15, 1944.Google ScholarCf. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, tome ler, Les rapports internationaux de la Hongrie avant la Conference de Paris (Budapest, 1947), pp. 91–101. Cf. notes 51, 52, 53, 55.Google Scholar

29 In the course of 1938 and 1939, Hungarian statesmen made clear to the German government that Hungary was not willing to take part in any hostile action against Poland. Prime Minister Telefci told this to Hitler bluntly in his letter of July 24, 1939, the text of which was published in 1946 by the Soviet government. Op. cit., note 22, p. 90.Google Scholar Inaccordance withthis policy, ForeignMinister Count Csáky rejected the telephone demand of Ribbentrop, made in the name of the German government on September 9, 1939, concerning the use of a Hungarian railroad line to attack Southern Poland. The Hungarian government refused to allow the use of the Kassa-Velejte railroad line for the transportation of German troops dispatched to stab the retreating Polish army in the back. Csáky told Ribbentrop clearly and firmly: “The Hungarian government is compelled, to its great regret, to request Germany not to use Hungarian railroad lines for the transportation of German troops against Poland. This government, as we have frequently stated, does not think it compatible with the honor of the Hungarian nation to permit such action.” When approached some days later with a similar demand by the Slovak government which joined Hitler in the aggression against Poland, Count Csáky was even more outspoken in his reply, warning the Slovaks that such a move would be considered as an act of aggression. In the meantime the Hungarian authorities ordered the mining of all the tunnels and bridges giving access to the line of Kassa-Velejte, as a precautionary measure against any German attempt.

30 The Hungarian Minister to Washington, J. Pelényi, resigned on this occasion.

31 It is a curious coincidence that at present Soviet Russia keeps an army in Hungary to assure the lines of communications with Russian troops stationed in Austria. This, however, was authorized by Article 22 of die peace treaty of February 10, 1947.

32 One of the best English experts on Danubian Europe summed up Telefci's activities in the following way: “Teleki had the terrible task of steering Hungary through the first two years of the Second World War. Although Central Europe was now completely dominated by Germany, and although Hungary had received two pieces of territory from her neighbors as a German present, Teleki fought stubbornly to retain some measure of independence for his country. His efforts compare favourably with those of Roumania in the same period. When resistance was no longer possible and his own Regent and General Staff betrayed him, Teleki took the classical way out.” Seton-Watson, Hugh, op. cit., p. 196.Google Scholar

33 Cf. note 27.

34 The British note was handed over to Bardossy on November 29, 1941, by the American Minister to Hungary. It reads as follows:

“The Hungarian Government has for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on the territory of the USSR, ally of Great Britain, in closest collaboration with Germany, thus participating in the general European war and making substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom finds it necessary to inform the Hungarian Government that unless by December five the Hungarian Government has ceased military operations and has withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries.”

35 It is not uninteresting to see how Hungary entered the war with the English-speaking powers. When the American Minister to Hungary, Mr. Pell, representing the British interests in Hungary, handed over on November 29, 1941, the above-cited British ultimatum, Bárdossy's reply according to his own record of his conversation, runs as follows: “I said: Your information comes as a surprise. I never believed it would go that far, nor that England could help the Soviet only by declaring war on us … There are no Hungarian forces fighting in Russia now. We have withdrawn our forces from the front. The Hungarian Government is not participating in any direct military action. … Most of the Hungarians placed their faith in English fairness to judge the present situation.They will feel hurt by such a decision of the British government. …

“Minister Pell stated that he realized the correctness and justice of our attitude. Then Counselor Travers added that the American Legation tried every means to prevent a declaration of war by England on Hungary after the first rumors of such a decision. Minister Pell spoke again and said that he considered the decision of the English Government as his own defeat …”

Some days later (December 11, 1941), Hitler declared in the Reichstag that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States. As a subterfuge, the Hungarian Government simply stated its solidarity with the Axis.- According to the files of die Foreign Ministry, in answer to die question of Minister Pell “Does it mean war?” Bár-dossy replied with a categorical “No.”

The Italian Minister and the German chargé d'affaires at Budapest, called the next day on Bárdossy, urging the Hungarian Government to declare war on the United States. So the Hungarian declaration of war was duly dispatched, too. This declaration of war, together widi those of the other satellites, was rightly described later in a note of the American Government, as made “under duress, contrary to the will of the peoples in question.” Similarly President Roosevelt stated in his Message to Congress: (June2, 1942).

“The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania have declared war against the United States. I realize that the three governments took this action not upon their own initiative or in response to the wishes of their own peoples, but as the instruments of Hitler.” On the proposition of President Roosevelt, the Congress declared “that a state of war exists between the Government of Hungary and the Government and the people of the United States …“ Cf. Hull, Cordell, op. cit., II, p. 1114. pp. 1175–1176.Google Scholar

The reluctance of Hungary and the other satellites to declare war on the United States reflects die fact that die free will of small nations is very relative in a world conflagration.

36 This was probably the reason why Goebbels gave expression to the true Nazi feeling towards Hungary in the May 5, 1942 entry in his Diaries: “I have received a report about the fate of the German minorities in Hungary. The Hungarians still dare to commit acts of effrontery toward us that go far beyond what we can stand for. I suppose, however, we must keep quiet for the moment. We are dependent upon them. But everyone of us is yearning for the moment when we can really talk turkey to the Hungarians (wenn wir einmal Fraktur reden koennen).”(p. 112).

37 The leader of the Small-landholder Party, T. Eckhardt, left Hungary in 1941 for the United States. He was deprived of his Hungarian citizenship by the Bárdossy government.

38 “It is a strange fact that Hungary, where reaction and terror were introduced earlier, and where people had fewer rights and liberties, retained longer than any other Eastern European State remnants of liberalism. Even after die outbreak of war with Russia newspapers such as the liberal Magyar Nemzet published articles criticizing the New Order; the Liberal Leader Rassay and the Social Democrats attacked the government in Parliament; and members of the former “March Front” openly discussed die formation of a Popular Front. One of these intellectuals even wrote an article declaring that Hungary in 1941 needed political liberty and national independence, and that these could be obtained only by a revolution of peasants and workers. … All of this is of little importance to the war effort of the United Nations, but it shows that the rulers of Hungary, who had reduced to the minimum their contribution to the Axis, are not “Quislings” in the same sense as Antonescu, Pavelic or even Boris.” Seton-Watson, Hugh, op. cit., p. 197.Google Scholar Cf.Montgomery, J. F., Hungary the Unwilling Satellite (New York, 1947).Google Scholar

39 One of the leaders of the pro-Polish organization was Rev. B. Varga, Chairman of the National Assembly in 1946–1947, now in exile in the U.S.A. Cf. Les Refugies Polonais en Hongrie pendant la Guerre (Budapest, 1946).Google Scholar

40 Hungarian hospitality provided them with all comforts. They were lodged in hotels on the shores of Lake Balaton, the playground of Hungary. They had free movement all over the country. Some of them were even helped to escape to unoccupied France. The Hungarian government refused to surrender them to the Germans in spite of the repeated protests of the Nazis. Cf. Refuge en Hongrie 1941–1945 (Paris, 1946), published by the escaped French war prisoners.Google Scholar

41 Cf. Hungarian Economic Resistance Against German Penetration (Budapest 1946). This booklet describes die principal means and results of economic resistance.Google Scholar

42 The hoard was subsequently seized by the Russians, and a fraction of it lent to die Hungarian government to feed the starving population of Budapest in 1945.

43 A typical exponent of this school of thought was L. Bárdossy, first Minister of Hungary to Rumania, in 1941 Foreign Minister and, after the suicide of Count Paul Teleld, Prime Minister.

44 Cf. note 29.

45 Under the German occupation both of them were imprisoned by the Gestapo. Szentmiklóssy met a cruel death at Dachau in the spring of 1945. Szegedy-Maszák was liberated there by American troops. He became Hungarian Minister to the U.S.A. in January, 1946, and resigned in June, 1947, when the Hungarian government became completely Communist-dominated.

46 The disastrous defeat at Voronesh reduced Hungarian military help to Germany to a badly equipped token-occupation force.

47 The Germans strongly criticized this statement in their memorandum handed by Hitler to Horthy on April 17, 1943. Cf. note 54.

48 The article of the New York Times, September 30, 1943, is not accurate in this respect.

49 The story of these negotiations, published in the city edition of the New York Times on February 5, 1945, by C. L. Sulzberger, is erroneous in some of its particulars and even in its main points. Mr. Sulzberger states that: “An armistice between the Hungarian Government's envoys and the United States was secretly signed on a motor-boat in the Bosporus at midnight of September 9, 1943. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Hugh Knatchbull Hughessen, acted as the Allied Plenipotentiary and an official of the Budapest Foreign Office was sent especially on a clandestine mission to conclude this armistice.” The truth is that in this period of the war the military situation did not make possible Tthe conclusion of anarmistice treaty with Hungary.

50 The negotiations conducted at Stockholm are explained by the former Hungarian Minister to Sweden, Ullein-Reviczky, A., Guerre Allemande Paix Russe: le Drame Hon-groit (Neuchatel, 1947.)Google Scholar

51 The passage of the note relevant here ran as follows:

“Die königliche ungarische Regierung wird zwecks baldiger und vollständiger Lösung der Judenfrage in Europa gebeten auch ihrerseits in Ungarn entsprechende Massnahmen baldmöglichst in die Wege zu leiten. Die bisherigen Ansätze in dieser Richtung werden deutscherseits begrüsst. Sie sind allerdings noch weit davon entfernt, mit der Entwicklung in Deutschland und anderen Staaten Europas Schritt zu halten. Alle Umstände sprechen dafür diese Frage noch während des Krieges zu einem endgültigen Abschluss zu bringen. Es handelt sich dabei nicht um ein deutsches, sondern um ein gesamteuro-päisches Interesse. …”

“Nach deutscher Auffassung waren daher folgende Massnahmen in Ungarn zweck-mässigerweise zu ergreifen:

1) Die Juden auf dem Wege fortschreitender Gesetzgebung unterschiedslos aus dem kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Leben auszuschalten.

2) Durch sofortige Kennzeichnung aller Juden die entsprechenden Regierungsmass-nahmen zu erleichtern und dem Volk die Möglichkeit zu klarer Distanzierung zu verschaffen.

3) Die Aussiedlung und den Abtransport nach dem Osten vorzubereiten.”

52 According to Sztójay's report, Luther added details about die “settling” of the Jews of other countries. He warmly praised Slovakia, where the last fraction of die Jews was being deported. He referred to die considerable number of Jews deported from Rumania. He extolled the severe measures taken by Bulgaria, as for instance the compulsory wearing of the yellow star badge. Almost no Jews were left in Yugoslavia. Only “ difficulties in transportation prevented Croatia from executing die deportation laws totally. The Laval government of unoccupied France was anxious to secure German help for die deportation of their Jews. They were just being extradited across the demarcation line, Luther said.

53 A Hungarian publicist, Lévai, J., collected and published in four volumes material concerning the fate of Hungarian Jewry. One of these volumes, die Grey Book, contains die history of die German interventions and Sztójay's respective reports. These volumes were published in Hungarian (Budapest, 1946): Black Book on the Sufferings of Hungarian Jews, Grey Book on the Rescue Action for Hungarian Jews, White Book on the International Rescue Actions, History of the Ghetto of Budapest.Google Scholar

54 The German memorandum accused die Hungarian Cabinet of failing to support die war, Prime Minister von Kállay of having lost faidi in an Axis victory, and Professor Szent-Györgyi of having conducted negotiations in Constantinople with the western powers, and of boasting there that he was protecting 70,000 Jewish refugees in Hungary. The memorandum then listed a number of threats to force Hungary into a more active participation in the Axis struggle.

55 The April 18, 1943, entry in the Goebbels Diaries summarized Horth's visit in the following way: “Horthy's visit on the Obersalzberg has come to an end. On the first day it was conducted in a very heated atmosphere. The Fuehrer minced no words and especially pointed out to Horthy how wrong were his policies both in general and especially with reference to the conduct of the war and the question of the Jews. The Fuehrer was very outspoken. He charged the Hungarians with having tried to contact the enemy via Spain and Portugal. Horthy denied this but that did not help him very much.

“On the second day the conversations were more normal. A communiqué was drafted similar to the one on Antonescu's visit. On the insistence of the Hungarians, however, the passage about our fight against the western plutocracies was eliminated. I suppose the Hungarians believe that in the house of a man who has been hanged one should not talk about rope!”(p. 335.)

In the following period the Goebbels Diaries reflect the growing German anger against Hungary: “Horthy heard very little in the way of pleasant things from the Fuehrer. But he does not seem to have taken this very much to heart, for he has so far fulfilled none of the promises he made on the Obersalzberg.” (May 7, 1943, p. 352.)

“The Jewish question is being solved least satisfactorily by the Hungarians. The Hungarian state is permeated with Jews, and the Fuehrer did not succeed during his talk with Horthy in convincing the latter of the necessity of more stringent measures. Horthy himself, of course, is badly tangled with the Jews through his family, and will continue to resist every effort to tackle the Jewish problem aggressively. He gave a number of humanitarian counterarguments which of course don't apply at all to this situation. You just cannot talk humanitarianism when dealing with Jews. Jews must be defeated. The Fuehrer made every effort to win Horthy over to his viewpoint but succeeded only partially.“(May 8, 1943, p. 357.)

56 The text of the proclamation has been published by Montgomery, J. F., op. cit., p. 236–238.Google Scholar